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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

LEROY WATERMAN

University of Michigan

NEVER were man's evident potentialities so amazing. Never was his continued existence on this planet so precarious. Never was his fate so manifestly in his own hands to make or to mar. All of this has come about as a breath-taking illumination born out of the ghastly wreckage and horror of World War II. The result is a new world concept as startlingly and radically different from what preceded as was the round globe from a flat earth, and much more far-reaching and significant in its human consequences.

A symbolic preview first appeared above the horizon at the Golden Gate, thrown on a backdrop of battle clouds that still darkened two hemispheres. Die-hard isolationists may have believed it to be merely a mirage or at most a threatened menace to be shunned at all costs. The atomic bomb has since quite surely blown to bits any remaining basis for future security in national isolation, and has made the once vague dream of a united, coöperative, and kindly world the sanest hope as well as the last chance of man.

Everything starts from the now compelling thesis, that mankind cannot hope to survive a future war employing nuclear forces. The nations must therefore be prepared to exert their combined power to preserve the peace of the world. It is at the same time equally clear that force alone can never accomplish the desired end. On the contrary, there must be continuous and mutual good will among the Great Powers as well as among all the nations. They must treat each other with justice. They must exercise kindness and be prepared to deny themselves in order that the less fortunate may not suffer unmitigated and embittering hardships. This entails sympathy and understanding and at least the tacit recognition that the highest good of every nation is to be found in the welfare of all. This gospel has now proclaimed itself, unchallenged, as the one way of man's salvation on earth, since failure to meet these basic conditions might precipitate fresh global strife that would threaten the ultimate ruin of civilization.

The measures thus far taken to meet this fateful situation have been

formulated as if this were a purely political problem to be dealt with by statecraft alone. The inadequacy of this assumption is that governments can prescribe penalties for what should be avoided but can furnish no inner motivation for positive accomplishment. Moreover, the present world outlook qualifies in all essentials as embodying the category of religion. In the first place, it proclaims specific conditions for man's salvation or ruin, here and now. No religion ever claimed more for mankind. Secondly, its ethical requirements of political and economic justice, universal coöperation and good will, and the necessity of some self-denial and self-sacrifice for others are among the highest known in religion. Thirdly, the category of religion applies because the over-all aim of religion in all ages, at all levels of civilization, can be summarized in the word *salvation*.

The content of the term necessarily varies according to the horizon of ideas of those who proclaim it. If life is looked upon as utterly bad, salvation will mean escape from existence.¹ If this life is regarded as entirely satisfactory to those concerned, salvation will consist of more of the same.² If the life of the senses is considered illusory because of its fleeting character, salvation may be provided in the metaphysical.³ Whatever is regarded as the ideal state of well-being, whether positive or negative, will give the content of the idea of salvation at any given time, and it will change as the outlook of its advocates changes.

This concept is, however, never confined to the individual nor is its content ever determined by him alone. On the contrary, because of the social nature of personality and the need for coöperation in the struggle for existence, religion is always social in character; and as a result the ideal of salvation can never be dissociated from a group relationship; and in ancient times, preceding the rise of individualism, the individual found his well-being and his highest good in the welfare of the group of which he was a part. This principle was thus regnant in all the earliest forms of family, clan, tribal, and national life.

The content of salvation on the national level can perhaps best be assessed in the case of ancient Israel, as recorded in the Bible. Israel's ideal of salvation was always to be summed up in terms of outward national prosperity. Any diminution of that condition, whether due to failure of crops, epidemics of disease, or defeat by enemies, was looked upon as caused by the anger of the national god. It was believed that whenever any of these untoward events happened, his anger could be appeased and his favor restored by appropriate gifts and offerings.

¹ As in primary Buddhism.

² As in early Vedic religion.

³ As in certain forms of Brahmanism.

Within the horizon of this religious philosophy, Israel and its contemporaries lived out their national existence. Every nation was the chosen people of its god. Each had its own god as a champion against all other nations and gods.

Such a philosophy was a natural steppingstone in the development of national consciousness, patriotism, and religious loyalty. It marked a definite advance over the earlier tribal stage. At the same time, it had the grave defect of aligning religion in support of the natural competition of economic forces in the life struggle, which denied all human rights beyond the national border. It thus led to savage, devastating wars that eventually destroyed both Israel and its competitors. Nevertheless this concept of salvation remains the dominant view throughout the Old Testament, as well as that of the first followers of the Nazarene in the New,⁴ while, as will be noted more specifically, the highest concept of religion in the New Testament is the reign of God in the lives of men here and now. All of which emphasizes the practical nature of religion and its predominant focus upon the life of man on the earth. There can therefore be no doubt about the genuineness of the religious aspect of the present international outlook. And if civilization is to persist, it is imperative that an adequate form of religion become available to meet the new demand.

Moreover, religion is essential to man's life, since whatever else it at times assumes to do specifically, the one thing that it always aims at, that no other institution or function of man ever makes its chief business, is to preserve the values of personality,⁵ and without the recognized and respected operation of this function, no form of society can long endure, as recent history overwhelmingly illustrates.

In the process of social organization in earlier human times, beginning with the family, each social group had its own tutelary deity; and as these units combined into larger entities, culminating in the nation, probably in every instance some form of religion of the coalescing units became the religion of the larger group. This procedure was both easy and natural since in all the group stages thus far, the same governing principles held throughout. There were the same rules of coöperation and mutual support inside the organization and the same attitude of aloofness, hostility, and disregard of human rights toward all beyond. But when the present stage is reached, which includes all mankind, the earlier philosophy completely fails.

First, there is no basis left for limiting coöperation and good will, since all men are now included; and second, no opportunity remains for

⁴ Cf. Matt. 20: 20 f.; Acts 1: 6; A. T. Olmstead's *Jesus*, pp. 252-255.

⁵ L. Waterman, *Religion Faces the World Crisis*, p. 8.

rivalry and strife with outsiders because these no longer exist. In the past, several historical religions have foreseen this possibility, though all existing faiths are still operative in a relatively limited human area.

In the present world emergency, it would be but natural to look for the needed assistance from among the so-called world religions. Islam can lay claim to universal authority on the basis of its one and only God, but its sharp antithesis between the faithful and the infidels, coupled with its militant tradition of propagating the faith by force, reduces its prospect as a world faith to the level of a totalitarian regime. Buddhism early passed beyond the land of its nativity, and has been able to adapt itself to diverse civilizations, but its monastic order plus its pessimistic view of this life can offer no encouragement for a united world. Of the other great faiths, neither Confucianism nor Hinduism has ever shown the capacity for adaptation to peoples beyond the lands of its birth.

It would be in accord with the traditional contempt of one religion for another, based on the assumption of each that it possesses the whole truth, to find Christians assuming that, though all other faiths should fall short in this crisis, Christianity could without doubt qualify.

It is too easily overlooked that Christianity is so hopelessly divided in doctrine that it is impossible for it to act as a unity for any purpose whatever. Moreover, far more of its energies have thus far been spent in internal rivalries over religious theory than have been used to save or improve the world. The salvation it has traditionally proclaimed has been primarily for the hereafter, with only an incidental interest in this life. Its conditions of salvation have never been based upon or centred in those specific items of conduct, upon which it has now become evident that the salvation of humanity actually depends. It bases its authority upon the Bible, a compendium of highly diversified literature which took more than ten centuries of developing human culture to produce. This literature is traditionally accepted as the Word of God, but Christianity knows no generally accepted principle of discrimination for determining present authority, where the dominant aims of various parts of the Bible stand in open antithesis. The religion therefore suffers an insidious and deadly neutralizing effect of claiming as its basis widely divergent and sometimes sharply opposed religious principles and teachings.

In view of the present world problem, the major aims of the Bible deserve reëxamination and appraisal in the light of the requirements that are now recognized to be essential to save mankind.

As already indicated, the Old Testament is centred upon the nation Israel, and while it lasted, salvation meant the preservation and outward prosperity of the nation to the entire disregard or detriment of all who came in its way. It proved to be a self-liquidating philosophy because of

its nationalistic defects when applied internationally, since it recognized no law but brute force beyond the national boundary.

Nevertheless, the story of Israel's national epic is stated in the Old Testament as having complete divine approval. It is recognized as a part of divine revelation, from which all sorts of valid and useful lessons can supposedly be drawn. At the same time we know that too long indulgence in that kind of philosophy will inevitably lead to the end of civilization and the destruction of mankind. It has, however, never been formally repudiated by organized religion, since it is a part of Holy Writ. It has further been legitimized because it is asserted that Israel was God's chosen people.

It is admitted that their nation perished because of wickedness, but a link of connection with the period following is made through those Jews who, in captivity, were persuaded that their God had not failed them as they at first supposed, but had rather destroyed the nation for its sins, and who as a result took courage and renewed their faith in God as trustworthy and of such great power that he could be relied on at all times. This became the religion of individual Jewish refugees, but as such they were without any stable form of social organization. In their blind groping for this it was very natural that they should fall back upon the most reliable form they had ever known, namely, the concept of a nation. Two things would be needed to make it a reality for them: first, that they be permitted to return to their native land, and second, that they be allowed to establish a government of their own.

In 538 B.C., Cyrus the Great gave permission to the uprooted peoples of his realm to return to their former habitats and restore their native faiths.⁶ The Jews in exile looked upon this event as a special divine providence and a confirmation of their national hopes and aspirations, as well as the assurance that God had taken back his people. Thus nationalism in religion and the Jews as his chosen people were reinstated, not indeed as a reality but as an ideal in which they saw their future salvation, their highest good. This was Judaism.

Had they realized their goal within a reasonable time, there is every indication that we should have seen little more than a repetition of earlier Israelitish nationalism. Actually this result never took place, and prolonged frustration coupled with oppression and ruthless exploitation of the Jews made any normal idea of nationalism impossible. The ideal had to be given up as impractical and impossible under the circumstances, and likewise their faith in God, or else support for the ideal had to be based on the unlimited supernatural powers of God.

⁶G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, 6th ed., p. 484; A. T. Olmstead, *History of Palestine and Syria*, pp. 555 f.

In desperation apocalyptic thought took this step, and when this had been done, there were theoretically no limits to what might be expected from God, and supernationalism was born. Whatever was contrary to national ambition was assumed to be against God's will. Whoever thwarted national realization was the enemy of God, whom God could legitimately be called upon to destroy.

The insignificance of the Jewish community, when compared with the great contemporary empires, further required that the advocates of Jewish nationalism should become totalitarian in outlook and think in terms of ruthless world domination or be forced to give up the minimum hope of their own national autonomy. This ideology now finds classic expression in the gory descriptions of vast human slaughter in late apocalyptic literature.⁷ Had these dreams materialized, their fulfillment could have claimed no superiority in principle over the worst totalitarianism of modern times, since it claimed preëminence in race and religion over the rest of the world as well as the divine sanction to destroy all who came in its way.

As it turned out, this Jewish supernationalism proved relatively harmless internationally, since the Jews were always powerless to put it into effect. Here again its legitimacy has never been formally repudiated by religion, and it too stands authenticated in the Scriptures as a legitimate part of divine revelation, although today we know, in the light of recent threatened global events, that its realization would have been nothing short of a world calamity.

The ideological struggle over nationalism was to take one other turn in Judaism. The vast supernatural powers claimed by apocalyptic thought could alone give no sound or enduring support to national aspirations, and it actually consisted of little more than a spiraling inflation in the currency of religious faith, that could only end in spiritual bankruptcy. Accordingly, as the national need for help became more and more acute and still no help came, faith in nationalism as such and hope of any kind of kingdom on earth inevitably turned to despair and pessimism. For the thoughtful, faith in God was with difficulty maintained by utilizing the newly acquired doctrine of immortality⁸ and by this means projecting the idea of the hoped for kingdom into the next world—a kingdom of heaven ruled over by God in the realm of the spirit.⁹

The first two phases of nationalism as thus sketched cover the Old Testament. Any opposing views now included are so arranged that outwardly they too support the nationalist thesis. The literature of extreme

⁷ E.g., Joel 3; Ezek. 36-39; Isa. 63.

⁸ Cf. Dan. 12:2.

⁹ Cf. R. H. Charles, *Religious Development between the Old and New Testaments*, chap. 2.

apocalyptic, ending in pessimism about this life plus an otherworldly philosophy, was never generally accepted by orthodox Judaism and hence was never canonized, and thus remained apocryphal to the majority of Jews. However, the apocryphal writings of the Jews and especially apocalyptic exerted a major influence upon the early Christians. On the other hand, nationalism continued to function among the Jews through the revived hope of a personal messiah.¹⁰ The first Jewish disciples of Christ based their faith in him as the fulfillment of the Jewish Messiah concept.¹¹ As they were not assured of that faith until after the crucifixion, in order to have any content to his Messiahship, they were obliged to add the doctrine of his speedy return to earth.¹² The New Testament in the gospels and the epistles frankly stakes its case on the Second Coming in that generation.¹³

The passing of the first Christians, coupled with the fall of Jerusalem, provided a test case against the truth of both doctrines, for if the Messiah failed to return to save Jerusalem from the Romans, the last hope of a kingdom of the Jews in Palestine vanished. No second coming after that event could ever fulfill the original requirements of that doctrine, and conversely if Christ was not to return, there was no ground on which the Jews could accept him as the Messiah. His Jewish followers were gradually liquidated, and the Jews as a whole quite logically rejected him.

To the gentile Christians, the terms *messiah* and *second coming* were little more than empty words, without background or meaning. Hence, the fact was not sensed that historically, these terms had lost the possibility of fulfillment by reason of the lapse of time. Accordingly, these two doctrines never suffered formal repudiation, but on the contrary, every effort was made to save them by projecting their realization into the future, until the attempt to set specific dates finally broke down of its own weight. The next step was to explain away the literal meaning. Still the reputation of Christ in the New Testament is made to depend on the genuineness of these two doctrines.¹⁴

After the fall of Jerusalem and the consequent failure of the hope of a temporal kingdom, and likewise of the messianic functions of Jesus, Christian thought fell back upon the pessimistic view of the world of Jewish apocalyptic. The return of Jesus could then only be conceived for the purpose of bringing the world to an end by meting out the just deserts of both the righteous and the wicked at a final assize.

This view of the world and its outcome was not unnatural to a

¹⁰ Cf. *Psalms of Solomon* 17: 23-30.

¹¹ Olmstead, *ibid.*, p. 253.

¹² Olmstead, *ibid.*, p. 252.

¹³ Matt. 24: 3-34; I Thess. 4: 13-17.

¹⁴ Mark 13: 14-30; Luke 21: 20-32.

struggling, persecuted, minor faith, but when Christianity had become the dominant religion of the Roman empire, with good prospect of winning the entire world, the incongruity of Christ's expected return to destroy Christian civilization was clearly apparent.

The doctrine of the speedy, supernatural end of the world has never been effectively renounced, so that a truer, more hopeful outlook could be introduced, based on better biblical foundations. Christianity has, therefore, gone on living from hand to mouth, theoretically waiting for the imminent end of the world and hence logically unable to participate in, much less lead in, any far-reaching plan for world betterment, its only avowed mission being the saving of men's souls for a life to come.

The irony of this commitment is that this task has never been taken seriously by the churches, but at most as a rather minor avocation. Thus the main energies of the churches have been applied to the activity of self-perpetuation and the achievement of correctness in doctrine, and this latter exercise, being without any definite goal within the realm of human experience, could only lead to divisiveness and the consequent splitting of the Christian following into an ever-increasing multitude of competing sects.

The ultimate historical authority of Christianity is necessarily the Bible, but that authority as customarily used takes for granted certain concepts and aims proven to be inadequate, detrimental, or mistaken.

Nationalism in religion as pictured in the Old Testament is now known to be a menace to man's continued existence on the earth. The traditional supposition that Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be the Messiah and hence stood for the fulfillment of that ideal would, if proven true, constitute his certain condemnation. The later transfer of the Messiah concept to the realm of theology and the corresponding projection of the kingdom of God ideal into the next world, together with the claim that Christians are God's chosen people, offer no assurance that such a religion would ever be able to save human society. As a matter of fact, Christianity has never proposed that as a goal.

On the other hand, the assumption that a religion unable to save society is at the same time capable of saving individuals to participate in another sphere of existence is contrary to reason and against the available evidence of experience.

Roman Catholicism in the land of its nativity and the centre of its power, as the official religion of the country, was unable to keep Italy from reverting to a barbarism that might well have shocked ancient Rome, and the church blessed the reversion, at least in its earlier phases.

Protestantism, officially dominant in the land of Luther since its origin in the Middle Ages, was more concerned with preserving its own prerogatives than with safeguarding the dignity of human personality, and it

proved powerless to prevent the German nation from falling to a subhuman barbarism that to date represents the nadir of human degradation and which we now know came within an all too narrow margin of submerging the world.

Greek Christianity became the prevailing religion of all the Russias, but made itself the ally and defender of an absolute despotism, that finally led to its loss of interest in the welfare of the masses of its adherents, and to its worldly undoing. By their fruits you shall know them, and according to the evidence such religion as a saving force declares its own bankruptcy.

The efforts of enlightened Christian leadership to utilize the results of historical criticism, in order to make available the higher moral teachings of the Bible, have resulted in no new brand of religion and no marked change in the ethical standards of society. The same negative results may be expected with every attempt at human betterment, based on the authority of Christ, as long as the outgrown and discredited ideals of the Bible are allowed to stand unchallenged as coördinate sources of present religious authority.

A still more deplorable result, because it affects future leadership in religion, usually accrues in the field of religious education, when the Bible is made the material of instruction. The assumption that the Bible contains the ultimate springs of our religious heritage is warranted, but there are no moral wellsprings in those ideals discredited by the course of events, or by the obvious requirements for promoting larger human welfare.

If the student looks into the Bible far enough to grasp the main aims of the Jews and earliest Christians, their manifestly limited ethic cannot fail to affect any higher teaching now found in that framework, as long as both are allowed the same validity.

Or the attempt may be made to teach the higher precepts of the Bible by disregarding the life setting of which they were a part. Such truths are like plants without roots, difficult to keep alive, very difficult to transplant into Christian soil, and well-nigh incapable of fruitage that can change the current Christian pattern. In other words, under such handicaps, no higher dynamic may henceforth be expected from present organized Christianity than is now operative, and that to date has not been sufficient to alter basically any major trend of civilization. As a consequence, in our time civilization itself has been brought to the very brink of the abyss by forces at work in Christian civilization.

The main question is not, Is the Bible a religious book? Rather, What kind of world will its combined aims and ideas as recorded produce if followed?

The basic question is not whether the Old Testament is fulfilled in the New. For if Old Testament prophecy of a Messiah had been fulfilled, the

Jews would have become the ruthless rulers of the world¹⁵ and Christ would have been the chief instrument to accomplish that end. The early Christians had no right to insist that Jesus was the Messiah to whom the Jews looked forward, and then, because of the course of events, so to make over the concept that no Jew could so much as recognize and much less accept it and still remain a Jew.

The vital question is, Does the Bible contain any higher, truer concept of religion than that accepted by Jews and Christians thus far? For if not, then men must look elsewhere for a religion adequate to save humanity. A more precise question is, Does the Bible contain provisions for a religion that is contrary to the prevailing aims and ideals so far expressed by Judaism and Christianity?

We have seen that the Jews looked for a restored nation, as the chosen people of God. We know that before the fall of Israel as a nation, from the eighth century B.C. onward, the great prophets denounced nationalism in religion by denying that there was such a thing as a chosen people,¹⁶ and by insisting that nothing else than economic justice for all, together with sympathetic understanding, could preserve the nation.¹⁷

When the nation had fallen and this school of religious thought continued, it is noteworthy that it gave no encouragement to the efforts to resuscitate the nation. On the contrary, the greatest prophet of the exile¹⁸ conceived of Israel as a servant, chosen to carry the knowledge of the one universal and ethical God to all the rest of mankind. There was no place in that picture for a conquering Messiah king and no room for conflicting national ambitions.

In the first century of our era, Jesus of Nazareth sought to perfect, implement, and apply this religion to the life of mankind. He taught that the reign of God must be within human personality here and now. Its genuineness in the life of the individual was to be tested by the application of the two great commandments of love to God and neighbor, and the Golden Rule.¹⁹ He founded no organization and established no ritualism. He set about teaching for not quite a year and four months,²⁰ when he was put to death through intrigue and misunderstanding. His peasant disciples failed to sense his message and after his death decided that he was the Messiah, foretold in nationalistic Old Testament prophecy, and through St. Paul and his appeal to the gentiles, the Christian churches that we know came into being.

¹⁵ Cf. Psalm 2.

¹⁶ Amos 9: 7.

¹⁷ *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXIV (1945), pp. 297-302.

¹⁸ Isa. 40-55.

¹⁹ *JBL*, LXIV (1945), p. 306.

²⁰ To be precise, 475 days; cf. Olmstead's *Jesus*, pp. 280-281.

The religion championed by Jesus was quite another thing, and shows how the values of personality can be preserved for all men to the mutual advantage of all. He made clear what would be required of the individual in order to have on earth a kingdom of God wherein dwell justice and mercy. His was a plan directly adapted to accomplish what is now known to be necessary if mankind is to survive, and the history of religious thought provides no comparable resource.

Humanity, stricken and impoverished through global strife by losses that baffle the imagination to conceive, stands today at the parting of the ways. The triumphant strategy of victory in war must be followed immediately by an even keener strategy for peace, if all is not to be lost.

The immediately staggering problem is that of reconversion. This issue must always be faced after every prolonged war, but what makes the present instance the mightiest task of all time is not only its world proportions, but also the fact that this process reaches down to the basic principles of existing society and at the same time involves the highest idealisms and hopes for the future, coupled with the further necessity that all this radical change must be accomplished with maximum speed and thoroughness if worse disasters are not to follow.

Reconversion from the production of the implements of war, on a hitherto unheard of scale, to peacetime goods without serious slackening of employment is its simplest aspect. The greater problem is the reconversion of the nations—allies, neutrals, and former enemies—from a death-struggle, wartime economy in which all, whether willingly or unwillingly, were inevitably participants, to a peacetime economy wherein all nations freely agree to collaborate as a coöperative world community, based on the principles of justice and good will.

Internationally, it has become clear that the nations must treat each other with mutual justice and kindness if man is to survive. But whence the motive to assure this thing which is so new among nations that rules of procedure are still lacking? Manifestly, the master motive so far is fear of the consequences, and this has been vastly accentuated by recent atomic studies.

Fear is a valuable deterrent among all sentient beings, but it alone is never adequate. Of all motives it most easily loses its force with the passage of time. Fear is a negative urge. It can point out the peril to be shunned, but can give no positive support for accomplishing constructive good. It is little wonder that anxiety is world-wide, and that pessimistic forebodings can be heard in every land, lest some government fail to live up to the unwonted requirements of justice and good will among fellow nations and so the frail bond of world unity fall asunder and a worse chaos ensue.

Why should the practice of justice and good will between the nations seem so precarious and difficult? Quite clearly, one reason is that this criterion is too unfamiliar as a working technique within the nations themselves. The great prophets of the eighth century B.C. declared that the practice of justice and kindness in all human relations was necessary to preserve a nation. No sovereign state has ever openly admitted that proposition. Modern political dictatorships illustrate the point. Some have recently been overthrown because of their utter lack of justice. Others still exist among our great allies. There are political democracies, like our own, that are ruled indirectly by economic dictatorships, or that exist in a state of economic feudalism, where justice to the common man is at best a rationed commodity, not always available.

There are so-called democracies where race discrimination is not only a deterrent to justice, but an explosive force, dangerous to the body politic. Nations in their relations with one another cannot be expected to rise to levels of conduct higher than the common practice of their citizenry. In other words, there is no way of imposing ethical conduct upon nations from without. There are no ethical controls within nations beyond those found within their people. The paramount importance of such controls for the preservation of the race makes their achievement the most important task of mankind today.

The prescription for this is clear and explicit. The logic of history and the words of prophetic religion coincide. Nations can be expected to do justly and love mercy only when at least a majority of their people, from the lowliest to the greatest of them, make it their chief business in life to exemplify such conduct in all their personal relations, because this is the only way that humanity can be assured of continuing to live on the earth.

Reconversion thus goes deeply into the realm of spiritual values. Today the course of human events has brought humanity as a whole to the recognition that its salvation henceforth depends on the conduct of nations, according to principles that are found only in the highest religion. Yet the nations are quite unaware of this religious significance and entirely without means to implement these principles.

The secular life of the entire world is involved in this process of reconversion with the ultimate hope that our world may be saved. It remains to be seen whether contemporary Christianity has the flexibility, the vision, and the vitality, now manifest in secular life, that will enable it to break loose from outworn dogma and unfounded assumption, and avail itself of the higher truth within its own inheritance that alone can save the world. The specifications for the religion culminating with Jesus have hitherto remained hidden away in the archive of Christian

tradition, the Bible, and for two thousand years they have been no more available to Christians than to the rest of the world. No organization has thus far sensed them sufficiently to think it worth while to try to put them into effect.

The course of world events and the clarification of the world's desperate need have completely altered that situation. The prescriptions of Jesus that supply the answer to that need, beginning with the life of the individual, were always plainly stated in the Scriptures, but it was everywhere assumed that they were something extra that Jesus threw in for good measure, but which were hardly practical in a sordid and debased world. The fact that these teachings precisely meet the world's present need suggests that these constituted his real message, and this is now confirmed when they are considered in the light of their spiritual background in the teaching of the great prophets.²¹ As for other teachings now attributed to Jesus, that make up the larger body of church doctrine, their paucity of human values and their irrelevance to his main message reveal their questionable character.

It is perhaps more difficult for organized Christianity to accept this religion today than for the rest of the world. Nevertheless, a door of opportunity is still open, the door of reconversion—reconversion from the religion about Jesus, which other men have made, to the religion of Jesus himself. This door offers the one manifest opportunity by which current Christianity might play a significant, even a major, rôle in the new world of tomorrow.

The fact that official Christianity would have to break with traditions of two millennia, that it would be obliged to give up its pride of doctrine and correct belief, the doctrines, for example, that the church is a divine institution and its members God's chosen people, would certainly be difficult. The fact that it would have to renounce the idea that salvation consists in anything else than conduct, and that it would undoubtedly have to humble itself in sackcloth and ashes and confess that for ages it had been dealing with much that was irrelevant and mistaken, would be exceedingly difficult, but not more difficult than many things now taking place, and that must take place in secular life, if our world is to continue.

But if organized religion is unable to see the light and proves impotent to act, there is no monopoly to prevent the rest of the world from accepting the unique insight of Jesus, which it may the more readily do as it comes to see that there is no other way of life open. The frightening thought nevertheless remains, Will a stricken and distraught world be

²¹ Cf. L. Waterman, *op. cit.*, chap. 10.

able to see and grasp this saving truth in time to avert Catastrophe III and its probable consequences?

Faith, not in existing organized religion, but faith in humanity, the faith of the ancient prophet in the people of Nineveh,²² points the way of hope. The future order of the world, if it is not to be merely a prelude to chaos, will have to be a new order, based on the procedure of coöperative good will among all nations, but also held together and undergirded by the universal acceptance of the cosmic principles of justice and loving-kindness, that must bind every man to his fellow men, regardless of race or station, creed or color. It has been revealed to all the world, by a light brighter than the sun at noonday and with all the force of a voice from on high, that these requirements are henceforth essential, if God's to be in his heaven and anything well with his world.

²² Jonah 3: 5-10.

PREACHING WHERE THE WAYS PART

HAROLD A. BOSLEY

Mount Vernon Place Methodist Church, Baltimore

I

A MAN simply cannot put his soul into something he doubts. Let him doubt the wisdom or worth of a cause, and he will prove a poor champion of it. Let him feel that it is inadequate, irrelevant, or trivial, and both his zeal and usefulness will rapidly approach zero. Since religion is essentially a cause, a way of life, governed by great goals and far-flung ideals, it is of utmost importance that it be served by men who are not ashamed of it. One of the indispensable credentials of the Christian minister in any age is that he be not ashamed of the gospel; that he be proud of it; that he believe in it; that he be willing to proclaim it to the whole world without fear or favor.

Paul was speaking both for himself and to all subsequent leaders in the Christian enterprise when he made the magnificent proclamation: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel!" In this assertion, he does two things: he indicates a problem and takes a position which are as old and as enduring as the Christian religion itself. The *problem* is how to conquer the perennial temptation to be ashamed of the gospel; to doubt its wisdom or its worth; to suspect that it is inadequate or irrelevant or even trivial when measured alongside the truly momentous issues which have engulfed generations like our own. The *position* is that of believing, affirming, and proclaiming the gospel to be the fact of supreme importance in human life and history. It is now quite clear that if Christianity is to be a mighty force in the redemption of our sin-ridden world, it will be because an increasing number of Christians both solve the problem satisfactorily and take the position unequivocally.

It is the high privilege and severe duty of Christian ministers to confront our way-lost generation with the absolute necessity of coming to terms with the will of God as we see it in Jesus Christ. The urgency of this task cannot be overestimated. Among the many serious blunders which can be made today, only a few seem dangerous enough to prove fatal to our civilization. But one such will be made if we persist in making our great decisions without regard to the will of God. Consider our plight in this day when tremendous problems in group relations are up for decision all over the world. So far as we can see, the dominant factor in the decisions which we are making now is that of self-interest. It is the self-interest of the Great Powers that dominate the decisions of the United Nations; that determined the structure of the international organ-

ization set up at the San Francisco Conference. It is the self-interest of the white race which seeks to be the dominant factor in racial relationships everywhere. It is the self-interest of privileged groups anywhere which seeks to freeze the *status quo* at the point and in terms of their maximum privilege.

It is the inescapable task of Christian ministers to bring a searching and relentless criticism to bear on all such decisions and to point out that they cannot last because they are in direct defiance of the will of God as we see it in Jesus Christ. We must point out the grave danger of being too complacent about the scriptural word: "If God be for us, who can be against us?" The really keen edge of this insight comes home when you state it in reverse: If God be against us, what difference does it make who and how many are for us? The will of God overrules even the largest majorities which men can muster behind their projects—if those projects are not, in some measure, expressions of the will of God. It is our business to articulate a religious tradition which has steadily maintained that, in his sight, nations, however powerful they may be when viewed in the perspective of military and material means, are in reality helpless if they set themselves against his holy will. In his sight "nations are but a drop in the bucket."

We must not be deterred from our task by the present unpopularity of honest and searching criticism. We see the sign "No Criticism Please" posted over all of the great and grave problems which our generation must, willy-nilly, confront in some fashion or other. If we criticize the policy of the United Nations, we must be prepared to be called fascist or Nazi or isolationist. If we criticize the foreign policy of either England or Russia, we are told with considerable asperity that we are bringing "aid and comfort to the enemy." If we criticize the policy of some of our Jewish friends who desire to make Palestine a homeland for the Jews, we must be prepared to be called anti-Semitic or intolerant. If we criticize the slowness with which injustices done to the Negro, or the Japanese-Americans, or any other minority group, are corrected, we shall certainly be told that we are agitators or troublemakers. But the issues before us are too serious for us to be deflected one whit from our divinely appointed task of bringing the will of God, as we understand it, to bear upon the problems of our day, as we understand them. One thing is clear—too clear for our comfort: if the fatal mistake is actually made of making the great decisions of our day without regard to the will of God, two reasons will account for it. First, there will be the natural but sinful desire of man to purchase security for himself even though it must be paid for in the coin of the security of another. Second, there will be the cowardice of the Christian churches in not proclaiming

the ultimacy of the will of God throughout the whole of life. Let us not minimize the scope and potential strength of the Christian churches in the world scene today. We number our members in the hundreds of millions. They are found on every continent and are of every nation and race. Important as it is to achieve greater unity than we now have among them, it is of even greater importance for us to realize that we do not have to wait for that in order to make a united impact on the total life of our day. Each church, speaking up and out in its own way, for God's sake, will let loose a most necessary corrective to certain man-centred and God-ignoring trends in the contemporary world.

So far from being a new rôle for religion, this task of bringing the life of our day under the judgment of God is one of the most ancient and honorable ones. Seldom has it been filled with greater power and adequacy than by the ethical prophets of eighth- and seventh-century Israel. Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel: how grandly these names ring wherever vital religion is discussed! They had a single purpose: to stand where the ways part and to keep Israel from choosing the path of sin and death, and to persuade her to choose the path of righteousness and life. To this end they laid claim to the whole domain of life, for God's sake. They criticized morals, politics, foreign policy, and religious institutions. They held Israel up against the standard of God's will—and no power on earth could prevent them from attempting the task. They knew the feel of danger, of stocks and dungeons, of public humiliation and private threat. But these happenings were trivial when laid alongside the tremendous fact indicated in the words: "The Lord took me. . . . The Lord spake unto me. . . . The hand of the Lord was upon me. . . ." Nothing human is foreign to religion—this is the message of the prophets; and we may well hear in it a stern call to the permanent task of being a preacher, for God's sake.

The career of Jesus Christ is too well known to require any elaboration of the point that he, too, was a preacher at the points where the ways part for individual and social living. His life and teachings had and continue to have the effect of drawing lines in the minds and lives of men, inviting them to take their stand "on God's side." "God is good," he said in effect; "he alone is supremely good. He made all things in conformity with his good will, giving to man alone the precious and tragic right to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage, to waste his substance in riotous living, to gain the whole world, yet lose his own soul. But, even when man has played the fool with his freedom, God does not desert him. Rather he seeks him out again and tries to bring him back to the path of brotherhood and love in his dealings with his fellows and with himself." When Jesus met the evils of life, he did not flinch, neither did

he tone down his denunciation of them. What a bucketful of woes he dumped out on the heads of the hypocritical religious leaders of his people! He could no more let the sins of his day go uncriticized than he could have engaged in them. And he saw what many of us are tempted to turn away from: to let them go uncriticized is one way of engaging in them. He was determined to put first things first and he seems never to have been guilty of letting second things slip into first place unchallenged. When his timid disciples warned him to be careful because of opposition, he replied in substance, "Fear not him who can kill the body; rather fear him who can kill your soul." He is a difficult man to follow, but we who name his name and proclaim the gospel which we find in him have no other honest choice open to us.

The great Christian leaders in ages subsequent to Jesus' life have been preachers at the parting of the ways for the life of their day. Paul, Augustine, Savonarola, Luther, Wesley—men like these are studied today not simply by theologians and church historians, but by historians, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists, as well. For they stood at the parting of the ways and preached with such effect that history continues to bear the impress of their efforts. While primarily and always churchmen, they nonetheless laid claim to the whole of life, for Christ's sake. They made many mistakes, to be sure, in their efforts; but they never made the worst mistake of all, that is, of believing and acting as though some part of life were separable from the claim of God as we see it in Jesus Christ. There are many today who, consciously or unconsciously, seek to destroy the spiritual unity of life by this process of fragmentation, by saying that "business is business" and "art is art" and "politics is politics." The plain implication is that "religion is religion," and that each and every interest ought to mind its own business and let every other interest alone. This whole tendency must be challenged by religion because it is a direct denial of the religious view of God as the creator and sustainer of all life; it is an equally explicit denial of the relevance of the kingdom of God, the ideal goal of all human striving. Once let this process of fragmentation get under way, and religion will soon find herself rigorously confined to her rites and forms and forbidden to study and pass judgment upon any vital area of life. The pivotal leaders in our historic tradition saw the alternatives clearly and acted decisively. Small wonder, with leaders like them, Professor Hocking can describe religion as one of "the strongest powers" in the life of man.

II

As we study men like the prophets, Jesus, and his great disciples through the centuries, we discover what might be called the strategy of

Christian criticism. It is this strategy which men who preach at the parting of the ways should master. It can mean the difference between a ministry of clear conviction and one of confused compromise. There are three steps in the development of this strategy.

The first step or the touchstone of Christian criticism is a vital personal experience of the will of God laying claim to the life of man. The prophet is captured by his vision of that will; therefore he must speak. The Christian finds that will in Christ; thenceforth he follows him as the light, the truth, and the way. There is at the heart of the Christian approach to life this experience of God, this categorical imperative of faith, this alpha of all vital religious endeavor. The prophet can no more ignore it than he can the roaring of a lion prowling the city streets. This is the experience that the mystic seeks to describe in his confused, ecstatic language; that the rationalist tries to outline in his theology; that the moralist endeavors to bring to ethical fulfillment in his calls to action. It is, in short, the directive of religious faith and life. It is far from being an easygoing master. An early American missionary made the dangerous journey from the relative safety of New England to the real danger of the Middle West in response to the divine imperative. His diary records, in simple language, a common experience among those who follow the gleam: "Many a night I would fain have turned back, but the hand of the Lord rested on my shoulder and He said, 'Tomorrow we go forward!'"

The man who preaches at the parting of the ways will keep this experience of the nearness of God at the centre of his life and thought. Through prayer, spiritual discipline, study, and various forms of personal and group devotions he will keep ever before his mind's eye the simple fact that he is a servant of the Most High. Men who do this are able to look the lords of earth in the eye and say, "We must obey God rather than man."

The second step in the development of the strategy of Christian criticism brings the entire life of the Christian under the judgment and mercy of the will of God. This is an endless, never-pleasant, and always humbling experience—a kind of living death, as Paul describes it. When you stand in the white light of his holy will as it manifests itself in and through Jesus Christ, no one on earth is more aware of your inadequacies, imperfections, and outright sinfulness than you yourself are. You understand Isaiah's exclamation: "Woe is me! for I am undone." You literally feel the layers of conceit, pride, passion, and prejudice peeling off, leaving you utterly devoid of the various protective coverings under which you habitually hide your own keen awareness of your creaturehood before Almighty God. You are not permitted to view this exposure in a

detached manner. Far from it! You are overwhelmed by an acute sense of guilt, of sins of omission and commission hitting you hard and all at once, much as waves racing for the shore sometimes suddenly unite to form a gigantic breaker which drops squarely on you. This, I take it, is the experience which our fathers called "the conviction of sin."

Fortunately, at the very depths of it, when we have no merit of our own on which we can rely, we can and must throw ourselves utterly on the mercy of him whose last word for man is forgiveness and love. At that point and in that spiritual act, we recover ourselves, but in a new or renewed relationship as the humble son of him whom we hope to serve. We are never cleansed of our imperfections; they continue to cripple and haunt everything that we are and do. But we know them for what they are, and are given new strength with which to struggle against them. We are encouraged to believe that God can use us in spite of them. We are prepared to move forth in Christ's name and for his sake, preaching the gospel to all men. Always, over all that we say, there is the humble overtone of our awareness of our own unworthiness. Without this experience of spiritual purgation—and it is a continuing one—preaching becomes a sorting over of prudential admonitions in search of the least offensive compromise. With this experience, preaching becomes a humble proclamation that what God has done for you who are the chiefest of sinners, he can and will do for all men.

The third step in the evolution of the strategy of Christian criticism brings the total life of mankind under the judgment of God. Nothing—no institution or idea or convention or group—is spared the ordeal of measuring itself against the ideal reality of the kingdom of God. And judgment begins in the house of the Lord! The Christian church must not ask to be excused from answering the question: "Does what you are doing square with the great goal of the faith, the kingdom of God?" Church organizations, church practices, church customs—all these must be cleansed of dangerous sins which infect the very institution that seeks to purge the rest of society in the name of the kingdom of God. Fortunately for us, the tradition of unsparing criticism of ecclesiastical sins by churchmen is one of the best established facts in our religious tradition. Nonchurchmen frequently and mistakenly infer that the church is one mass of homogeneous complacency, until and unless they criticize it. The actual truth is that the severest critics of the church in every age come from within her fellowship, and, as a rule, stay within that fellowship. Theirs is a necessary task. Without it the church would soon perish of ethical and spiritual dry rot. But it must be done in every age, especially in an age of confusion like our own. As an indispensable prelude to her proclamation to other institutions and interests to cleanse their hands

and hearts in the sight of God, the church must show the way by her own deeds and policies. She cannot and will not do this if her leadership is not continually measuring her against the goal of the ideal kingdom to which she gives allegiance. Measure her disunity against the ideal of unity, and she stands convicted of sin. Measure her racial discrimination against the ideal of brotherhood, and she stands convicted of sin. Measure her compromise with the war system against the ideal of love, and she is one of the archsinners of the world. Judgments like these must be made—made in love to be sure—but made with courage and definiteness. Without them the church has no answer to the question: "Can the blind lead the blind?"

Although her witness is undeniably weakened by her sins, the Christian church must nonetheless bring to bear the standard before which she bows upon the life of the nations of the world. They, too, must be brought to the judgment bar of the God of the universe who holds the destiny of all in the hollow of his hand. So far from being a simple and easy task, it is as varied as the culture and position of the peoples of the world. We who minister to churches in the United States of America at this time when her military power is at flood tide, when her pride in her achievements as a great power is reaching a new high, will take as the text of our preaching: "Pride goeth before a fall"; or, "Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain"; or, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be added unto you." We must remind our fellow countrymen of the power, the pride, and the arrogance of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and Rome and never let ourselves forget that there is still a lot of space on the museum shelves of history for nations that live as though there were no moral law superior to their own self-interest and power. To do less than this is to betray the great heritage of being a watchman, for God's sake.

If, on the other hand, we were called to minister, as are our brethren in Germany and Japan, to a defeated, crushed, and almost hopeless people, our task, in principle, would remain the same, though the actual emphasis would be radically altered. We would still seek to exalt the kingdom of God as the governing reality in the life and thought of men, but we would present it as the encouragement to hope, confidence, and work for the redemption of the good name of our beloved country and for the sort of future in which our children would find their security in terms of world confidence and coöperation. In all this hard task, the reality of the love of God, as we see it in Christ, is the source of greatest Christian confidence. To portray it as persuasively and as realistically as possible is the task of the Christian minister.

When it is clear that any given economic order, or some principle

or policy within it, is the prolific mother of conflict and injustice, the man who stands at the parting of the ways must single it out for careful and searching criticism. The Christian minister has no blueprint of an economic utopia, but he does have the guidance of the ideal of a social order in which mutual concern and purposeful coöperation lay the foundation for personal and social security. When he finds trends afoot in his day which seem to be proceeding in other directions, he must bring them before the judgment bar of the ideal. To the self-styled realist who demands to know what he has to offer that is "better" than the trend he criticizes, the preacher may say many things, but he need say no more than this to justify his right to speak: "This is going away from the ideal, not toward it, if we are to judge by its fruits of injustice and misery in human life. It, therefore, is wrong. To persist in it, consciously and wilfully, is a sin against the will of God." To refuse to seek another and fairer solution of the problems it seeks to solve, is not so much a confession of ignorance as it is confession of guilt before God, whose holy will we refuse to search for "with all our heart." Like Ezekiel, we may be perplexed by the further question which we ask of ourselves: "But what good does it do to say that sort of thing? Proud, angry, and prosperous men seldom heed admonitions which spring from spiritual seedbeds." It is well to remember Ezekiel's answer, couched in terms of God's assurance to him: "Nevertheless, if thou warn the wicked of his way to turn from it; if he do not turn from his way, he shall die in his iniquity; but thou hast delivered thy soul." Which is another way of saying that the *conclusion* rests with God, not with those who have been called to preach, in his name.

No greater task confronts the minister of Jesus Christ today than that of rebuilding man's shattered confidence in himself and in his fellows as potential colleagues in the achievement of a world in which justice and law undergird international life and dealings. Many difficult problems will have to be worked out by diplomats and legislators, but the most difficult one of all, one that must be worked out before even the correct solutions to other problems can stand, is that of basic mutual confidence in mankind, including ourselves. Our so-called "mastery of nature" has turned out to be not so much a bad joke as a dangerous half-truth. As a bitter Englishman put it: "We have mastered the air only to be forced to burrow in the ground." Eating away at the heart of all our plans for world order, and a new world of security and plenty, is the cancerous suspicion that we are simply incapable of doing anything good, that the seed of death and destruction is implanted in any and everything we turn our hand and mind to. It is the high calling of religion to reassure man at this point of deep spiritual doubt; to point out that the will of God is the permanent reality of the world, that whatever is in accordance with

his will will live, that we have our clearest revelation of his will in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ, that it is our clear duty to seek an understanding of this revelation, and that we must commit ourselves without reservation to the endless task of seeking its fulfillment in human life and history. It is easier to claim too little than too much for this answer. While it lacks a lot of settling specific questions about tariff and immigration, it does provide an atmosphere in which they can be discussed hopefully and with justice to all. It does not *answer* them in detail; but *without it*, answers, however correct in detail, are purely academic.

III

The sum of the matter is this: we are called to preach the kingdom of God; to proclaim both its actual and potential reality in the life of man; to insist that all things human must finally square with it or perish; to awaken men to the realization that it is God's will, made in judgment and love, for all men; and that it will prevail.

To take this position is to run head-on into the current tendency to depreciate loyalty to great goals as perfectionism. This word is suffering the same fate as did an early term, *puritan*, which began its career as a description of virtue and ended it as a synonym for the evil of bigotry. Yet we are either perfectionists or we step outside the tradition of Christian ethics. The New Testament gives scant comfort to those who depreciate perfectionism. It raises the standard of a life and a way of life to unexcelled heights and calmly says, "Follow me"; "Do this, and thou shalt live"; "Go, and do thou likewise"; "Be ye perfect as your father in heaven is perfect." So far from being stray verses lifted out of contexts, these are conclusions to some of the weightiest discussions of principles for living that are recorded in the New Testament. We can ignore them or modify them to suit our own convenience only by imperiling our relationship with the kingdom in whose order they are fundamental. Without perfectionism, without supreme loyalty to absolute and perfect goals, we are lost in the maze of prudentialism and compromise; we get our sense of direction from the daily newspaper instead of from the New Testament. We may well get a fuller and clearer knowledge of some of the problems we are up against from the press, but it is a poor guide so far as ethical principles are concerned.

The usual specific charge leveled against perfectionists by the critics, inside and outside the church, is that they insist upon attaining the ultimate goal at the first jump or they refuse to move at all. If there are men like this, they are more than naïve realists; they are superficial perfectionists. If your perfectionism is rooted and grounded in the New Testament approach to the kingdom of God, you will not scorn the step-

by-step progress toward the perfect goal. You will accept it as the only way in which progress in personal and social living can be attained. But you will insist that you take your sense of direction from the proper goals, from those norms for personal and social righteousness which we gather up in the all-inclusive concept of "the kingdom of God." The real quitter in this business of Christian living is the fellow who suddenly decides that, since the kingdom of God seems impossible of achievement, it is no longer relevant to human problems. As a matter of actual fact, no one knows whether it is actually impossible of achievement. No one knows how successfully we may be able to nurture and strengthen the possibilities for good which are implicit in every man and age. No one has any more than the vaguest notion of the true extent of such possibilities. It is, therefore, the reasonable as well as the religious thing to do to take the kingdom of God as our goal and to get our sense of direction from it throughout the whole range of life. To do this is to pass from despair to hope, from the indefinite and indecisive ethic of prudentialism to the definite and decisive ethic of perfectionism, from the gospel of man to the gospel of the kingdom of God.

We have no cause to be ashamed of this gospel. We do well to be ashamed of the many ways in which we have diluted and compromised it; of the ways in which the church has forsaken it in so many of her practices; of the ways in which we ourselves sin again it, despite our best intention to be governed by it. But so to be ashamed is not to be ashamed of the gospel; rather it is a tribute to our loyalty to the gospel.

I am not ashamed of the gospel of reconciliation today when the only other gospel is that of retaliation. I am not ashamed of the gospel of brotherhood today when the only other gospel is that of suspicion, distrust, and strife. I am not ashamed of the gospel of love today when men are both ruining themselves and plotting the ruin of their children through the gospel of hatred.

Let the Christian minister, then, stand at the parting of the ways and preach the word without fear or favor; the word that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself . . . and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation"; that we must bend our every effort toward the creation of a world community which fulfills his dream, "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." That gospel is the good news of God to this and every other generation because it is the light, the truth, and the way out of our chaos into his peace.

COMING EVENTS IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Boston University

MANY WILL DEEM it both presumptuous and more than a trifle ridiculous to attempt to forecast the development of thought in any field, especially in that of religion, where individual character, piety, and insight play so large a part and pure logic so small a part. Yet there is Shakespeare's authority for the belief that coming events cast their shadows before them, and Patrick Henry's for the fact that he had no lamp by which his feet were guided save the lamp of experience. Light from that lamp not only illumines the path we now tread but also casts shadows down the way, which may be shadows of coming events.

The experiment of prediction was tried by George Herbert Wells in *The Shape of Things to Come*, and he was altogether too successful for the world's comfort. We still have to find out whether Sinclair Lewis' *It Can't Happen Here* was mere pessimism, or whether, like Cassandra, he was gloomy and right. Philosophers and theologians have rarely undertaken to portray the future, unless they were of apocalyptic bent, in which case they might try to discover in Ezekiel, Daniel, and Revelation a sort of divine almanac of future history down to the end of the world. The wiser eschatologists think in terms of a millennium or so (as the unwise Hitler did), although the weaker brethren set continually revised dates for the Second Coming, and even predict the course of current political and papal history. Philosophers, on the other hand, have often painted utopias, but have rarely followed the party line of apocalyptic. In fact, Hegel made it a principle that philosophy is the interpretation of what has actually happened, not a prophecy of what will happen. The philosophical owl of Minerva does not fly until the shades of evening have fallen and the day's work is done; then, and then only, the philosopher asks what it all meant. In spite of this principle, however, Hegel once tried his hand at prediction. "The future," he said, "lies with America." Berkeley before him had written: "Westward the star of empire takes its way." Of late, the distinguished sociologist, Sorokin, has found signs of a coming idealistic future. With these precedents, in spite of the perils, we shall now risk some relatively humble predictions about the probable course of religious thought in the coming decade.

I

First of all, a good deal may be said with considerable assurance about the social environment of religion for the decade, 1946-1956. It

will be that of a postwar world. No matter how many other wars may threaten or develop ("wars and rumors of wars . . . but the end is not yet"), everything that happens or is thought in coming years will be under the tragic influence of the war that began in 1939 and its atomic bombs. The dead whom we have destroyed; the maimed and the wounded; the mental sufferers; the broken homes; the jobless; the ruined cities; the starving millions all over the world; debauched minds and bodies; racial minorities increasingly conscious of their wrongs and of their strength; the desperate determination of "free enterprise" to maintain capitalism in America against the rising tide of world socialism; the black-market mind (which prohibition had exposed but not created); a national debt of some three hundred billion dollars in the United States; churches in many places weakened; attacks on religion by the materialistic and the disillusioned; and the (already fading) ideal of the four freedoms—all this is a part of what we are sure to face.

If we may judge by past history, such an environment will not destroy religious faith. But the prospect raises a serious question: Will the desperate state of the world drive the church to a policy of isolationism? In the history of the church there have been many movements of escape, many trends toward the life of the hermit or the monk and toward the worship of a God infinitely remote from the concerns of this life.

How will the church face the challenge of the social environment? I predict that the church, and especially its youth, will make more intense efforts than ever before to cope with the social needs of the world. I also predict that this will, for a time at least, cause a deeper cleavage between those in the church who are and those who are not socially minded. The Good Samaritan is always more popular with victims of bandits than he is with priests and Levites. Priests and Levites are likely to be with us at least as long as the poor. But they are not always good thinkers, and serious religious thought will raise a new demand for social righteousness.

II

In the coming postwar world, the hope of world peace will be an undying ideal. Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations and Wendell Willkie's "One World" will be seeking fulfillment through the United Nations. It would be vain to predict how the undertaking begun at San Francisco will fare in a selfish world, however terrified it may be by atomic bombs. But it is not vain to predict how Christian thought will be directed in the presence of this great social experiment. The religion of the Prince of Peace must support every move toward coöperation for peace, while resisting militaristic proposals for peacetime conscription, and it must act to make the elementary conditions of effective love real in the world. It is

true that there are Christians (especially in Germany) who believe that all political action by the church is in principle wrong, yet those very persons are the ones who usually demand that the church support every war, right or wrong; there are others who are so pessimistic as to believe all efforts toward world peace to be utterly futile. Fortunately neither opinion is likely to prevail in the coming decade. The teaching of the Golden Rule and of St. Paul's psalm on love will be seen to be more Christian than the current hopeless interpretations of the seventh chapter of Romans. Christianity cannot perpetually resist the force of the words in John's gospel: "And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also must I bring, and they shall hear my voice; and they shall become one fold, one shepherd."

The coming church will see that such principles refer to more than the inner life, and more than church organizations or missionary work; they find their fulfillment in One World at peace. Religious thought will not merely oppose war; not merely support conscientious objectors to war; but will see that religion is essentially practical and is committed to the transformation of life. Religious thinkers cannot be blinded to the economic, social, and political injustices of society which require radical change before the conditions which make One World possible can be fulfilled.

But religious thought will not have smooth sailing in its renewed social emphasis. The church itself, with its endowments, its institutions, and its members, is thoroughly implicated in the present economic order. Every step forward will be violently opposed from within, now that America is almost the last refuge of "free enterprise." The difficulties which religion confronts from without are symbolized by the fact that silence had to be substituted for prayer at San Francisco. Communism, however its tactics may change, is in principle antireligious. If Karl Marx had had the wisdom to connect his social and economic program with the ethical principles of the prophets, of Buddha and Confucius, of Jesus, instead of building on materialism, the social development of the world might have been far more rapid and more peaceful. The great task of religious thought in this field is to convince communists and socialists that religion is as much concerned with the welfare of the common man and with a coöperative and just social order as they themselves could possibly be. Only when this is done both in thought and in action will solid foundations for One World be laid, in which religion will play a part. Neither the socialist world nor the returning veterans will see any hope in a religion that is not willing to take sacrificial action for human justice. Religious thought faces here a challenge which will lead to a deeper and more practical social gospel than has been yet conceived.

III

In preparing for a religion that is more effective, religious thought will have to clear away much underbrush that has been accumulating of late. I predict a disintegration of current irrationalism. The dialectic of thought is so obvious in this case that the movement is, sooner or later, inevitable. A perplexed, but thoughtful, minister has put the case for irrationalism thus: the philosophers differ; how can an average minister pick and choose? He must therefore abandon the confusions of reason and take refuge in revelation without reason. Then the dialectic takes form:

Thesis: Philosophy rests on reason. *But* philosophers differ; therefore

Antithesis: Revelation rejects reason and stands alone. *But* theologians differ even more sharply in the interpretation of revelation than do philosophers and they must use reason to make their meaning clear; therefore

Synthesis: must arise. It is fair to predict that a humbler and more tolerant use of reason and a more reasonable view of revelation must arise.

Whatever form the synthesis may take, irrationalism must disintegrate. No human being can avoid facing responsibility for the choice of his fundamental beliefs; and no mature person can be satisfied unless he can give a "reason of the hope" that is in him. The current and traditional ideas that reason is essentially "proud" and that faith and love are essentially "unmotivated" will collapse of their own structural defects. A man cannot be proud and be reasonable at the same time; reason is a search for truth, a love of truth, a submission of all present attainments to the inexhaustible ideal of truth. Pride is dogmatic confidence in the present; reason is humble search for future light. If faith were "unmotivated" and irrational, there is no reason why either God or man might not commit his unmotivated faith to sin or vice or ignorance. If it be said that the notions of the pride of reason and of unmotivated faith can be shown by learned research and apt quotations to be ancient and widespread, the reply of Adam Clarke to the traditional interpretation of the Song of Solomon is timely. "Many errors," he said, "are more than a thousand years old."

In spite of the antiquity of a tradition of irrationalism, I predict that its recent revival is temporary and that it will disintegrate from within by its own dialectic and from without by the demands of the times for a religion that can give an account of itself. Rejection of reason is skepticism, and no enduring religion can be built on the basis of skepticism.

IV

As irrationalism disintegrates, there will be fresh movements for the integration of reasonable faith. As political authoritarianism declines and

democratic coöperation increases in the secular world, there will be a new opportunity for new democratic coöperation of thought and life in the religious world, and religious authoritarianism, which has been creeping into Protestantism, will decline.

In the past decade there has been much cry about the decline of liberalism. That cry, always born of hopeful confusion rather than of clear understanding, will die down in the coming decade, and there will be a new birth of liberalism. By liberalism I do not mean general laxness—not the admiring gush that says, "Oh yes, he's a liberal; he drinks." Nor do I mean a specific creed, whether theological or economic. By liberalism I mean the habit of mind which tests all belief by appeal to experience reasonably—that is, coherently—judged and organized. Modern science has cultivated this habit of mind in the field of knowledge of nature, based on our sensory experience; modern religion will cultivate it in the field of knowledge of God and the spiritual life, based on our value experience. Religious thought will become more philosophical and more theological as it interprets the relations of these fields. Naturalism, the most prominent and vocal movement in current philosophy, is narrow, and too vague to cope with human experience as a whole in all its needs. The next step in religion will be as surely beyond naturalistic humanism as it will be beyond irrationalism. But it will take far more than the next ten years before a synthesis of liberal religion will be achieved which will serve as an adequate working faith. The methods of liberalism will be clarified; their profounder and more adequate application will come later.

V

From the beginnings of the integration of reasonable faith there will follow a new stress on religious experience. Recent irrationalism has had the effect of removing the "totally other" God so far from any relation to man's daily life, that religious experience and the very word *religion* have fallen into disrepute in irrationalist quarters. Naturalism has had a like effect, by its dogma that only sensory experience gives us any contact with objective reality and its inference that therefore all religious experience is wholly subjective. The coming renaissance of liberalism will be empirical, and will emphasize that faith in God roots in experience which is broader than sensation. Sensation is, of course, the basis of physical knowledge. It is impossible for a human will to produce out of nothing a sensory experience of a house, an automobile, or a human being. It is equally impossible for a human will to produce out of nothing the ideals of reason, of justice, or of love. In all aspects of our experience, sensory and ideal, we confront a reality not ourselves. Naturalism, which rests on the primacy of sensation, and humanism, which rests on the

primacy of ideals, will be superseded by a broader liberalism which rests on the primacy of personality.

Religious thought will explore more fully the possibilities of personality. The long literary discussion of mysticism on the part of psychologists and devotees will begin to bear fruit. The life of prayer, which has declined in much of Protestantism to a reliance on reading *The Upper Room*, and has lost much of its vital and personal power, will be renewed. There are signs that Christianity will learn lessons in meditation and spiritual communion from the Orient.

It is noteworthy that Beatrice Webb is on record, despite her early and long association with Herbert Spencer, as having said that many of the guiding principles of her life of social devotion came to her in prayer experience. I can add a somewhat related testimony. It was through teaching courses on mysticism that I not only came to a deeper appreciation of the mystical experience itself, but also found that mysticism in its highest forms leads to a higher and nobler devotion to the social uplift of humanity.

If ever a noble and divinely guided inner life and if ever a spiritual principle for social relations were needed, it is now, when science has achieved its wildest dream of the control of atomic power. The world faces a simple alternative. Either science must be destroyed or religious experience must be cultivated on a grander scale than ever science has known. The debased state of our religious experience—its barbaric level—has been illustrated by frequent proposals over the radio to destroy German science. The only effective way to destroy German science is not merely to destroy all known and all secret laboratories, but also to destroy all scientists and all boys and girls who show scientific promise. The Mad Hatter and the Mad Hitler taken together could not be madder than those who make such proposals. Science must not and will not be destroyed. Hence it is perfectly safe to predict, as a necessary condition for the survival of humanity, that there will be a revival of religious experience, which will not be a wildfire of fanaticism, but the sort of fire that generates steam in the boiler of the good life. It will be religious experience within the framework of enlightened liberalism, and which will be as much more powerful than fanatical mysticism as controlled steam within a boiler is more powerful than steam at large, escaping from a burst boiler. Such religious experience will be a fusing of reason and emotion and moral will in conscious coöperation with the Supreme Reason and Emotion and Moral Will. It will be a renewal of the mystical righteousness of the prophets and of Jesus and of Paul, opening into the perspective of the Johannine Jesus: "He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do."

If exegetes urge that the literal meaning of "works" here is "miracles," then living religion must burst the bonds of literalism. Science has shown us the way to physical miracles; what humanity needs and what it will seek for in the coming years is a "greater" application of the "new commandment, that ye love one another."

In an age of science, religion will die if it is mere theory. Science must be theory, but theory that rests on experience and experiment, and can point to results. So too, religion (as philosophy and theology) must be theory, but theory that rests on experience and experiment, and can point to results. "By their fruits ye shall know them." I predict a new crop of fruitage in the realm of religious experience in the coming years.

VI

What, specifically, may we say of the course to be taken by religious scholarship in the coming decade? In a sense, the term "religious scholarship" is a misnomer. Scholarship as such is not religious; not even scholarship that is concerned with religion. Scholarship is, to be sure, devotion to an ideal—the ideal of objective knowledge and truth. There is keen and intense joy in the fulfillment of that ideal, something akin to the mystical. But the joy of knowledge is not necessarily the joy of the Lord. In fact, "religious" scholarship suffers in principle from the same defect as secular scholarship: it may put atomic bombs into the hands of a humanity morally unfit to be trusted with so dire a responsibility. Scientific scholarship in the field of religion is just as innocent of concern about ideal values as is physics or chemistry. The pure scientist of religion asks: Who or what group did, felt, believed, said, or wrote what? where? when? why? and with what effects? As a pure scientist he neither knows nor cares whether the deeds, feelings, beliefs, sayings, or writings were wise, right, and true, or unwise, wrong, and false. To quote the Germans, his work is *wertfrei*, free of value.

Now, such pursuit of knowledge is necessary for human welfare—not merely to satisfy the curiosity of scientists, but to provide a basis for life. When a parent takes a sick child to a physician for a diagnosis, he does not want to learn how dear, how precious, how talented the child is. He knows that. What he wants to know is the exact state of the child's health and the exact treatment that the child requires. It is true that pure science is usually confined to diagnosis and leaves therapy to the arts. But the facts must be known before they can be appreciated. There is no reason to suppose that there should be or will be any decline in the sciences of religion in the coming decade. There will be more, rather than less, scholarly specialism.

To sum up, we need more specialism but fewer specialists. We need

more understanding of the Synoptic problem, and fewer persons who understand nothing else. We need more scholarship, but no mere scholars. Specialized scholarship may be as disintegrating in its effects on society as is irrationalism. We need liberal scholars who are liberally educated. Their liberal education should include more than music and art, which for some is hardly more than selfish enjoyment affording surcease from the laboratory but furnishing little or no insight into human need or divine power. We need scholars who are more than scholars because first and foremost they are good men—good individuals, good members of society, good children of God. This means a broader general education for all specialists—an education that includes science and religion and philosophy. All scholars need such an education as comes from reading the Bible, the Bhagavad-Gita, Plato, Dante, Shakespeare, and Darwin. But a merely scholarly knowledge of this literature is not enough; the new education must supplement objective scholarship with appreciation of values. It is not enough to know the historical, literary, and social facts about the great work of the past. It is necessary to use that great work as a mine of values to reinterpret and apply today. The only justification for theoretical knowledge is that it makes men better—better, not only through the exalted joy of intellectual contemplation of truth, but better through a transformed individual and social life. Kant was right. The practical reason (*reason*, mark you) has the primacy over the theoretical. Or better: the total personality has the primacy over any of its parts.

The new breed of scholars that is envisaged here is the breed that *ought* to be. *Will* it be? F. H. Bradley (doubtless a “starry-eyed idealist”) once wrote that “what ought to be and can be—must be.” If this is too sweeping a rule, it is clear that the remaking of the world demands scholars who are better men than most scholars have yet been, broader in their spirit and more socially minded. Social and economic needs and the fantastic advances of science cry aloud for men of character who are willing to explore the resources of God for the good of man. My faith in God and in man makes me predict that such men will be found in increasing numbers.

VII

One of the acute problems of Protestant religion at present is that of religious education. Whether in the home, in the church school, in the public school, or in the college and university, religious education is in a critical condition. The period of mass revivals with crisis conversions has passed. The period of religious education based on the assumption that children are born as members of the kingdom of God and need only to grow therein, has been only mildly successful in the development of

sturdy Christian character. In our times, some religious education has faded into a diluted, tamely moralistic and educationally inferior imitation of secular education, based on the naturalistic philosophy of Teachers' College, and relegating knowledge of the Bible to a more or less subordinate place in the curriculum. The difficulty of securing trained teachers at any level, who are both informed and religious, is increasingly acute. The clergy, as a whole, has shown too little concern about improving the work of the church schools; the clergy's lack of adequate training in religious education and its indifference to the literature and organizations devoted to it are matters of common knowledge. A national convention on religious education has been held in a great city with no local ministers attending save those invited to lead in prayer. Scholars in general (except psychologists and educators) are interested almost wholly in mature minds, and the training of the young has been neglected by them. As a result of these and other conditions, there has been an almost steady decline in the enrollment in most church schools, and a generation of church members has arisen to whom such words as *conversion*, *the new birth*, and *salvation* are not only alien, but incomprehensible, and sometimes even abhorrent.

Only in the churches with a more conservative, orthodox, or fundamentalist theology, or with a unique theory of revelation—such as the Latter Day Saints or the Christian Scientists—has religious education remained vitally alive. We may sum up the theory of such churches under the head, "authoritarian." Then it might be said, in a broad way, that the underlying struggle of religious education in the present is between authoritarianism and naturalism, with the most successful religious results in the camp of the authoritarians and the numerical majority in the hands of the naturalists. This, of course, does not mean that the majority of the Protestant churches have adopted the philosophy of naturalism; it means, rather, that more or less unconsciously, the leaders of Protestant religious education have followed the trends in secular education. When the idealistic theories of William T. Harris ceased to govern educational thought, and the naturalistic instrumentalism of John Dewey became America's educational polestar, it was almost inevitable that religious education should experience some influences from the change. There is no doubt that many of the methods introduced under Dewey's inspiration have been sound and wholesome. But the more humane, democratic, and psychologically sound atmosphere of our schools today no more proves the truth of Dewey's naturalism than the religious vitality of authoritarians proves the truth of fundamentalism or Mormonism or Christian Science. Religious success cannot be measured by secular success. Neither numbers nor power, neither good methods nor vitality, is a sign of religious success. There is religious success only where there is increasing

devotion to God; and there is Christian success only where Christ is known and honored. Devotion to God and to Christ means devotion to truth. Authoritarians emphasize devotion to God and Christ at the expense of free search for truth. Naturalists avow a free search for truth, but rarely devote serious thought to God or to Christ as possible objects of faith and sources of religious experience.

The current tension cannot continue. Changes are in the air. One sign that the crisis is recognized is the increasing emphasis in theological schools on clinical training, psychotherapeutic methods, and counseling. But as wise leaders in this movement have pointed out, such methods may easily fail to produce religious results unless very wisely applied; anyone familiar with the problems of work in guidance knows how much harm can be done by unskilled counseling. More fundamental cures must be found for our ills than are provided by the most expert psychological means for dealing with the failures of our basic religious training. That our universities recognize this need is indicated by the recently established or proposed departments of religion in Princeton, Dartmouth, Yale, and Boston University, as well as by long existing departments in a large number of other institutions all over the country.

Educators and religious leaders are aware of the need. I predict that the next ten years will be a period of ferment and rethinking in religious education; that every group will lose something of the partisan smugness that has haunted much discussion of these problems in the past; and that a more Christian and a more liberal religious education will arise. In it, the best results of psychology will continue to be applied; but the pupil-centred curriculum will be modified so as to lay less stress on the child as he is, and more on his possibilities. In the new religious education there will be more use of the results of the critical study of the Bible, more emphasis on the relation of the soul to God, and on its consequences for individual and social conduct, and a renewal of the long neglected idea of definite Christian commitment by a personal decision as a normal and necessary turning point in life. Thus, I predict, wholesome and valid elements from both authoritarian and naturalistic thought will contribute to a new day in religious education.

It may be that all of these predictions are to be proved false by the actual events that will occur. It may be that they represent wishful thinking. But whatever their defects, they are sincerely offered as hints of directions that may be taken, accompanied by a faint hope that they may exert some slight influence on events through a few readers who may "will to believe." This day, awed by the overwhelming power of atomic bombs, calls for religious thought as mature and as powerful in the field of spiritual motivation as is the thought of scientific atom-splitters in the field of physical energy.

THE ROAD TO GAZA

J. WESLEY INGLES

Bates College

I

THERE are some literary critics who resemble butterflies fluttering lightly above the flowering fields of literature, diverting attention from the flowers to their own brilliant and wayward flight. They tend to make one exclaim with a Japanese poet, "When I saw the fallen flower return to the branch—lo! it was only a butterfly!" But (if one may be permitted to continue the insect figure in connection with such a worthy group of men) there are other critics who resemble hornets, the sting of whose clever and cynical satire lingers long and unpleasantly in the memory, unless the victim happens to be one not particularly dear to us, when we are amused rather than indignant. However, there is still another class of critics who, like the honey bee, move with purpose over the fields, garnering nectar not for themselves alone, but for the many who shall share in the fruit of their labors.

Of this sort is John Livingston Lowes. And yet he combines the features of all three types. He has a light and brilliant style which delights the eye and ear. He has a sting, though it is seldom used, and then only upon those passages which we are convinced deserve the keen point of his irony. Rarely does one discover a critic who so richly combines in his work these three varieties of criticism: who at once pleases with a style that is of beauty all compact, who can reveal the flaws in a man's work with a trenchant and incisive wit, and who withal counts it his chief task to garner and to distil the essence of beauty in a form both palatable and nourishing.

It is not difficult to illustrate his qualities. They abound on almost every page of his work. First, one might note the poetic quality of his prose, by which he is able to make his thought real and vivid to the reader. In the opening chapter of *Convention and Revolt in Poetry*, to illustrate the truth that the poet's mind is "like a sensitized film, alive to impressions," and that two worlds, the subjective and the objective, are involved in the reception of stimuli, he writes the following description:

I lie on the sand of the seashore. And there pour in on me a throng of physical sensations: light—gleaming and sparkling on the sea, shattered into fragments of a rainbow in the spindrift, glinting from the sand, glancing along the waving beach grass, luminous in the air; color—the infinite purples of the sea, a phantom ship shell-pink, the white flash of a gull; line—the pure, sharp line where sea meets sky, the curve of the beach, the exquisite pattern left by the receding waves; sound—the slow, recurrent, rhythmic thunder of the sea, the wind through

the grass and in my ears, like Dante's voice within a voice; touch—the texture of the sand as I sift it through my fingers, the wind, soft and flowing across my body, the warmth of the sun felt beneath the wind; taste and smell—the fresh salty tang of the sea.

One can quite readily imagine himself in Florida or at Waikiki under the spell of his words. Now anyone who can work that sort of magic with words has command of his medium. The power of lucid, beautiful diction permeates everything he writes. Instead of using that power creatively, as he might well have done, he has chosen to use it critically to judge and to evaluate and to interpret the creative work of others. In this choice, he made a decision comparable to that made by Paul Elmer More in *Shelburne, N. H.*, although probably of less ultimate significance for American letters.

The second quality of his work, an ability to penetrate the artistic blunder and to reveal mercilessly its weakness, is used with restraint and a fairness that adds justice to judgment. In a passage in the book to which we have already referred, where he is seeking to show the way in which poetic illusion is shattered by the intrusion of bald and mathematical fact, he quotes Wordsworth by way of illustration. "Since Wordsworth at his best," he writes, "is infallible in his touch, and as unerring as a shaft of light, we may take him without scruple at his worst." After that warning against dangerous generalizations in criticism, he proceeds to quote a stanza from "The Thorn":

High on the mountain's highest ridge,
Where oft the stormy winter gale
Cuts like a scythe, while through the clouds
It sweeps from vale to vale;

"So far," interjects Lowes, "we are on the heights (even if not very near the summit), fairly safe in the airy citadel of poetry. But the stanza remorselessly proceeds:

*Not five yards from the mountain path,
This Thorn you on your left espy;
And to the left, three yards beyond,
You see a little muddy pond
Of water—never dry . . .*"

"And," says Lowes devastatingly, "poetic truth lies buried in the infant's grave that Wordsworth dugged a few lines later in the poem." We are constrained to agree with him.

But just as he can help us to see where and why a man failed in the use of his artistic medium, so he can also lead us to magic casements opening on beauty we may have missed. And this is his chief glory, his supreme gift.

In the book which will remain one of the greatest feats of detective work in literary criticism, *The Road to Xanadu*, there is such a plenty of this gift that it is difficult to make a selection. Let us take the opening passages in the chapter on "The Shaping Spirit":

On a moonlit sea, spread white and glistening like frost, lies printed the huge shadow of a ship. The picture is as sharply etched as its beauty is strangely and powerfully suggestive:

"Her beams bemocked the sultry main,
Like April hoar-frost spread;
But where the ship's huge shadow lay,
The charmed water burnt alway
A still and awful red."

Within the black shadow, and without it in the white expanse move the creatures of the great calm. And their hueless coruscation in the moonlight is set off against their rich and parti-coloured radiance in the shadow through the exquisite structural balance of two stanzas which answer to each other, phrase upon phrase, like an antiphon:

"Beyond the shadow of the ship,
I watched the water-snakes.
They moved in tracks of shining white,
And when they reared, the elfish light
Fell off in hoary flakes.

"Within the shadow of the ship
I watched their rich attire;
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
They coiled and swam; and every track
Was a flash of golden fire."

The magical symmetry of the pair of stanzas unfolds from the initial concept of the ship's huge shadow with the inevitableness of a leaf expanding from a bud. Somehow upon the chaos of images which thronged up from their sleep, a luminous unity has been imposed. And a new element enters into our synthesis.

It is the gift of genius to touch such fragile beauty analytically without soiling it with all sorts of critical fingerprints. Lowes has that gift. He comes therefore to his work with remarkable faculties of insight and expression not often blended in one critical intelligence.

II

It is obvious that both his critical insights and his masterly style are the result of an extremely comprehensive knowledge of the vast fields of American, English, and European literature. If one were to make a list of the writers referred to within a few chapters of one book, he would find some such strange juxtaposition of names as this: Keats, William James, Wordsworth, Shakespeare, Matthew Arnold, Philip Sidney, Ten-

nyson, Meredith, Robert Frost, Burns, Stevenson, Amiel, Dryden, Coleridge, Francis Thompson, Goethe, Eckermann, Byron, Chaucer, Ovid, Virgil, Burton, Homer, Boccaccio, Oscar Wilde, Dickens, E. L. Masters, Jane Austen, Rupert Brooke, Omar Khayyam, Conrad, Saintsbury, Wells, Zola, Ben Jonson, Raleigh, Thomas Browne, De Quincy, Carlyle, Ruskin, and Walt Whitman.

The list of books to which he refers would probably include everything worth reading in creative literature. His virtuosity in the use of his sources is staggering, for he seems to fly through space and time with the greatest of ease. He is particularly fond of associating the old and the new in such a way as to enhance and illuminate both, as in this passage from his *Geoffrey Chaucer*:

Chaucer was as modern as the moderns, six centuries before their birth. . . . One of the most effective plays of recent years is Colton and Randolph's *Rain*, and in that, as in the tale on which it is founded, rain assumes the relentless character of Fate. And in the *Troilus*, rain, with consummate art, is made the fated instrument of Criseyde's surrender. It was raining when Pandare asked her to his house, and she was loathe to come. But come at last she did.

It is his prodigious memory for a word or phrase, like that of the detective who never forgets a facial characteristic, that makes his *tour de force* in *The Road to Xanadu* a truly phenomenal achievement. His keen eye detected bits from the most obscure books that were part of the unassorted stuff that fed the creative imagination of Coleridge. Like Coleridge, he apparently never forgets anything that has made an impression upon his imagination. It all sinks down into the subliminal pool and rises whenever the bright flash of an associated idea attracts it.

Curiously enough, the very quality of the creative imagination which he studied in Coleridge, its power to assimilate and fuse phrases and images from his reading, is a characteristic of his own work. This is particularly observable in his constant incidental quotation of phrases without the use of marks to indicate that they are not his own. While this habit includes quotations from a multitude of sources, it will be obvious to the careful reader that probably the chief source of these unmarked references is the King James Version of the Bible.

The first essay in the volume, *Essays in Appreciation*, is entitled, "The Noblest Monument of English Prose," and deals with this matter of the influence of the Bible on the English language. Concerning its diction, he writes, "Utter simplicity, limpid clearness, the vividness of direct, authentic vision, these are the salient qualities of the diction of the men who wrote the Bible." And they are the qualities of Lowes' diction.

In another place, where he is describing the origin of the rich beauty of the biblical imagery, one can observe the subtle blending that comes

from a stocked and freely moving memory and not from a rigid system of literal quotation:

That which gives to Hebrew poetry, for instance, its depth and poignancy is just this elemental quality in the words. The large and simple and permanent objects and elements of life—the eternal hills, the treasures of the snow, rain coming down upon the mown grass, winds and all weathers, the rock in the desert, still water in pasture lands and the sea that roars and is troubled, sleep and the fleetingness of dreams, the mystery of birth and death—all the perennial, elemental processes of Nature, all the changing, yet abiding physiognomy of earth and sky, were charged for psalmist and prophet with spiritual significance, and woven into the very texture of their speech.

And these lovely cadences and perennially fresh images of the Bible are apparently woven into the very texture of his speech. It might be an interesting test of one's knowledge of that "noblest monument of English prose" to observe some of the passages illustrating this phenomenon in his style, seeking to identify the biblical source of the allusions. Often these take the form of mild puns, but whatever their form, they are woven intricately into the pattern of his own thought. Even although the following examples are rudely wrested from their context, they will give clues to the quality of his critical insights. They are all drawn from *Convention and Revolt in Poetry*, which is his first book, written nearest to the years spent in a theological seminary studying the Bible. Naturally the ore here is richest, although innumerable veins of it are to be found throughout all his later work. The passages will be given for the most part without comment. It will be the reader's task to identify the biblical allusions.

There are the two worlds—on the one hand, thought, affliction, passion, hell itself; on the other, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon, and our hands have handled—each incomplete without the other. And poetry mediates between the two; or rather it brings the two together into one.¹

[Commenting on Keats' "Ode to Autumn" he writes:] Actual? No. True? Yes—if there be any virtue and if there be any truth.²

For the poet is like Saul the son of Kish, who started out to find his father's asses—in a stubblefield, for aught I know—and found a kingdom. [This is printed without quotes, although it was said by Eckermann to Goethe substantially as it is quoted.]³

If there is in a work of art a contravention of nature and the resulting effect seem more true than if it were true, the artist, be he painter or poet, is justified when he speaketh, and we clear when we judge.⁴

[The heroic couplet became a convention] when other poets, following Chaucer, looked upon it and saw that it was good, and wore it threadbare.⁵

¹ I John 1: 1.

² Phil. 4: 8.

³ I Sam. 9: 3.

⁴ Psalm 51: 4.

⁵ Gen. 1: 4, 10, *et al.*

The marguerite, like the rose, was but the symbol of the lady; the lady must be perfect and entire, wanting nothing in all the qualities inherent in a lady. . . .⁶

To us moderns perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon of the Middle Ages is the mass of conventions that in literature and in life accumulated about love. It is not that love itself has changed its spots. We that are true lovers run into strange capers still. . . .⁷

The mediæval poetic idiom came after while to seem jargon—quaint, to be sure, and delectably naïve, but tedious and drolly untrue to life. Dido didn't wallow and swoon, or Aeneas wear a helmet equipped with a carbuncle that made the night as bright as day. . . . Let us put away childish things. And so the seventeenth century proceeded to put them away."⁸

But that shuddering relish for the horrors of conventions at their worst I grant to be a purely human frailty, like a fondness for detective stories. Artistically, the thing is reprehensible, and the feet of it go down to death.⁹

But "an ampler ether, a diviner air," also bears Wordsworth's unequivocal image and superscription, though this time the gold is the gold of Virgil.¹⁰

In the above passage there are two distinct allusions, while in the following there are actually five within the compass of one paragraph. After illustrating the manner in which various writers shape old material into new and lovelier forms, he writes:

None of these things move us, whether in Wordsworth, or Ben Jonson, or Burns, or Beethoven, or Miss Lowell. They are stuff for the loom, clay for the potter, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble—it matters not what in the slightest degree. We know what they are, but we know not what they may be, when the poet is done with them.¹¹

For inspiration is like the wind, that bloweth when and where and how it listeth.¹²

[Speaking of originality remoulding old materials, he writes:] Its cachet is its power to call breath from the four winds, and breathe upon the valley of dry bones, and make them live.¹³

For poetry, after all, is very much like Harvard yard. Somebody, in the good old Colony days, cut across at a new angle, and another at another, and adventurer followed in adventurer's wake. And the sequel today of their brave farings-forth is a criss-cross of trim and sacred paths. Which parable he who runs may read—and lo! into the waiting rut I too have comfortably slipped. [Which is interesting self-analysis!]¹⁴

But for a cumulative effect, and to save space, we will abbreviate still further the quotations and hear only the phrases: "make shipwreck

⁶ James 1: 4.

⁷ Jer. 13: 23.

⁸ I Cor. 13: 11.

⁹ Prov. 5: 5.

¹⁰ Matt. 22: 20; Gen. 27: 22.

¹¹ Acts 20: 24; I Cor. 3: 22; Isa. 29: 16; I Cor. 3: 12; I John 3: 2.

¹² John 3: 8.

¹³ Ezek. 37: 1, 9.

¹⁴ Hab. 2: 2.

in the process,"¹⁵ "new lands it has spied out,"¹⁶ "gathered to their fathers,"¹⁷ "there are lions in the way,"¹⁸ "Their last state is worse than the first,"¹⁹ "the fearful and wonderful thing,"²⁰ "when the critics clothed their necks in thunder and the poets pawed in the valley,"²¹ "one word is taken and another left,"²² "Ben Jonson shows the more excellent way,"²³ "things regarded as in any way common or unclean,"²⁴ "If ever the beauty of Israel was slain upon its high places, it was then!"²⁵ The list could be lengthened indefinitely, but it should be sufficiently obvious from these examples that John Livingston Lowes is thoroughly steeped in the biblical imagery and constantly uses that imagery to enrich his own diction.

III

But this astonishing familiarity with the language of the Bible, this direct and indirect homage to its literary power and beauty, raise a question as to his attitude toward its central message, for is it not the message of the book that gives to it wings and beauty and power? Is it possible in genuinely wise criticism to treat of style apart from content, of form apart from the informing spirit? Is not that the grave error of the mechanistic scientists of a passing era who attempted to interpret all human phenomena in terms of the body's functions?

At this point Lowes is seldom explicit, and one can find directions only by following indirections. Obviously he cannot completely escape the spiritual implications of the biblical message. "For not only," he says, "is the message of the Bible the most profoundly human that was ever penned, but its very form, in the soberest, least sentimental sense, is compact of 'the mighty hopes'—and fears—"that make us men.'"

And concerning the *Pilgrim's Progress*, he makes this interesting statement:

I have said nothing of the deep spiritual sincerity of the allegory, and I shall say but little now. It is the supreme source of the book's immortality, but its beauty is best served by reticence. . . . Behind the person of Christian stands the lovable figure of Bunyan himself. . . . Had the *Pilgrim's Progress* nothing else than that one great personality to offer, it would still be a book that the world would not willingly let die.

¹⁵ I Tim. 1: 19.

¹⁶ Numb. 13: 17.

¹⁷ Gen. 49: 29, 33, *et al.*

¹⁸ Prov. 26: 13.

¹⁹ Matt. 12: 45.

²⁰ Psalm 139: 14.

²¹ Job 39: 19, 21.

²² Matt. 24: 41.

²³ I Cor. 12: 31.

²⁴ Acts 10: 4.

²⁵ II Sam. 1: 19.

But it is the infinitely greater Personality behind that of Bunyan whom Lowes apparently fails to see.

He seems to be a part of the meandering stream of modern humanism, concerned neither with origins nor ultimate ends; but there is an almost wistful nostalgia for the spiritual security felt by men in other ages when he writes this note descriptive of our contemporary loss of a spiritual centre:

We have no shrines, most of us, any more—we Protestant-Puritan-Pagan-Anglo-Saxon-Occidentals—no tranquil Buddhas or symbols of the passion by the roadside, no solemn temples, few cool, silent churches, always open and inviting to withdrawal from the hurly-burly of the world. It is not my business to determine whether that means loss or gain. But one thing it is always in our power to do—to withdraw now and then from the periphery to the centre, from the ceaseless whirl of the life that streams and eddies round us to the deep serenity of those great souls of better centuries. . . .

For, like most men brought up within the Christian tradition, he can never quite lose his sense of the sustaining value of its spiritual heritage. He is among those excellent men who live upon the inheritance of faith stored up by our forefathers, but who add nothing to it. Indeed it is for this reason that the stores of spiritual energy in our time are being depleted. Like a true humanist, he looks to culture for our salvation.

Back in 1917, in an era comparable to the one in which we live, he wrote in his first book:

One reason why poetry is worthy of the consideration of men and women breathing thoughtful breath, in this return to chaos, is the fact that poetry's essence is also, in a sense that is profoundly true, the goal of life—it is creative energy made effective through restraint. And in these days when a shattered world is to be made over, and moulded into form and comeliness again, whatever throws into relief the eternal validity of the balance between freedom and restraint, of the belief that the individual is most truly individual when he builds, as individual, upon that which is common to him and to his kind—whatever lays stress on that is of constructive worth.

That is a brave note in a world where western culture as we have known it was threatened with extinction, but it sounds a bit thin in the midst of the awful clash of human passions. Something more dynamic than the "wise and urbane detachment with which," he says, "Chaucer came in the end to view the human comedy" is needed to preserve a world in which a professor can retain a chair in any such comfortable detachment. Our salvation lies in something that goes far deeper than "the refusal to be forever hurried with the crowd, and in our resolution to step out of it at intervals, and drink from deeper wells." There is

need for a new moral fibre in men and nations if even that area of life is to be saved.

Humanism alone, for all its cultural values, provides neither the moral standards nor the moral dynamic by which those standards may be achieved. The humanistic renaissance of our time requires also, if not chiefly, a moral and spiritual reformation. Urbane detachment is good and right if it sends a man back into the stream of humanity with new insights and a deeper sense of involvement in man's common lot, but if it becomes an ivory tower from which one serenely surveys the landscape and one's struggling fellows, it is part of the negative forces that would ultimately destroy all serenity.

In *The Road to Xanadu*, John Livingston Lowes made a significant contribution toward a "study in the ways of the imagination." It is a work that will remain a classic in the field of literary interpretation and discovery, for it is an amazing combination of skill in research and a style of lucid and imaginative power. It is to be hoped that it will increasingly achieve his purpose to make the findings of literary scholarship available "(and interesting, if that may be) beyond the precincts of its own solemn troops and sweet societies." He has analyzed in the most penetrating fashion the constant struggle between "Convention and Revolt in Poetry" in his book under that title. He has interpreted and enhanced the art of Geoffrey Chaucer in a book describing the development of his genius. And on every page of his critical work he has revealed a mind stored with the treasures of the ages and moving freely in the realms of gold. What more could one ask from a literary critic?

Surely one could not expect him to drag moral and religious implications into works of purely literary criticism. Undoubtedly not. There is nothing more inartistic than the moral tag. But does that mean therefore that we are to expect no serious attempt on the part of the critic to relate all man's vast creative energy to some sort of dynamic purpose in life such as is found within the stream of the biblical literature from which he has drunk so deeply? Should not the critics of our time help us to find a spiritual centre?

It is just here that Lowes disappoints some of us. He is not among those men ignorant of the biblical heritage and the Christian tradition. His diction is shot through with its imagery. But its central message of man's need of God, of man's need of redemption, man's desperate need of salvation, seems to have left him quite unmoved.

He would acknowledge the infinite beauty and pathos of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, but he would seem not to understand its spiritual implications for his own life and for the life of the world. He is like one who rode in a chariot on the road from Jerusalem to Gaza and read the

ancient prophetic evangel without comprehension until a man attached himself to the chariot and interpreted for him its meaning. One could wish for him, and for all men of good will in contemporary letters, that they might discover the significance of the Christian philosophy as it was discovered by Paul Elmer More in the writing of the volumes of *The Greek Tradition*.

Some such spiritual centre American life and American literature must recover if they are to make the highest contribution to the advancement of the race. Not on the æsthetic road to Xanadu, but perhaps on the road to Gaza or on the road to Damascus, it might be discovered afresh.

A PROBLEM IN FORM CRITICISM

GEORGE BROCKWELL KING

United College, Winnipeg

SOME little while ago I read in Professor W. W. Sweet's most informative book, *The Story of Religions in America* (first edition, 1930), an anecdote which interested me greatly. Dr. Sweet was commenting upon the musical part of New England worship in the Puritan colonies which, he said, "consisted of Psalm singing, in which the Psalm was lined out by the ruling elder, or by one designated by the minister. The people knew few tunes and as late as the beginning of the eighteenth century New England congregations were rarely able to sing more than three or four." Then he added:

The story is told of a New England deacon who, because of failing eyesight, found difficulty in reading the first line of the psalm and he apologized by observing:

"My eyes, indeed, are very blind."

The choir thinking this the first line of a common-meter hymn immediately sang it; whereupon the deacon exclaimed:

"I cannot see at all."

This the choir also sang. Astonished, the deacon cried out:

"I really believe you are bewitched"

and the choir responded, "I really believe you are bewitched," whereupon the deacon added "The mischief's in you all" and after the choir had sung that, the deacon sat down in disgust.¹

My interest in this story was due to the fact that for years I had had in my files another form of it, given by Nina Moore Jamieson and printed in the *Toronto Star Weekly* in its issue of June 13, 1925. Mrs. Jamieson made use of it as the beginning of an article on "Canadian Churches of Other Days." I quote it in full:

Fifty years ago church services throughout the country were largely held in the schoolhouses, where there was, of course, no organ, or other means of leading the singing. Hymn books were very scarce, so that it was usual to "line" the hymns. The minister would read two lines; the congregation would sing them. Then the minister would read two more lines, and they would be rolled forth dolorously by the people.

In a remote little country section there were two men who attended service regularly, each ambitious to lead in the singing, so that it was a race always to see which would get the tune started first. In such haste were they that little else appealed to them until the winner got his voice launched with its burden of words. Robert Hoath and Davie Farley they were, fine men both. One Sunday the minister

¹ W. W. Sweet, *The Story of Religions in America* (New York, Harper, 1930), pp. 85 f. Permission to quote has been granted by author and publisher.

wished to explain that there would be difficulty about the "lining"—he was an old man, and shortsighted.

In his most impressive voice he said, "My eyes are dim, I cannot see, I left my specs at home." Immediately Davie Farley made a jump for precedence, without realizing what he was jumping for, and off he went to the old common-metre tune "Ortonville":

"My—eyes—are—dim—I—cannot—see
I—left—my—specs—at—home—!"

The surprised congregation, though accustomed to Wesleyan flights of oratory such as

"With joy upon your heads arise,
And join your Captain in the skies—"

could not quite accept the new hymn. Some smiled audibly, but Davie was conscious only of triumph, as he had piously closed his eyes. The minister, irascibly emphatic, said loudly: "I did not say for you to sing—I left my specs at home!" And away went Davie the conqueror again, on this second couplet. This was too much for the congregation, especially the younger people, who fled giggling from the old log schoolhouse. For many a long day at barn raisings and logging bees, some loud voice would carol forth as a comic song: "My—eyes—are—dim—I—cannot—see—I—left—my—specs—at—home!"²

The finding of these two similar but dissimilar stories started the writer of this article off upon a long and delightful investigation, with something of the alluring thrill of a "mystery" tale about it, calling for close analysis of material and the following out of clues.

Obviously the two stories have a common origin. Obviously, too, the second story is the more recent, not only in setting, but in other respects. What is more interesting, however, is that both display characteristics similar to those which the application of the principles of form criticism has shown to exist in the material which went into the making of the gospels.

There is, for example, a change of setting of the incident narrated. Dr. Sweet's story has a Congregational background, with a choir and a recognized leader of sacred song. In Mrs. Jamieson's story, a pioneer Methodist setting has replaced the Congregational. There is no choir, and the singing depends for its success or failure in large part upon the presence in the little gathering of someone who can "raise the tune." This is an ordinary development in folk oral storytelling, a necessary one, if a story out of one environment is to have point in another and different environment.

Changes of setting are common in the gospel stories. The story of the sensible and stupid builders in the Gospel of Matthew (7:24-27) is furnished with a Palestinian setting. The sensible man is the one who

² Quoted by permission of the *Toronto Star Weekly*.

builds his house on the outcropping rock of the high ground. The stupid man is he who builds in the *wadi* bed, dry and sandy most of the year, but filled in the freshets of the rainy season. The two houses received their test in the winds and the rain of the wet season of the year. As it appears in the Gospel of Luke (6:47-49), the story is given a Syrian setting. Christianity has moved out from Palestine to Syria. There was in the valleys of Syria no such outcropping of rock as in Judæa only needing to be scraped off and built upon. But there were destructive floods in the springtime when the melting snow from the mountains filled the rivers to overflowing. He was a wise builder in that region who sank the foundation of his house down to the underlying rock. The stupid builder was the man who built simply upon the earth. The river in flood made speedy end of his house, while the other house stood fast. Thus the teller of Jesus' original parable changed, possibly almost unconsciously, the setting of the story to one suited to the environment of his audience, so as to press home more effectively the same lesson of foresight in character building.

Then there is the addition of the names in Mrs. Jamieson's story—"Robert Hoath" and "Davie Farley" instead of the unnamed "deacon"—and of the very tune used in the singing—"Ortonville." It is a common law governing the development of oral tradition that unnamed characters tend to be provided with names, preferably familiar names, if they are at hand, otherwise names as circumstantial as possible (note the "Davie" in the name above).

This too is a characteristic of the gospel stories. The use of the impersonal plural is a feature of the Gospel of Mark. This impersonal subject tends to be replaced by a definite subject in the other gospels, as when, for example, the "they" of Mark 3:2 who watched to see whether Jesus would heal the man with the withered hand on the Sabbath appears as "the scribes and Pharisees" in Luke 6:7. In Luke 22:8, the definite proper names, "Peter and John," are supplied for the indefinite "two of his disciples" of Mark 14:13. This phenomenon finds interesting expression in the apocryphal gospels, where the "wise men from the east" who came to see the infant Christ, as recorded in the Gospel of Matthew, become the definite personages, Gaspar, Melchior, and Balthazar. These gospels give the names of Mary's parents, omitted in the canonical gospels, as Joachim and Anna, and supply names also for the woman with the issue of blood, the robbers crucified with Jesus, and the centurion at the cross.

There is, finally, the increase in circumstantial detail in Mrs. Jamieson's story, even to the extent of the doubling of characters. There are two leaders of song, instead of one. The failing eyesight of the preacher is accentuated by the fact that he had forgotten his spectacles, and the

episode is pictured as not confined to the choir or congregation, but it becomes a part of the community tradition. This too is an inevitable mark of the storyteller's art. Stories do not become less detailed as they are told and retold, but, instead, become more detailed. Mrs. Jamieson's story is an artistic production, with touches that add interest and kindle imagination, and it is that because many hands (or should I say rather "mouths"?) have had a share in its fashioning through the years.

It is unnecessary to point out that this "law" may be seen operating in the gospels. To the story of the rich man who came to Jesus (Mark 10: 17-22), the detail is added by the Gospel of Matthew that the man was young (19: 20), possibly an inference from the words of Mark 10: 20, "from my youth," while the Gospel of Luke speaks of him as of the ruling class (18: 18). One blind beggar in the Gospel of Mark whose sight was restored by Jesus (10: 46-52) becomes two in the Gospel of Matthew (20: 29-34). Four thousand people are fed by Jesus from seven loaves and "a few small fishes." But the story of that miraculous feeding was retold many times and eventually the number of people fed became five thousand, and that from but five loaves and two fishes. This process is continued in the apocryphal gospels, where we are told, indeed, that there was not one, but two rich men, who came to Jesus, and that one of them, when he heard the requirements which Jesus laid down, began to scratch his head. These gospels fill in many more details lacking in the narratives of the canonical gospels.

The origin of Dr. Sweet's story intrigued me. Accepting at first the narrative as it stood, without critical examination, I let my imagination have free rein, and saw this story, originating in the New England states and in Puritan times, carried up from the place of its origin by United Empire Loyalists, who in the time of the American Revolution or in the years immediately following, driven from their comfortable and settled homes by the ill feeling stirred up by that fateful struggle, made their way in their thousands to the wilderness of Upper Canada, and there carved out new homes for themselves under the protection of the British monarch. Among the few possessions which they brought to this new land was this delightful bit of humor. In the new pioneer environment the setting and the incident underwent the changes and development noted.

Thus the matter rested, as I thought. In the meantime, I had quoted the story in its two versions to a class in Canadian church history. Then one of my students who served a week-end field at Clandeboye, some twenty-five miles north of Winnipeg, reported to me that he had repeated the anecdote in a church gathering there, only to be told by a member of his afternoon congregation, now resident with others of her connection in Manitoba, that she had heard her mother narrate the same story in

England. To the best of the knowledge of this informant, the incident actually occurred when the mother was a girl (about 1860) in the Select Baptist Chapel in Torquay, Devon, England, during the ministry of a Rev. Mr. Clancy, who would appear to have had Torquay as one of his preaching points.

The English version of the story is similar to the American, but the apology of the minister or deacon was couched in these words:

“My eyes are dim,
I cannot see,
My glasses I must wipe.”

When these lines were sung by error, he replied:

“Go on, you silly creatures!
You baint a-singing right.”

Now my finespun, imaginative theory of the origin and travels of the story had to go by the board! It was possible, of course, to think of it as also traveling across the Atlantic, but what about the tradition that the incident had actually happened at Torquay?

I should add that my friend, Professor S. R. Laycock, of the University of Saskatchewan, has since related to me a version of the words as he had heard them as a boy from his father in Ontario:

“My eyes are dim,
I cannot see,
My specs I left behind,
But down the road
Comes my son John,
And I hope he'll bring
My specs along.”

This version I dismiss with scorn, as I am sure my readers will. It shows an impoverishment of invention from which artistry is absent, revealing the fact that the popular mind had exhausted the possibilities of the theme.

I was now led to do—what I should have done in the first place—give Dr. Sweet's story a critical examination. My attention was immediately drawn to the mention of a “choir” in the story. Could there have been a choir in a New England church within the early period whose deficiencies in musical attainment Dr. Sweet appears to illustrate by this anecdote?

Investigation of the authorities would seem to rule out the choir. Paul Henry Lang, in his *Music in Western Civilization*, tells of the

decline of singing among the immediate descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers. So far did it go that John Cotton was led to publish in 1647 a defense of singing, in which he maintained that to sing the Psalms was a religious duty. The result was that a simple manner of congregational singing developed. But the congregation needed guidance in singing; so a precentor was appointed to lead the congregational singing by "lining out the tune."³ The eighteenth century saw, however, a gradual recovery and a new and more sympathetic attitude to music in churches.

John Tasker Howard, in *Our American Music*, has much the same to say about the development of music in Pilgrim days. He refers to the fact that the lack of music in the *Bay Psalm Book*, as also the inability of many in the congregation to read not alone music, but printed English as well, led to the appointment of the precentor. He points out that the habit of this leader of singing the Psalm line by line, pausing each time for the congregation to repeat the line he had just sung, led at times to ludicrous situations, such as the precentor's chanting the opening line:

"The Lord will come, and he will not"

waiting for the congregation to repeat it, and then continuing:

"Keep silence, but speak not!"

Eventually, singing societies were formed throughout New England. Their work led some of the churches to reserve the first seats in the gallery for the best singers, and from this custom church choirs developed.

So too Ezra Hoyt Byington, who states, in *The Puritan in England and New England*, that the Puritan fathers did not favor church choirs and that the singing was by the congregation for the larger part of the first (seventeenth) century.

It would appear, therefore, that Dr. Sweet's story cannot apply to the earliest Pilgrim period. It could find a setting, however, in the eighteenth century, and equally as well in the nineteenth. The "deacon" of the story can scarcely have been the precentor, for, if you have a choir, you do not need a precentor. True, the institution of the precentor died hard, in New England just as it did in Scotland. Dickson, on the authority of Dr. Chalmers, tells the story of an old member of the latter's congregation who opposed the movement to abolish the precentor on scriptural grounds.

³ The institution of precentor may have had its rise in this natural way in the Congregational New England churches, but it should be noted that in the year 1645 the Westminster Assembly passed a recommendation to the effect that "as many in our congregations cannot read, it is convenient that the minister, or some other fit person appointed by him and the other ruling officers, do read the psalm, line by line, before the singing thereof." The practice, thus originating in England, was adopted in Scotland with such perfervid ardor that it became one of the most striking characteristics of the national psalmody. For a very human portrayal of the precentor of olden Scottish days, see Nicholas Dickson, *The Kirk and Its Worthies*, chap. 5.

Asked to state her authority, she at once replied by asking, "What says Isaiah, Doctor? 'Line upon line, line upon line: here a little, and there a little.'" It is therefore not beyond the bounds of possibility that the story reflects a time when some individual church had for the moment both a precentor who lined out the Psalms line by line, and a choir with some instruction in singing from notes. It is more likely, however, that the "deacon" is to be looked upon merely as one who read the lines, the choir setting the tune.

If the incident occurred in New England in the eighteenth century, it could have traveled to Canada and been given an appropriate setting there, and also across the ocean to England. The difficulty with this conclusion is that the evidence for Torquay is fairly circumstantial.

If, on the other hand, the incident be placed in the nineteenth century, it might very well have occurred in England, and the account of it have crossed the ocean to the United States and become acclimatized in New England. It also reached Canada, and, according to the chronology of Mrs. Jamieson, became a tradition in rural Ontario in the years around 1875. I am inclined to accept this tentatively as the life history of the anecdote, though recognizing that it is but supposition, representing an attempt merely to construct a plausible theory to account for all the facts.

The pursuit of clues led to my writing to the compiler of "Table-Talk," that most delightful page of anecdotes and stories published weekly in the *Methodist Times and Recorder*, London, England. Stories appearing in an English setting on that page often have their American counterparts, and I thought it possible that the editor of the page could throw some light upon the story of our study. I received no answer to my query, however, and since it was the days of the greatest activities of Hitler's submarines, it is possible that the letter of enquiry was sunk without trace. Nina Moore Jamieson is no more; so investigation in that direction was blocked.

In "mystery" stories the investigator invariably gathers up all the tangled clues and puts his finger upon the archcriminal, to the great relief of the reader. I fear, however, that I have got myself enmeshed in an international imbroglio, from which at present I see no escape. Nevertheless, the attempt to untangle the skein has been a pleasant one. Perhaps the readers of this journal can furnish further clues to the puzzle of where this interesting story *really did originate!*

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF GERMANS

A REVIEW OF *MEN, MIND AND POWER*

SEWARD HILTNER

Federal Council Commission on Religion and Health

THIS BOOK¹ deals with a theme whose fundamental importance in relation to world peace is far greater than is commonly recognized. It is therefore, with reluctance that a somewhat negative judgment must be drawn on the competence and authoritativeness of this particular volume.

Men, Mind and Power is a psychological analysis of those characteristics of the German people which permitted Nazism to come to power legally, together with observations on the psychology of Nazi collaborationists in adjacent countries such as France and Norway. Its author is a Norwegian psychiatrist who has specialized in work with criminals, who has been in the United States since 1940, and who is now a research associate in the department of psychiatry of Columbia University.

Nearly two years ago this writer had the privilege of sitting in as a guest with a group carrying a very long title, and discussing the same subjects as are considered in this book from essentially the same point of view. While the conference was initiated by psychiatrists, its membership and guests included representatives of all the various students of the "life sciences"—psychologists, cultural anthropologists, sociologists, educators, and others. The findings of this particular discussion group have not been made public. But what struck me forcibly was the very large area of agreement on fundamentals. The agreement was objective and professional, that is, it was by no means simple patriotism united against an enemy nation. And in essentials I found my own view in agreement with the consensus. While I cannot quote this group, it is possible to present briefly my own views on the psychology of understanding the pattern of German character—if it is understood that I believe I am speaking, at least on fundamentals, for most careful students of the social sciences.

Why did the Germans permit power to be turned over to Hitler by legal means? Why did such a large proportion of the people receive such deep inner emotional satisfaction over having an absolute leader? What did Nazism mean to the German people? Are its inherent causes still present? These are some of the questions that require at least tentative answers.

A premise which needs to be accepted is that we are justified in thinking of the "character structure" of a people. Such a phrase could

¹ *Men, Mind and Power*, by David Abrahamsen, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 155, \$2.

of course be distorted to mean "group mind" or something of the kind. But barring such distortions, it is possible to refer to a people as having a certain character, or characteristic pattern of feeling and conduct, in the same sense that we can refer to a gas having a characteristic pattern of behavior. The conduct of any particular gas molecule cannot be wholly predicted; but the gas as a whole acts in a fashion which can be observed and predicted. The gas is an aggregate of molecules with different forms of behavior. It is also an entity with typical behavior. Recognizing full well the great variety of patterns of behavior to be found in individuals, subgroups, and regions, it is nevertheless possible to view the typical behavior of Germans as a group, just as might be done with any other group or people.

If this premise be accepted, then, despite the many divergencies and individualities, we can view certain patterns which are typical of German feeling and conduct. The essential point would seem to be the peculiar form and power of duality in the German typical character. It may be expressed in many different ways. On the one hand, we see a trend which is emotional, idealistic, active, romantic, irresponsible, creative, rebellious. On the other hand, we see a trend which is orderly, hard-working, methodical, gregarious, materialistic, preoccupied with status in a hierarchy. This is not to say that one group of Germans is of one type, and another of another. Nor that a mathematical blending of these two trends exists in every German. It is to say, rather, that in a typical sense German character can be seen as a partial fusion of and partial conflict between these trends.

Such trends may be found in individuals in other nations, but only in Germany do they appear to have the strength and extent that would warrant their being considered characteristic. To use one comparison, think of the difference in concept of status between Britain and Germany. Britain has been traditionally a nation with an hierarchical system, with nobility, tradesmen, servant class, etc., and with a rather strong notion that each should keep his place. But we have never heard this carried to such extremes in Britain as to refer to the postmaster's wife as "Mrs. Postmaster Brown." Yet in Germany we hear of "Mrs. Hotelkeeper Schmidt," or of "Mrs. Commissioner Hollweg." That is, the British have had status distinctions, but have not been obsessed by them. In the typical German character as we have referred to it, there has been an obsessive preoccupation with status distinctions. Thus we may speak of "status-anxiety," of being so deeply dependent upon one's status that one must continuously reiterate it as a form of self-reassurance.

Each of the aspects of the two trends mentioned above might be illustrated and elaborated upon. But the point to be kept in mind is that

one is dealing not with isolated factors or elements (such as a methodical factor) but with broad trends. That is, the methodical trait is so intimately tied up with the status-anxiety trait that they cannot be dealt with as separate elements but only as currents of the same stream.

The primary mediator of the culture is the family, and an understanding of the "typical" German family—in the sense in which we have referred to "typical" and "characteristic"—is helpful in understanding the development of the particular German character duality. Mother is loving, even overindulgent to the children until father comes home. He is then absolute ruler within the household, and the child may feel betrayed because mother concedes all points to father. The child, however, sees his father cringing before superiors in the hierarchy outside the family. Hence the child is given love, but of a conditional kind. He has security, but only up to a point. Betrayal, so to speak, becomes an integral part of life. Thus the child is taught the status-anxiety trend, from which relief is sanctioned only through the romantic, idealistic, irresponsible trend. Many observers have pointed out the peculiar character of the pre-Hitler German youth movement—its romantic and rebellious character, and yet the fact that most of the youths who romantically left home returned and entered father's business after all.

The psychological brilliance of Nazism was shown in the way it reinforced these trends—the worst elements of them of course—but it did not initially fight them. Unquestioning obedience, loyalty, readiness to sacrifice, self-assurance through place in a hierarchy, hard work—could these not be done better for the Leader than for father or something vague? Making something new, rebelling, romanticizing, having great ideals—could not these be better achieved under the Leader's direction with a heavy emphasis on anti-Semitism?

In a brilliant book Erich Fromm (*Escape from Freedom*, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941) demonstrates how Nazism was the culmination of the impossible psychological situation of German character which eventually produced this eruption as an "escape from freedom." It is of extreme importance to recognize that Nazism had roots, and that an understanding of those roots is deeper than looking merely at militarism, or at the Junkers and other large landholders, or at anti-Semitism, etc.

Nor is this analysis the same thing as saying that German character structure was authoritarian in nature. Certainly the dominant elements of character of certain other peoples might also legitimately be called authoritarian, but those peoples have not attempted to disrupt the peace of the world, and would not even if they were large enough to consider it (I am referring to certain smaller nations). There is something else in the German situation, the feelings and behavior of Germany as a nation.

We may call it extreme nationalism, but what does that mean? It means that it has been totally inconceivable for the "typical German" to imagine mutuality in relations between nations, because he has experienced no mutuality in all other relationships of life. Such a German would find "personal relationships" incomprehensible, insofar as they are relationships between basic equals. Functional differences become totalitarian differences. A captain is not just a better soldier or a better planner than a private; he is a better man. To think of anything else is impossible, in the view of the characteristic German pattern. With inner feelings and emotional presuppositions of this sort, all the premises of relationships between nations which we would think of become irrelevant. This gives insight into the motivation behind the premises of nth-degree power politics.

In every society there are individuals who present, in greater or lesser degree, the kind of character pattern which has been suggested as typical of the element which gained control—social control—in Germany. The scientific workers apply various terms to these, depending on the exact type and degree of severity. In extreme form they speak of "paranoid" trends; in less extreme form, of "compulsive" trends. The layman, looking at and talking with such a person, is inclined to think: "This person seems entirely rational except on those one or two points; it is too bad he is 'crazy' in those particulars." If he is asked to go through the wards of a mental hospital and select those patients with the best chance of cure, the chances are he will choose such a patient as this as over against one, for example, who does not know what day of the week it is. Yet the specialist knows that the chances of the second patient may be much better than those of the first. The first has woven his insecurity into a system in which he seems excessively sure of everything; the second still is troubled, and therefore is more open, despite appearances, to finding the way out.

Psychotherapy with individuals has shown that it is only with extreme difficulty that persons who have developed this kind of character structure can be helped to change. Actually, they feel weak; and to overcome this, become obsessed with power. They fear their place in the world; and so become preoccupied with their status till its assertion becomes an obsession. They have hidden doubts as to whether they are wrong; and so they assert compulsively that they are right, and go to every length to justify this. Their reasoning is scrupulously correct once their premises are accepted.

Nothing is gained by calling Hitler a paranoid; technically, that is not correct. To say that those trends in the German character which he typifies have come into being, and operate, on the same bases as produce

individual paranoid responses is, however, largely correct. The essential thesis of Richard M. Brickner's volume, *Is Germany Incurable?* must be accepted.

What has experience with individuals of this type shown about the best ways of getting them over these trends? At one extreme we might try the approach of sheer power, pushing the patient around, manipulating him, going after him for every detail. When this is tried, it reinforces the basic difficulty, makes the patient concentrate more on his system and its details, and bars any chance for the emergence of a more constructive attitude.

At the other extreme would be the softhearted approach. This would imply, "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this patient; we must simply stop him from injuring himself or others at those few points around which his obsessions centre." This also reinforces the basic difficulty. He takes advantage of every doubt accorded him, interprets the approach to him as weakness (whether it is or not), and feels that his power is becoming dominant.

If one starts treatment with the following assumptions, however, good may result. First, there is some constructive potentiality in the patient which is obscured by the deeply imbedded individual character structure; nothing can be done unless that is reached. Second, contrary to appearances, the patient really feels weak; and is obsessed with power because of lack of strength. Hence, whatever can reinforce real strength (as opposed to power over people) is good. Third, in essence the patient is preoccupied with the sense of responsibility, and will do everything possible to avoid feeling this. Hence, the only chance is that which refuses to allow him to project his sense of responsibility for his actions and their consequences. Fourth, since nothing can be done on the basis of his "emotional assumptions" about the nature of human relationships (one is either more or less powerful than another, and there is nothing else), some experience must be introduced which gives the feeling that relationships may be on a wholly different, *i.e.*, mutual basis.

On the basis of such assumptions, some individuals have been changed. It is a long and difficult process; and, in individuals, the outcome depends on the degree to which the constructive forces inside still have enough strength to beat at the psychic door and demand to be let out.

This is merely analogy; but provided the analogy is kept strictly within bounds, the following do seem to apply to dealing with the German people. First, attitudes of either vindictiveness or vacillation toward Germany will equally stimulate the main unsatisfactory trends in character structure. Second, measures aimed only at single elements in the typical character will entirely miss the point. Third, any impression that some-

thing from outside is ultimately responsible for the national destiny will further provoke the projection, or shifting, of the sense of responsibility. Fourth, the application of strength (but not power) must be for the ultimate purpose of evoking the real strength which is potential in the German people. Fifth, while the application of such strength may temporarily appear like the exercise of power, or even of vindictiveness, we shall fail if this appearance is permitted to become a reality.

In a general way, it is possible to say that most careful students of the life sciences would agree on the analysis that has been given above. Let me return to the book under review and see it in the light of this understanding. Nearly all the points mentioned are also contained in this volume, and so it has both truth and relevance. But it is somewhat disjointed and "unsemantic." A great deal of it is devoted to psychological analysis of individual leaders—Hitler, Goebbels, Laval, Quisling, and others—after the case-history fashion. These are interesting, though not done with distinction, but the author makes little effort to suggest what the relationship is, if any, between these as explanations of the warped trends in selected individuals and the phenomenon which has been German Nazi culture. There is sociological naïveté at times, as when he indicates that Goebbels' "attending so many universities indicates that he was unable to find himself and that his emotions were difficult to control," apparently forgetting what a strong feature of Germany university life peripatetism has been for many decades. Though his studies of Quisling and Laval are the most original contributions of this volume, he nowhere attempts adequately to wrestle with the question of why one person with deep inner insecurity attempts to get rid of it through attempts at power, while another assumes quite a different pattern of behavior.

In his attempt to trace back the German sense of insecurity which has resulted in the character duality, one may consider his references to the Germans as dwellers in dark forests a bit on the fanciful side. He follows Sigrid Undset in considering that the Pied Piper of Hamelin could have been created only by Germans, and also, like her, ignores those elements of similarity (though not identity) with Scandinavian folk tales. Fortunately he does not appear to share Undset's unobjective emotionalism about everything German.

Abrahamsen at times uses the analogy of criminals in relation to Nazi leaders and collaborationists. They are not "war criminals," but "were criminals before the war, and they were criminals before they became the leaders of Germany." He says: "Hitler was a savior as no gang leader has been. . . . They had a cause—an evil, twisted cause, but still a large goal outside themselves." This identification with criminality seems a bit warped, for only in one sense did the Nazi leaders

have "contempt for the legal and ethical standards of established society." They did have such contempt for the ethical standards of what may be called loosely "western civilization." But, unlike the criminal individual, they were scrupulous in following all legal procedures until they got into power, and then were scrupulous in justifying anything they did. It is true some criminals are like that; but it is because of the character pattern they have developed. That is, *criminal* is the description of an outcome, rather than of a process or a cause. Failure to remain clear on this point has detracted from the cogency of Abrahamsen's argument.

The author's "doctrine of man" is a bit on the superficial side. We must assume, he says, that even a criminal or a German "has a core of good traits." To believe that, beneath all observable conduct, there is a constructive potential is one thing. To talk of a "core of good traits" is quite another. The implications of the latter are that one can peel off this or that element and allow the "core" to come forth. This contrasts with the view which sees character structure as something unitary, rather than as a mere bundle from which one may take away a fagot or two. The whole structure stands or falls together. It can be changed, but not by dealing in fagots or their psychological equivalent, traits.

The author's suggestions for what can be done with and to Germany now are distressingly vague. Of course the Germans must be made to see that the world could survive only if Nazism were destroyed. Of course attention must be paid to the education of the young. Of course we must aim at sufficient change in basic character structure as to eliminate those forces which will be satisfied only with world domination. But a psychiatrist might well have been more trenchant in his suggestions.

Certainly we can now be reasonably sure that a good deal of what is actually being done in Germany runs counter to what would be implied if the principles generally accepted by the social scientists were followed. It is doubtful if the occupation authorities are as much to blame for this as general public opinion. Insofar as we have failed to take moves to get food and clothing to German children, we have been vindictive whether we like that word or not. Insofar as we have not made up our minds whether our troops should treat the Germans as persons, we are vacillating. The uncertainty as to how long American occupation forces will stay is also vacillating, and is interpreted as weakness. What are we doing to encourage "strength" as against "power"? No one who has not studied the scene on the ground can afford to be merely critical. But no reports from any source suggest that the American public mind is prepared to back the kind of program that would be implied in the general conclusions of this paper.

Christians are properly concerned with the desperate plight of many

Germans along with that of their victims, especially with the suffering and death of the children. This case must be argued for a long time. But is it not desperately essential for Christians to think of the long-term effect of attitudes toward the German people as well as political action toward the German state? The Christian church is, to a large extent, the only institution which crosses national lines in such a way that the "new experience" element, mutual human relationships, can naturally come more deeply into German life. But this would seem no reason for individual Christians who are citizens of other countries to fail to see that many Germans will interpret soft action as weakness, and hence be confirmed in the character trends which produced the difficulty in the first place. Food and clothing are not soft action. They can and should be major ways of introducing that new emotional experience which can become capable of experiencing mutuality. But uncertainty whether the Americans will pull out in a few months is soft action, the kind of vacillation which will root the malignant trends more deeply. Let us hope that, by the time this appears in print, the actual situation in Germany may have improved. But may we not forget that there is a continuing obligation to help the American people to *understand* Germany and the German people, and not merely to react for or against them emotionally. At least may we hope that those who do the actual occupying receive some education about German character.

A final word. Many Germans or persons of German origin react with resentment to this kind of analysis, either that in *Men, Mind and Power* or in my review. "You see nothing good in Germans, and put us all in the same boat," they say. Such a reaction is to misunderstand analysis of this kind. It is possible to analyze the "typical" American character structure—as being preoccupied with personal advancement measured through certain symbols, for instance—and make it sound pretty gruesome by sheer description. What has been attempted for the Germans could be done for any people or group. It is done for Germany because the particular trends threaten world peace. Until they are changed, world peace cannot be assured. If the feelings of a methodical and romantic professor of German ancestry are hurt because he likes those qualities, and exercises them in a framework which does not threaten world peace, we can only ask him whether there is not a world of emotional difference between what he feels are proper relationships between persons and what the Nazis typified as to those relationships. We are not condemning the German people. We are most assuredly saying that those trends in German culture which have made possible the rise of Nazism must be condemned and eradicated if the world is to know peace and all Germans, as well as others, are to have a chance to be human beings.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

IT IS very easy to be conservative in someone else's field. Anyone who has occasion to see a group of experts in action can easily verify that fact, especially if the observer is, so to speak, on the fringe of the group. In their own field they are at home, have a profound appreciation for values which are everywhere observable to them, but at the same time are aware of many problems which to the layman, even though he be an expert in his own field, are not so clear. And precisely because he is to a real degree an amateur, it is very hard for him to refrain from the feeling at times that there is an almost reckless casualness in the way evidence is treated. Thus he awakes with a start—if he is really a conscientious scholar—to the realization that were the rôles reversed and one of these experts to attend a discussion in which he and his fellows went to town, precisely the same emotions would probably be engendered.

So I mused a few weeks ago at a meeting of classical students, who for the most part were competent investigators. It so happened that the speaker had presented a paper somewhat remote from the special competence of most of the classicists: a phase of early Christian history. In the ensuing discussion one of the members, a professor of Greek and an able classicist, expressed surprise and, though he was courteous, evident disapprobation, at the "customary skepticism" displayed by biblical scholars to the canonical scriptures. To be sure, the reader had shown precisely that, largely because he was far from being an expert in the field which he was discussing; but that was not the real reason for my friend's disapproval. He would have felt the same way had the speaker been never so expert. On the other hand, had the paper been devoted to Homer or some other of the classical authors where he knew the evidence and could see the problem, he would have been quite easy, while the biblical student might well have sat in the seat of the perplexed, if not of the scornful.

As these thoughts chased themselves through my mind at that meeting, I thought again of another example I had had some years before. Professor Goodspeed had just published his translation of the New Testament, and it was being widely discussed. No less a figure than Arthur Brisbane, the brilliant editorial writer for the Hearst syndicate, took a hand in the game. He had just discovered that Goodspeed had omitted the famous story of the Woman Taken in Adultery, and he was greatly pained. The burden of his editorial was the reckless and unwarranted treatment of the Bible by so-called scholars. No wonder the church was suffering setbacks when such was the order of the day!

I have learned few more valuable lessons than was mine that minute. I had been an admirer of Mr. Brisbane, and regularly read his editorials on government, politics, and law. He had seemed to me to have a profound and expert grasp of problems which to me were very obscure, could walk with certainty in fields to which I was a stranger. Then came the dawn. Here Mr. Brisbane had chanced into a field where I was not a stranger, and instantly I knew what the old phrase about the idol having feet of clay meant.

Professor Goodspeed had been entirely justified in omitting the section. As a conscientious student, he could do no other. The story, regardless of its appeal, and irrespective of whether it may or may not rest on some actual experience of Jesus, is not a part of the Gospel of John. The textual evidence leaves no question. The four earliest uncial manuscripts omit it; no Greek manuscript before the ninth century, save the *Western D*, has it. The Greek Fathers—Clement, Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, to mention but a few—did not read it in their copies of John. Eusebius' evidence, though not intended by him to illumine that point, is decisive; for he remarks, when speaking of Papias, that the latter had expounded "a story about a woman who was accused before the Lord of many sins, which the Gospel according to the Hebrews contains." Whether the story known to us was this other story, and whether the reference to the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" was due to Papias or to Eusebius, are uncertain points; that as late as the time of Eusebius (*ca.* A.D. 323) there was no such story attached to the Gospel of John is beyond question. Furthermore, the fact that one whole family of late manuscripts places it after Luke 21:38, that others put it after John 7:36 or 7:44 or at the end of the gospel, indicates its foot-loose nature. The first of the Greek expositors to consider the question, *viz.*, Euthymius (*ca.* A.D. 1100), remarked: "It is necessary to observe that the section is either not found in the accurate manuscripts or is obelized. From this it appears to be an interpolation and addition." How the story, which not only distinctly interrupts the narrative in John at the point of its insertion, but is written in a totally different style from that of the gospel, chanced to become attached to it at this point is one of the many enigmas as yet unsolved. Was it in part to deny the charge in 7:15 that Jesus could not write? Was it prompted, in part, by 7:51 ("Doth our law judge a man, except it first hear from himself and know what he doeth?"), in part, by 8:15 ("Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man")? At any rate, the conscientious translator has no option in the matter. It is not a part of the Gospel of John, and therefore is not a part of the New Testament. To print it in brackets (as did the American Revised), or in the margin, or in different type, or

even as a footnote (as do the translators of the new Revised Standard Version) is an unjustified and dangerous and misleading evasion. The only honest course is to omit it.

These are not details of esoteric wisdom, known only to the initiated few. They have been known and frequently expressed in entirely understandable prose for nearly a century; yet the facile Mr. Brisbane wrote his schoolboyish blast. And by writing it he lost at least one admirer and reader, for it suddenly dawned on me: I have been reading this man as though he were the Lord's anointed. With no knowledge at all of the fields in which he roams seemingly so at home, I have assumed that he knows what he is talking about, has appraised the evidence as I have not, and is accordingly competent to have an opinion as I am not. Now I have seen him at work in a field where I am at home, and either his ignorance is profound and inexcusable or his moral sense is so blunted that he can ignore facts in order to noise prejudices. Is it not highly probable that many of his other editorials which I, a layman, have read with profound respect, verging on awe, have seemed as shallow and amateurish to the experts who really know the facts as does this one to me where I am at home? The suspicion was deadly. And for me Mr. Brisbane set to rise no more.

But it was a wholesome experience, for it dinned home once again that other cardinal, but easily overlooked, fact: How hard it is to realize that to have the right to an opinion requires a real degree of exact knowledge! And since that day I have smiled inwardly again and again when one of my students begins in pontifical tones: "Professor, I have always thought..." And sometimes, I must confess, my smile has not been entirely inward. And the same confession might be made with only slight alterations regarding thoughts I have had while sitting in the pews. Irresponsible talk, the readiness to express an opinion on every subject, eloquent protests and glittering criticism of the work of those who turn up evidence which we do not like—these are the banes of our age, and, like the poor, are ever with us. Alexander Pope may seem to many shoddy and out of date; his observation anent the nature of the Pierian spring might still be read and pondered with profit. And so once again we can conclude and emend: "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly."

From Off the Campus and On

AT THE RISK of seeming flippant it may be said with some literalness that it is risky business to essay the rôle of a prophet, for not infrequently the rôle turns into a tumble. Professor Waterman is ready to assume that risk; the CROZER QUARTERLY, while making no claim of especial inspiration, is ready also to assume that rôle to the modest extent of predicting that Dr. Waterman's article will receive a wide reading. And for him it is far from a mere academic subject. His address, as president of the American Oriental Society, a half-dozen years ago, was devoted to it; in 1943 he published a volume, *Religion Faces the World Crisis*, reviewed in these pages in July of the same year; now the present article. Since 1915 Professor Waterman has been chairman of the department of Oriental languages and literatures at the University of Michigan. He was one of the translators of *The Complete Bible* (the so-called "Chicago translation"), has done much in the fields of archæology, and is a cuneiformist of distinction. He is a graduate of Hillsdale College, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, and was elected a few months ago to the presidency of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

Dr. Bosley is a well-known preacher. Since 1938 he has been minister of the Mount Vernon Place Church, in Baltimore. Following his graduation from Chicago (B.D. and Ph.D.), he was director of religious activities at Iowa State Teachers College for four years. During his current pastorate he has published two books: *The Quest for Religious Certainty* and *The Philosophical Heritage of the Christian Faith*. He is a frequent preacher on college campuses, and in 1942 received an honorary doctorate from his *alma mater*, Nebraska Wesleyan.

It is always a joy to welcome Dr. Brightman to our pages; to introduce him in full form would require at least a page—and paper is still scarce—and would be unnecessary, for his name is a household word among philosophers and religionists, professional and lay alike. Whenever he writes or speaks—and both of these functions are to him automatic—people heed. And students still go to Boston University, where he has taught since 1919, to do their graduate work with him. *Ipse quoque adstitit multis, et mihi ipsi*.

Professor Ingles may be introduced in his own words. (They are of interest and provide a moment of respite to the editor.)

As to personalia: I was born in Scotland, but have been educated entirely in this country, receiving the A.B. from Wheaton College (Illinois), Th.B. from Princeton Theological Seminary, and M.A. in English from Princeton University.

I have more recently done further graduate study under Dr. Edwin Lewis and Dean Hough at Drew University. I began teaching in prep school immediately after graduation from seminary and taught for eight years. Then I served as assistant minister in a Presbyterian church, and as pastor of a Baptist church (my own denomination in spite of training at Princeton Seminary), and finally joined the faculty of Bates College two years ago as assistant professor of English. I have published three novels, a number of articles, and some poetry.

Professor Ingles' article will probably prove of interest to most; his concluding paragraphs may arouse dissent in some and even the desire to querry their author.

Dean King is no newcomer to our pages. Several articles and book reviews by him have appeared through the years. It is a pleasure to welcome him back, especially when he comes with so delightful an essay in his hands. He is a graduate in arts (including a Ph.D.) of the University of Toronto and a bachelor and a doctor of divinity from Emmanuel College, Toronto. For several years he was managing editor of the *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*. He is now dean of theology at United College, Winnipeg.

Dr. Hiltner's article was accompanied by a letter of apology—I had been asked for a review: behold what I send! A paragraph from that letter will be of interest:

I've been interested in the psychological understanding of Nazism for a long time, especially under the stimulus of my friend Erich Fromm. Nearly two years ago I wangled myself into the inner circle of the psychiatrists to attend their special series of conferences on this subject. I wrote a couple of things at the time to clarify my views, but never published them because I couldn't quote this group, and could claim no expertness in having visited Germany and all the rest. A constructive exposition starting from a book review has seemed the ideal way to get my views in print without trying to pose as an expert in ways in which I am not. But do be assured that I shall be most delighted to file this and write a brief review. After all, I've got it off my chest.

We are sure that there will be many readers who will agree that both Mr. Hiltner and the editor chose the better part. Mr. Hiltner—a graduate of Lafayette College and the University of Chicago, and a Presbyterian minister—is executive secretary of the Commission on Religion and Health of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

Once again the CROZER QUARTERLY is able to present a good grist of reviews from able reviewers. The pages devoted to these reviews and notices are apparently, if letters can be trusted, eagerly read and keenly appreciated. Thus in extending thanks to the twenty-two reviewers the editor is confident that he is expressing not only his personal thanks but the thanks of those who might be styled—to borrow a phrase which he

often heard in his days of attendance at meetings of Christian Endeavorers—"absent in body but present in spirit." Professor Abrams is a member of the department of sociology of the University of Pennsylvania and a frequent reviewer in these pages. Dr. Arbuckle is minister of the Newton Centre Baptist Church and associate professor of preaching at Andover Newton. President Aubrey and Dean Batten, both of Crozer, are always welcome reviewers. Professor Branton holds the chair of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Cranston is Phillips professor of religion at Dartmouth. Professor Davidson is a member of the department of anthropology at Pennsylvania. Professors Davis and Enslin have chairs of theology and New Testament respectively at Crozer. Professor Ferré is Abbot professor of Christian theology at Andover Newton. Dr. Grey is minister of the First Congregational Church of Woburn, Mass. Professor Hallowell is a member of the department of political science at Duke University. Dr. Harkness is professor of church history at Crozer. Professor Keighton has the chair of homiletics at Crozer. Dr. Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament of the same school. Mr. Morey is supervising principal of the Swarthmore (Pa.) public schools. Professor Pritchard holds the Old Testament chair at Crozer. Dr. Rose has been for twenty years minister of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia. Professor Thomas is professor of practical theology at Crozer. Mr. Westphal has been for many years minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. Professor Widgery, a frequent figure in these pages, is on the faculty of Duke University in the department of philosophy. Professor Wright has held a similar chair at Dartmouth since 1916.

BOOK REVIEWS

What Is Christian Civilization? by John Baillie, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. 59, \$1.

The small number of pages of this publication might wrongly suggest that it is a mere pamphlet. Compactly printed, it contains the Riddle Memorial Lectures (University of Durham), which followed closely the author's Hoyt Lectures and others given "to ministers in Pittsburgh, Princeton and Chicago in June and July." This is mentioned to indicate the nature of the volume and to draw the attention of those who may have heard the lectures. They may agree with me that this is a book to read and reread and will want to possess it. The publishers deserve commendation for offering it at a price conducive to its wide circulation.

The standpoint indicated in its last line should be remembered in reading the whole book: "that here we have no continuing city," that is, that in the sense in which the term "civilization" is taken, Christianity involves more than any civilization. In his first section the author describes the relations of Christianity and civilization up to the latter part of the eighteenth century. The changes which have occurred since that time up to our own day are considered in the second section on "the Christian attitude towards contemporary civilization," with so many more or less completely detached "from the fellowship of Christian worship." Against any form of Christian "isolationism," Dr. Baillie insists that Christians have "a responsibility towards the general society of the West," and have a duty to strive for the realization of "the conception of Christian civilization." In the third section, on "the future of the West," he raises the question as "to the residual sense in which our present society may be held to merit" the name, Christian.

At the opening of his final paragraph, in what must be considered his concluding remarks, Dr. Baillie says: "It is accordingly wrong to think of earthly civilization and the Christian ideal of community as standing in simple antithesis to one another; . . ." His use of "accordingly" is justified, for this view is implicated in his argumentation throughout the book. What I would point out is that this statement does not contrast "earthly civilization" with a "*Christian civilization*," but with "the Christian *ideal of community*." Dr. Baillie does not give us any clear "conception of Christian civilization, but stresses certain ethical principles acknowledged in Christianity and points to certain aspects of Christian religion which go beyond any civilization. It is a question requiring discussion beyond the scope possible in a short book review, whether one ought at all to use the term "Christian civilization." One might, and I think, should endeavour to form a conception of "ideal civilization." In this the ethical principles acknowledged by Christianity, if valid, would rightly be included, and that as valid ethical principles and not specifically as Christian. Such an ideal might be acknowledged and worked for by a Christian or a Jew, a Hindu or a Muslim, even by a mere secularist or an avowed atheist. Each might do this in association with his religious or nonreligious attitude with reference to what is beyond civilization.

The chief defect of the book, a serious one because it is fundamental for his subject, is that Dr. Baillie does not make clear what he fully means by the term "Christian." He says that the Christian religion is a faith and a fellowship. In fellowship he definitely includes fellowship of worship, by which I take him to mean Christian worship. But what is the scope of belief involved in the faith?

He quotes a report of "the Youth Advisory Council appointed by the Board of Education" in Britain: "We are concerned to see preserved, or born, a genuinely Christian civilization. This we take to mean, not a civilization all of whose members are necessarily professing Christians, but one in which the Christian belief in God, and all that is consequent upon it of human liberty and brotherhood, and the preservation of the fundamental ideas of truth, goodness and beauty, set the tone for society." Of this, Dr. Baillie writes: "It will be seen how closely this conception of Christian civilization resembles that which I have myself ventured to defend." But the question which forces itself on me is: Does the phrase "the Christian belief in God" imply for Dr. Baillie the traditional ecclesiastical dogmas, as, *e.g.*, the Christological, and does he suppose the compilers of the *Report* to imply them?

That there is much mere secularism today is all too evident. Dr. Baillie does not adequately consider the question: Who is responsible for it? The leaders of the Christian churches may be charged with having the largest share in that responsibility: but he does not consider that. The situation is not a simple anti-thesis between secularism and traditional Christianity: there are many who are not content with the former who cannot express their religion in the latter. In my opinion (which may be wrong) there is a religious attitude that does not seek expression in the Christian churches, more widespread than Dr. Baillie appears to acknowledge; and among many outside the churches there is a felt need for religious expression. With Milton one might say: "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed." The spiritual constitution of the modern man revolts from forms of Christian doctrines and finds no nourishment in some continued forms of Christian worship. That so many today have no interest in the stale bread of Christian tradition gives me hope for our civilization.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

The Coming Great Church, by Theodore O. Wedel, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. ix, 160, \$2.

The warden of the College of Preachers in Washington, D. C., deals with the problem of church unity from an Anglican point of view. He is a middle-of-the-road Anglican who sees values both in the high church emphasis on liturgical solidity and in the evangelical stress on possession of the Holy Spirit. In general theological position he leans toward what is today called neoorthodoxy. The book is one of the very best discussions of the problem from the Anglican viewpoint.

His main contention is that "the coming Great Church" will be a people's church, rooted in an increasingly common faith, achieving organic union through deeper recognition of the necessity for corporate life and authority, and finding a formula for ecclesiastical order in the bishop as the presiding officer at the Lord's Supper. This contention he supports by arguing that Protestant appeals to the Bible bring us back to the fellowship that produced the Bible; that the Holy Spirit functions always through a Christian fellowship; and that the church today is doomed unless it returns to a biblical theology to give it a firm standing place in the face of modern secularism and modernist historical relativism.

This argument is close-knit, but yet it is not convincing because it reads history with an Episcopalian bias. Many outside the Anglican church will welcome the benignity of the author's spirit, the absence of that arrogance which too often marks the Roman and the Anglo-Catholic. Yet important facts in the history of Christian thought are neglected, which other communions think significant.

To use the Old Testament to substantiate the importance of the church in religion is to confuse the Jewish ecclesiastical system with the Jahweh covenant—an identification which prophets from Amos to Jesus definitely repudiated. It tends also to elevate the temple worship at the expense of the more informal and democratic synagogue.

In accepting the view of Irenæus and Cyprian that the Holy Spirit is found only in the church, Dr. Wedel ignores the recurrent spiritualist sects which have repeatedly achieved reforms of Christian discipline and enriched personal religion. It is unfortunate that he should approvingly quote Dom Vonier to the effect that it is not the coming of Christ that is manifest and the Spirit hidden but the reverse, for the quotation itself confuses the point by speaking at one point of the human birth of Jesus and at another of the Ascension as though they were the same. The Spirit remains invisible in a sense that Jesus was not, even if one think of the church as ministering the Spirit. The implications of this fact are important for the whole argument.

The reader will certainly be shocked to be asked, regarding the amount of theological reflection devoted to the nature of the church, ". . . there is the *City of God* of Augustine. But what else—until almost our own generation?" Surely the work of Gregory the Great, the *Commonitorium* of Vincent of Lérins, the fourth book of Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles*, Wyclif's *de Ecclesia*, Calvin's important discussion in the fourth book of the *Institutes*, and Schleiermacher's in *The Christian Faith* will at once come to mind; not to mention the vigorous controversies of the seventeenth century. A careful reading of the last named would force the author to restate many of the issues.

The solution proposed for the knotty problem of "orders" (i.e., the ministry, the dominant nettle in current Anglican-Presbyterian conversations) is a dubious one. The proposal is that the act of presiding at the Lord's Supper be taken as constitutive of the episcopate, and that the bishop in this sense be the centre of unity. But this would require a specific rite as the basis of Christian unity, and one's mind goes back to Paul's attack in Galatians on the Judaizers. The Quakers would of course be excluded by this device.

On the nature of Christian unity the book is clear: it should be organic union. The lack of such organic union is deplored, and federation is found sadly wanting. But to many of us federation seems both a more realistic and a more profitable solution of church divisions.

However, anyone interested in Christian unity must read this book. He will find shining through its arguments a gracious and irenic personality such as the ecumenical spirit requires.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Valiant for Truth: The Biography of Frederick Lincoln Anderson, by Joseph Chandler Robbins, Philadelphia, Judson, n.d., pp. ix, 166, \$2.50.

Great biographies are scarce articles. Generally they have been the story of a man or woman who seemed to be of far from common clay; always they have been told in such a way that quite apart from the central figure the reader finds himself enthralled. Most biographies are not that. Their charm lies in the fact that the one whose life is retold was already of interest to the man who turns the pages. And this is true of *Valiant for Truth*. It makes no pretense of being great writing; it is utterly free from any bids—conscious or unconscious—for immortality. It is a simple, unpretentious chronicle of a man who by many, perhaps most, standards

was far from out of the ordinary. When it appeared, it made no stir, nor will it ever be a best seller. Nonetheless it will be highly prized by many men and women who knew and respected, yes, and loved, the good man whose story it so unpretentiously tells. I have read and reread it, and I expect not infrequently to repeat that pleasure in the coming years; and with many others who would undoubtedly say the same, I gladly express my gratitude to Dr. Robbins for his work.

Much of the material in this book will be familiar to many of its readers—at least it was to me. Professor Anderson's students can scarcely forget having heard many of the incidents from his own lips, while the anecdotes about him were of a quality to be eagerly passed on and remembered. Nonetheless I question whether the majority of the folks who knew him by name and by sight really knew him. His mannerisms were many, and were easily imitated; his marked ability as a religious politician and his bulldog tenacity to hold the line against what he felt were harmful assaults, as in the case of the proposed merger of Baptists and Disciples—this was well known; his dominating—some would say his domineering—attitude in most assemblies where he chanced to be present, and his insistence on hewing to the line—these too were well known. But there was another side to the man, and those who really knew and got under his guard, knew it and loved him for it. He was not a man to take liberties with. Those who tried it learned its folly to their cost. With Longfellow he would have agreed that life was real and life was earnest, though in many other ways I fancy he would have differed widely from the genial Cambridge poet. He took his religion with the bristles on; his fondness was for the tough corned beef. What was worth doing was worth doing well, and woe to the one whose hands became slack. But there was another side which was not so well known. Under his gruffness and severity, there was one of the warmest, kindest, and most sympathetic hearts I have ever known. He was demanding of others; he was more demanding of himself.

As I have said, much of the material in this volume was familiar to me, as it probably will be to many others—Professor Anderson's friends and former pupils—but again and again I found as I read, incidents in his early life which seemed to explain many a point. Some of them were obvious. No one could have been sired by that old war horse, Galusha Anderson, without becoming—if he survived at all—a son of battle. Again he had told me, as he doubtless had others, when he detected in me what seemed to him too little regard for intercessory prayer, the moving experience which he had had as a young husband during the night of crisis when his wife's life hung by so slender a thread. But there were other incidents which I had not known, but which, as Dr. Robbins has introduced them, throw many side lights and half-lights. Some of them, while not so intended, I found even funnier than some of the anecdotes which Newton men have chuckled over for years. One of them was his sudden awaking to the fact, as a college student, that his religion had been getting decidedly rusty. Like Paul, he heard a voice, and it addressed him in characteristically Andersonian manner: "What a fool you are. If you are not a Christian, you'd better become one, and do what God demands." In reply he said, "I will." And how did he start? First by making the beds which his invalid mother had failed to get around to; next by volunteering to teach a class in the Sunday school. And he received a class with two little girls! Anybody who knew Andy at any period of his checkered career—from the cradle to the grave—and can, without a grin, visualize him teaching "two little girls" in some corner of a Sunday school room, has greater self-control than I. The other incident which caused me to howl occurred during his pastorate in Rochester. Between making his church

what seemed⁶ to him a democratic one, insisting that the souls of all in Rochester get themselves properly saved, and waging warfare on the forces of liquor and vice (during which battle, in the author's fresh and novel phrase, "the brewers began to tremble in their shoes") his twelve years were full. But one week he had attended a clerical club in which "a Christian leader whom he revered and loved" had read a paper, "Will the Coming Man Drink Wine?" and, believe it or not, Andy was carried off his feet! He decided that that was hot stuff and that he would "speak along the same lines to his men's class on Sunday." That was Thursday night. What happened between then and Sunday morning when the deed of devilish daring was to be done is a story which is too good to spoil by quoting. Buy a copy of the book and read it on pp. 69 ff. And learn—believe it or not—that during an earlier illness he "had had to take brandy" and "had hankered after it for months afterwards." These were bits of Andersoniana which had escaped me.

Despite such lovely sections, and the pictures of his clashes with some of the big boys of Rochester—both in and out of his famous Second Church—I found the chapter on life in the pastorate less facile. Too often it seemed a patchwork of incidents supplied by willing hands and pasted together by a couple more. But when he reached the Newton Hill as professor of New Testament, the story for me sparkled, probably because that was the Anderson whom I knew and loved. And now I am able to fill in the details of his memorable fight in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention and his friendship with that ace-in-the-hole politician, Martin Lomasney, which was already legend while I was on the Hill.

All told, I have read the book with delight—and of how few books which come across his desk can an editor say that! A dear friend of the years to whom I owe a debt of gratitude which I can never repay was with me again. In many ways he was a last Puritan; as in the case of the Paul he admired, some of the things he fought and bled for seem today far less important; some have solved themselves. But though again and again you smile and even chuckle, it is never in contempt—at least it is not for me—rather, it is always in affection and admiration. Dr. Robbins is to be thanked for this labor of love to a friend of his who was also a friend of many. And it was a true flash of inspiration which led him to print as the concluding pages of this book the address which Professor Anderson gave at the funeral of one of his students who died just before graduation. To read that is to read the heart of one who was often, and rightly, styled "the dear old bear."

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Experience Worketh Hope, by Arthur John Gossip, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. 200, \$2.

Here are sermons which listen as truly, and quite as much, as they speak. Reading them is like overhearing a telephone conversation in which the answers given at the far end of the line are inferred from what is said at the near end. For Gossip seems not so much to preach as to carry on a conversation with his audience. It is as if, having stated a point, he listens for and gets a reply by means of a strange sensitivity to the thoughts of others. Then he goes on either to clarify that point or, being sure of its acceptance, to state another. There is no setting up of "objection" one, two, and three to be answered in public by the mind that raised them in the study. The interchange between pulpit and pew is far more subtle than that. Both sides of the conversation are genuine, alive, and warm. This curious phenomenon which appears in all of Gossip's sermons raises a question: Can a minister live so intimately, sympathetically, and lovingly in the midst of the human mass that,

whether in the study or the pulpit, the thoughts of others are almost as immediate and vivid to him as are his own thoughts? The preaching of this man seems to say "Yes." One who recognizes this correspondence of minds in the sermons under discussion without being able to achieve it in his own pulpit experience may say that it is all due to Gossip's strong imagination. Even so. But does that dispose of anything? Is it not the duty of every man who mounts the pulpit to cultivate an imagination which can enter into the doubts and affirmations, the despairs and hopes, of those before whom he dares to preach? Such an imagination may restrict the ego painfully, but it opens unlimited horizons for preaching.

Another figure may help further to disclose this Scotch genius to those who have neither heard nor read his sermons. There are preachers who treat Christian truth as if it were a bolt of yard goods. They unroll the bolt in the pulpit and smooth out the cloth, recommending it for quality and beauty. They cut off exactly three and a half yards and, at the end, toss the swatch into the congregation for anyone to seize who may admire the weave—or for all to trample in the aisle if they will. Gossip is different. He cuts his cloth to a tailor's pattern, fits and stitches it to make a finished suit; and when the service is over, someone, perhaps that student with the eager face who sat down front or the woebegone fellow whom the preacher marked in the middle of the last pew in the left balcony, goes out newly clad. No! Gossip does not mutilate the truth to fit any man's stature; yet his every message is designed to become a means of decency and warmth to actual persons of whose presence and need he seems to be made aware by spiritual emanations that join pulpit and pew. Why are so many of us content to examine our truth with cool academic detachment while there are persons before us who would appropriate that truth if they could be shown its relevance to their own lives? Better to assure John Smith on some point which bedevils his mind than to discourse learnedly on spiritual affirmations in a cosmos where

"If the sun and moon should doubt,
They'd immediately go out."

There is always John in the congregation; seldom Einstein or Jeans. At any rate, Gossip—and make no mistake about it, he sits at ease among the intellectuals—is less concerned to praise abstract truth than to see his concrete assurances worn by those who need them.

Most of the sermons in this volume are evangelistic; nonetheless they achieve evangelism without profanation. Why do we dignify by the term "evangelism" that yearly exhibition of bad manners in which a preacher merely takes off his own coat without "putting on Christ"? Perhaps it is not unfair to say that the evangelist as we know him is like the maker of swing music. The master of swing does violence to the scores of great composers; he violates sound musical forms and breaks the restraints of time and accent; he crams a bolus into the mouth of his trumpet to give the instrument a smothered and seductive tone, or plays his violin slightly off pitch to produce a savage dissonance. Having done this violence, he is ready to "make with the hot music" to which phrenetic nerves respond. The commercial evangelist and the parish minister who admits the obligation of going evangelistic for one week in the year feel that they must break with intellectual and spiritual restraints and be slightly off the pitch of dignity in order to "give" with the gospel trumpet. Not so with Gossip. In the first place, he is no seasonal gospeler. For him there is no reason but evangelism for preaching at any time. Nor does he find it necessary to compromise his dignity nor the Lord God's. He neither lolls nor

swaggers nor tootles his little horn in the face of the Almighty. Always he keeps the beat of eternity and preserves the phrasings of classical Christianity. With him there are no broken rhythms, no atavistic bleatings to arouse the sensuous man. His is a serene and beautiful music, rich as a Bach chorale, heart-searching as a mediæval plain song. Yet it is wholly relevant to the passing moment and to all the future. It is immediate and urgent because the preacher knows that God is no stranger in a machine civilization; that Christ has destinations in the modern world to which he will lead those who will follow; that the Holy Spirit ministers definitely and instantly to all who seek an "eternal meaning in the narrow span of time."

The power of Gossip's ministry seems to be due in part to a wide general culture, sincere theological convictions, a firm grasp of philosophy, and a genuine sympathy with all sorts and conditions of men; but most of all, one feels, to the richness of the man's own spiritual experience. He speaks as only one can speak whose "life is hid with Christ in God."

ROBERT MUNSON GREY

The Trinity and Christian Devotion, by Charles W. Lowry, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xviii, 162, \$1.50.

More and more we are getting to look forward to the *Presiding Bishop's Selection for Lent*. That series exceptionally combines religious truth with devotion. This year's book is no exception. It has the added distinction of being selected by the Archbishop of Canterbury as well. As a matter of fact, it was written at the suggestion of the late Archbishop Temple.

The book flowers forth out of both a rich and a long cultivated soil. Dr. Lowry, in fact, wrote his doctoral dissertation at Oxford on the subject. To know a subject well, one must know its history comprehensively and intensively. The work exhibits such knowledge. Such knowledge also poses the problem, however, of what to include and what to exclude. For this reason the book somewhat lacks full evenness, and contains, besides, much historic material that may prove difficult in one sitting for the general reader. The thoughtful and persistent person will, nevertheless, benefit from the inclusion of this background material.

There is some crying, and rightly so, for a more adequate modern development of Christian doctrine. This volume partly helps to meet this need on this subject. To what extent it is difficult to say. Some doctrines are hard to make really alive. A great leader of conservative faith, even officially, said to the reviewer that even in conservative circles historic doctrines are all too often dead doctrines. He particularly singled out the doctrine of the Trinity.

Dr. Lowry's approach is a cautious combination of biblical revelation with philosophic speculation. He rejects both Sabellianism and the societal conception of what amounts to tritheism, whether of the Cappadocian Fathers or of liberals like George A. Gordon. He rather ontologizes the psychological approach, somewhat after the general, grand pattern of Augustine in his greatest of works, *On the Holy Trinity*. What are functions in man—partial, passive often, at least interrupted—become hypostasized in God as separate persons, or centres of consciousness; yet withal, and this is to be noted, within a common consciousness or superconsciousness of the Godhood as well.

Dr. Lowry frankly admits that for such a relation we have no human analogy and must depend upon biblical revelation plus an adequate construction of thought. The reviewer wonders whether Dr. Lowry has done full justice, however, to the relational point of view. Does not the doctrine of the Trinity, when all is said and

done, really spring out of the need to explain the full functional revelation of God in Jesus within the limits of Jewish monotheism and the general need by all religions for an ongoing principle of revelation and empowerment, like the Holy Spirit? Does not the relational, historic point of view, moreover, have definite and significant implications for ontology? When we ponder the relation of the unhistorical to the historical, eternity to creation, eternal creation, springing out of eternal love, to inability to think eternity accumulatively or serially, that is, spatially, we meet with facts and relations, both true as events and yet pointing beyond our kind of knowing to the infinite mystery which is the source of the incarnation of the highest goodness. The ontological implications of the relational go far to suggest the union of mystery and revelation which must be at the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity. Frankly speaking, however, this does not bring us to the personal preëxistence of Christ and to an eternally ternary constituency of the Godhead. If Christian faith must hold to a separate preëxistence of Christ as a conscious being in his own right apart from the Father, biblical revelation and tradition alone will get us that. A full doctrine of the reality of the incarnation of God himself as love in Christ can, however, be held without such a doctrine of the Trinity. Which way Christianity?

John Donne may have been right that the Trinity is bones to philosophy and milk to faith. Certainly a strong aspect of the book is Dr. Lowry's sure sense of what is central in Christianity, his rich insights which fairly cascade, and his personal, intimate grasp of the devotional life. Here is a book for the head and the heart. The ideas stimulate even when they may fail to convince, and the spirit of the book witnesses beyond specific instructions for the devotional life to the reality of the Spirit in whom alone we can find, beyond our best effort and thought, our rest and our zest, our security and our creative satisfaction.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor, by Jonathan Grossman, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 302, \$3.50.

The story of the life of William E. Sylvis reads, in some respects, like many of those which came from the pen of Horatio Alger, Jr. There is this marked difference: Mr. Alger dealt with poor boys who rose from the ranks to become capitalists, while Mr. Sylvis rose from obscurity to become the greatest labor leader of his time in America.

Born in central Pennsylvania in 1829, of poor parents, our hero came to be the third president of the International Molders' Union (1863-1869) and the greatest inspiration to the labor movement in this country during the years of the Civil War and up to the time of his death in 1869.

Though of frail health he accomplished in the brief space of a few years what would seem almost impossible for a man of much greater physical vigor. His indomitable spirit and devotion to the cause of organized labor are illustrated by his trip in 1863 to organize the iron molders.

Sylvis's first trip took four months and was extremely arduous. He covered a great deal of territory—central and western Pennsylvania, the Ohio towns, and St. Louis—his farthest west, back through Illinois to Detroit, northern Ohio, Buffalo, across the border and north to Ottawa, back again to Erie, Buffalo, Rochester, and finally—home. It was midwinter when he started, and he had to travel in drafty and often icy-cold coaches. Illness laid him low right at the beginning—in Middleburg, Pennsylvania—and the trip almost ended there. Alone in a strange city, he cooped himself up in a room, nursed himself back to health and resolutely went on. In many foundries his welcome was a cold one. In more than one instance grim employers and threatening foremen barred his way. He was plagued by ill health and poverty. His funds consisted of \$100, the gift of the local Philadelphia union. He wore his clothes "until they

became quite threadbare," and his shawl was "filled with little holes, burned by the splashing of the molten metal from the ladles of molders in strange cities, whom he was beseeching to organize, and more than once he was compelled to beg a ride from place to place on a engine, because he had no money sufficient to pay his fare."

Much of his activities took place in Philadelphia, in which city occurred the greatest strike ever undertaken by organized labor up to that time—in February, 1863. It had been largely provoked by the employers in order to wreck the union. In the end the employers practically accomplished their purpose. A description of the tactics used on both sides reads like a page from today's newspaper. Here was the battle for a higher wage, for less hours, the right of collective bargaining, etc., etc.: capital and labor in the death struggle. The general pattern of conflict of that day gives us insight into the beginnings of similar methods in use today. The principal difference is that in 1946 both sides are much better organized and the techniques of conflict carried out with a larger background of experience, more skill, and on a tremendous scale. The stakes are higher and the Federal and local governments take a hand.

The untimely death of Sylvis in July, 1869, at the age of 40, proved to be a terrible blow to organized labor in this country. However, many of the reforms which he advocated have since come to be realized. Moreover, "The elimination of political, religious, racial, national and other prejudices continues to be an objective of forward-looking labor leaders and is to some extent being accomplished by law. Even independent political action by labor is again being employed and many of its proponents echo the arguments Sylvis advocated more than seventy-five years ago."

He was deeply religious, taught in the Sunday school, and was a devoted member of the Methodist Church. He believed that his work was "attended by the favor and blessing of God." Having seen the evil effects of drink on many a workingman, he maintained that "the devil won a great victory when he introduced whisky into the world."

The minister who is seeking inspirational and educational material for a Labor Day sermon could perhaps do no better than to read and take notes on this book. Mr. Grossman has accomplished a fine piece of work. It is a contribution to American history and a further understanding of the labor movement in this country.

RAY H. ABRAMS

The Practice of Religion, by Frederick C. Grant, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 271, \$2.50.

Here is a stimulating volume that deals with the practice of religion in relation to life as a whole. Religion is defined as life controlled by the consciousness of God, and the whole volume is an amplification of his text. The ever-recurring emphasis on social and ethical ideals is heart-warming. As the teaching of Jesus meant a highly moral life, conduct occupies at least fifty per cent of the thought of Christianity, and when religion becomes self-centred it dies.

As religion is life controlled by the consciousness of God, the problems of God, his being, nature, and communicability are central. The universe, which is, as it were, an idea in the mind of God, is constantly expanding, and God is in it and in every part of it. He can thus no longer be thought of as the absolute monarch of Greek philosophy, though he must be considered supreme, and infinite. He, as well as man, has freedom, which is the mark of personality, and is in every sense a free person. He is limited by himself, that is, by his own laws, and he could contradict himself, but he does not. He is the Good and the True, the Great Ally in the world

struggle of light against darkness, and is quite incapable of evil. Here the author is the student of Greek philosophy and modern science, and he has gone so far that one wonders why he has not gone all the way. God *in* the creative process that is not yet complete, *in* the social order, *in* the individual subconsciousness; the great Reality *in* the great adventure and who has never missed the way, never turned back, and never began over again—is not such a God but the shadow of reality? And man in his freedom brought death into the world with all its woe—is this not, in a new form, bringing back the old devil who was conjured up to save the myth of a golden age at the beginning of creation? All the evidence points to pain and suffering and evil being in the world long before the advent of man, and to beginnings that biologically, sociologically, ethically, intellectually, and religiously were on levels of the lowest order, and more than hint at a golden age far down the vistas of the future. Would not man in his struggle toward that far-off divine event rather walk with the great Reality in the struggle, who was touched with a feeling of his infirmities from the very beginning, than be watched over by a passive, though perfect, Inactivity?

Though God is found in all nature and in social life, especially in goodness, righteousness, beauty, and truth, it is in Christ that his character is most perfectly revealed. In fact, Professor Grant's conclusion is that what little we know of God we know through Christ. Not only is he like God, but for us the two melt into one. Reading as carefully as he can, the reviewer suspects that when the author refers to Christ he means that ideal figure that has slowly taken form under Greek, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon influences, mediated through our Christian history, rather than the historic Jesus. That this development, which was legitimate, has subtly affected the thinking of each is certain; and it is equally certain that no one, especially the scholar, would venture to determine the dividing line between the actual and the ideal.

The institution and the doctrines of the church likewise reveal the frame of mind of the author. Christianity is a way of life, rather than a religion in the old sense of the word. Anyone who commits himself to virtue and righteousness, without believing in God is not far from the kingdom (p. 74). Even those who have not gone beyond naturalism are in some sense religious (p. 218). The church must be free, and democratic, without special privilege at law, or under any crown; should have in it all the nation, and should be united (p. 211). Here optimism rides the crest of modern ecumenicity, and believes a Catholicism, liberal, tolerant, comprehensive, and free is being evolved. Dr. Grant is striving toward a theology that squares with human experience and is well on the way. Throughout these pages there is an urge, a passion, that is contagious, and the volume is evangelical, or probably I should say evangelistic.

I. G. MATTHEWS

William Morris, Medievalist and Revolutionary, by Margaret R. Grennan, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. x, 173, \$2.50.

What is the meaning of history? What value is there in a knowledge of it? Does history repeat itself? Can or should the process of civilization be turned backward upon itself? These are questions which Miss Grennan, perhaps without intent, answers in this book. In every age there are those, people of high motive and deep concern for social progress, who, inspired by the success of leaders who have championed the cause of human welfare in the past, and captivated by their spirit, are unable to emancipate themselves from the thralldom of their method and techniques. Thereby they become frustrated and defeated in their most laudable hopes and purposes.

There were many such in England in the glorious Victorian era now gone. In the swift development of a mighty empire never before equaled, the expansion of industrial magnitude, her rise as the world's financial power, the nation seemed established on a solid rock, impervious to shock or destruction. Surely all was well with a people who had risen to such high heights and whose foundations had been so well and righteously laid.

There were those, however, who were not quite so certain. Were the foundations, when one beheld more widely the general state of all her citizens, so well and truly laid? If there was wealth, there was also poverty; if palaces of the newly rich, there were huts for the desperately poor; if cathedrals for the aristocracy, there was indifference for the Godforsaken multitude. Everywhere "barracks, taxing-houses, poor-houses, mad-houses, and gaols." To some serious-minded students of history and contemporary society of that nineteenth century, the glory of England was largely, at least too much, glitter and glamour.

Among them are William Cobbett, historian; John Ruskin, preacher of the beautiful; Thomas Carlyle, thundering prophet. Themselves solid as a rock in character, honest in the depth of their convictions, piercingly keen in their vision, they saw to the heart of the social structure. And all was by no means well! But pioneers as perforce they were, unprepared by the suddenness with which the new order had been thrust upon them, they were not skilled in the laws of social developments. Consequently, incapable of coping with the tremendous urge of the revolutionary forces creating a new culture and civilization, they turned with nostalgic fervor toward the greatness of their nation's past. Safety from the headlong rush toward disaster was to be found only in a return to the manners and methods of their calm, unhurried ancestors. Who could withstand the appeal of the *Morte d'Arthur*?

Cobbett contended that "the Reformation . . . [was a] tragedy in social history from which stemmed most of our modern economic woes." "For nine hundred years, under the Catholic religion,' there were neither poor laws nor paupers. Then suddenly, England, from a 'land of roast beef' was changed into a 'land of dry bread, or oatmeal porridge.'"

Ruskin thus predicted "the change in store for England—in a century or more she will be where Venice is—among the dead of nations.'" And Carlyle wrote Ruskin: "It is quite a new 'Renaissance,' I believe, we are getting into just now; either towards new, wider manhood, high again as the eternal stars; or else into final death and the marsh of Gehenna for evermore."

Chief among these who sought the solution and security of the future in the golden age of the past was William Morris—poet, artist, lover of man as of nature. No one in his day carried more earnestly upon his heart the deficiency, destitution, and deprivation of his fellow Englishmen. But what help could be given them? The world of mankind, especially that portion which dwelt in the once Merrie England, had strayed far from the paths of peace, pleasure, and plenty. As artist, he reveled in the mediæval arts and crafts; as a poet, he thrilled to the sagas of the lord and vassal in which loyalty and *noblesse oblige* made secure the needs and worth of men. Socialist he was and of the communistic order. Man would find joy again, and sufficiency for his needs, as he joined hands with his fellows and labored for the common good as he had in the days gone. So he wrote voluminously and spread his messianic gospel from the pulpit and platform.

And thus the paradox—William Morris, Medievalist and Revolutionary! Greatly and sincerely as he sought to create a beautiful, worthy, and economically

secure way of life, he was a student of the old culture, of which he was enamoured, rather than of the laws of social progress. Scientific he was not, but genuinely concerned he was for human rights. And his fervor set afire the imagination and the hearts of those following him who did become scientists in the field of human relations.

This is especially worthy of note in the year of Miss Grennan's publication and the rise of the Labor party to power. England's socialism is not Marxist, as, perhaps, the reports of the U.N.O. Security Council may prove. As is true of almost everything else that is English, her socialism stems from her own long history. It is the product and creation of Englishmen's love for England—the dignity and worth of men freeborn.

But Miss Grennan has accomplished something more for her readers—and something all men should take to heart. It is exceedingly dangerous to try to make history repeat itself and impossible of achievement. The mistake in so endeavoring often comes from reading into words of centuries ago present-day meanings. Words have a way, by their own beauty, of implying a situation which did not historically exist. It is quite too easy to idealize the past. Words of arresting significance for yesterday may be meaningless today. And that should be remembered by ministers as by reformers. Moreover, there is no solution of present-day problems by an escape into the times and conditions gone by. There can be no such retreat. It is forever true—we must evangelize the inevitable, make righteous and humanly helpful the course by which civilization takes its way through industrial achievement, political organization, and cultural pursuits. Men of today are true children of their sires when they face the demands of the hour with their courage and will, not necessarily with their methods and means. Our fathers do indeed rest *from* their labors but we cannot rest *upon* them.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

This Earth One Country, by Emeric Sala, Boston, Bruce Humphries, ©1945, pp. 185, \$2.50.

The ideological root of this book is found in an article of the Bahá'í faith: "It is not for him to pride himself who loveth his own country, but rather for him who loveth the whole world. The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens." Throughout the volume the universality of Bahá'í mentality is frequently called to the reader's attention. One is not allowed to forget that the essential lack of such mentality was the weakness of earlier religions. Christianity, for instance, is held to be a religion in which the individual loves other individuals, but not groups. It can unite neighbors as individuals, but it cannot project love into communal affairs. Mohammedanism is held to be able to organize people upon a national state basis and is, indeed, given credit for introducing this form of societal organization into the life of the world, but it cannot create a world community. Only Bahá'ism is capable of infusing into human life a divine love which is transformed into divine justice in the community. Hence, it alone holds the key to the future of world organization if the world is to be saved. Knowing no racial or nationalistic loyalties which are more primary than the love of mankind, it alone points the way to the supranational community. Already there are over eight hundred Bahá'í communities spread over sixty countries. "'The world is but one country and mankind its citizens' epitomizes the spirit which sustains this world-wide community founded upon the teachings of Bahá'u'lláh" (p. 102).

So much for the general flavor of the book. In addition we should mention the fact that for the initiate into Bahá'í history and ideas the volume presents a

concise and interesting account of the religion's origin and growth. It started in Persia in 1944 with one Siyyid' Alí-Muhammad, a descendant of Muhammad, who assumed the title of the Báb (i.e., gate), proclaiming himself as the *qá'im*, or prophet, who was to do away with Islam, thus fulfilling messianic prophecy. Through him there would come another greater than he who would be a manifestation of God's will and purpose. For these heretical ideas the Báb was seized and imprisoned. After six years of strict confinement he was put to death. Seventeen of his eighteen immediate disciples were similarly dealt with. One only escaped, he to whom the Báb, before his death, had delivered his seals, pen, and papers. This one he had also named Bahá'u'lláh (Glory of God). It was he who was destined to be the true founder of the new faith. Despite almost continuous imprisonment for his loyalty to his faith, he was able to produce a considerable literature which now contains the foundation ideas of the Bahá'í movement. The central note running through all of Bahá'u'lláh's thought is the oneness of mankind. When once asked, "What is a Bahá'í?" he replied: "To be a Bahá'í simply means to love all the world; to love humanity and try to serve it; to work for universal peace and universal brotherhood" (p. 104).

Many Christians and Mohammedans will, of course, take issue with some of the criticisms leveled against them throughout this volume to the corresponding exaltation of the Bahá'í faith. Christians, in particular, will find considerable difficulty in accepting the thesis that their religion has no social drive and is entirely ineffective in creating a sense of world brotherhood and of the equal worth of all peoples. Certainly such a position is not easily defensible. While many Christians have been implicated in the activities of the nation-state, as indeed have all Bahá'ists except as they assume the pacifistic position and disavow adherence to the nation-group, they have nonetheless given much evidence that they believe mankind is intended to be one. The extensive efforts of the Christian church in terms of famine relief, medical aid, educational endeavor, postwar reconstruction, and general missionary work would be strong refutations of the contention of this volume that Christianity is incapable of making the Christian principle of love effective in the social areas of world experience. Our author has been guilty of an underestimation of the available evidence.

Yet even with its limitations this is a worth-while book to read. Its central convictions of the constitutional unity of mankind and the possibility of an effective union of the various peoples of the earth need very much to be considered in our day. Many will agree that the only hope for the future lies in increasing union among the nations. Only thus can we come to the crux of our contemporary problem which resides in the issue of national sovereignty. Those who long to live for a few hours with a warm presentation of the idealism which religion presents to the contemporary world situation will be greatly benefited by *This Earth One Country*.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Institute for Religious Studies [distributed by Harper], ©1945, pp. ix, 247, \$2.

Delivered originally as lectures at the Institute for Religious Studies, this volume numbers among its contributors many distinguished intellectual leaders, among whom are Louis Finkelstein, Edgar S. Brightman, Irwin Edman, John C. Bennett, Pitirim Sorokin, Mordecai M. Kaplan, and I. L. Kandel. If one is expecting an

integrated and consistent analysis of the intellectual foundations of world order, however, he will be disappointed.

Although the book is described on the flyleaf as an indication of "how religious leadership can contribute to a permanent world order," the orientation of the contributors is predominantly secular rather than religious (unless you mean by religious, ethical). Polite obeisance is paid to God, but ultimately it is to the will and knowledge of man rather than to the wisdom and grace of God that most of the contributors look for the salvation of the world. At best, religion is viewed as a source of ethical insights. The Saviour of mankind is scarcely mentioned—by most contributors not at all—and when he is, it is to praise his ethical teachings or to point out that his ethical teachings are not unique. I imagine it would embarrass some even to mention Christ as the Saviour, which in itself is an illuminating commentary on some phases of contemporary Christianity. Perhaps it would embarrass us less if we felt more keenly the need to be saved. But if we are to believe our leaders, it is the world, not men, which needs salvation. How that is to be accomplished except through the regeneration of human nature is a question to which I, at least, found no answer in these pages.

Writing in the liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, most of the contributors would describe the obstacles to world order in terms of man's ignorance rather than in terms of man's sinfulness. Their optimism often borders on the fatuous. Perhaps the common faith of the contributors is best expressed by Norman Cousins in an essay on "World Citizenship," when he says: "The democratic cycle is begun when the Three E's of civilization—education, enlightenment, and evolution—are present in sufficient balance and degree both to awaken the desire in men for free institutions and to qualify them to maintain those institutions...but, even when favorable, these factors cannot of themselves bring democracy into being. That can be done only by civilized intelligence. The womb of democracy is the human mind" (p. 217). How "civilized intelligence" differs from reason perhaps Norman Cousins knows, but it is characteristic of these essays, if not of our times, that jargon is often substituted for thought.

There is little discussion in these pages of reason, faith, truth, justice, the moral law; there is a great deal of discussion centring around such terms as "organic pluralism," "psychological variables," "the dynamics of hostility," "the task of cultural rebuilding," and "the democratic process." Two phrases recur frequently, "the free world" and the "dignity of man," but, significantly I think, without any detailed analysis of what they mean or of the basic presuppositions from which they are derived. Mordecai Kaplan, of the Jewish Theological Seminary, comes closest to such an analysis when he says that "man owes to the power of God the freedom he needs in order to fulfill his own nature as a human being. When God redeems, he redeems not only the oppressed from the hand of the oppressor, but also the inner man from a bondage which is more crushing than that which any outward tyranny can impose. The inner freedom which then emerges is the soul of whatever freedom man aspires to or hopes to attain" (p. 139).

John C. Bennett, the Protestant spokesman, discusses the ecumenical movement and declares that "the existence of a world-wide community of Christians" united in their political and economic convictions "is one of the surest guarantees of freedom" (p. 135). The Catholic spokesman, John Lafarge, S.J., declares that the "Catholic Church, like many other representative religious bodies, places its primary reliance on the moral law. It holds without compromise that the only sound and lasting organization in human affairs is that which is built on a juridical foundation.

This juridical foundation cannot be mere legalism, but must be something which flows out of the very nature of man, out of his essential relation to an infinite and all-wise and all-good Creator" (pp. 119-120).

One of the disappointing things about a book that purports to show how religious leadership can restore world order is the lack of any discussion of the concrete and specific problems that confront us today. For if world order is to be restored, it can be restored only by decisions which we make today, not by gazing longingly at the future. If world order is to emerge from the political anarchy and moral chaos that is today, we must seek to guide political decisions in specific situations in accordance with the demands of justice and reason. We are not so much in need of discourses on understanding cultures different from our own, or instruction in the psychology of human behavior, as we are in need of wise decisions on such questions as: What is the best way of rehabilitating the former enemy countries? What should our policy be towards Russian expansion? What rôle should the United States play in the United Nations Organization? etc. The contributors are silent on these subjects, for their gaze is fixed on the future. Yet we should have learned by now that the only time we live is in the present and the only decisions that matter are those we make today. It is not planning for the future which we so urgently need, but the knowledge of what is right and wrong, just and unjust, and the will to apply that knowledge, whatever the risks, to specific decisions today. It is not the false humility that knows no truth, but the true humility that seeks the truth with faith which we need. Christ died on the cross not that we might live securely, not that the kingdom of man might escape destruction, but that those who professed to follow him in faith might not be afraid to follow his example.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL

Empirical Philosophies of Religion, by James Alfred Martin, Jr., New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. xii, 146, \$2.

The volume opens with this significant statement by William James: "Let empiricism become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin" (p. 1). After a brief survey of the empirical tradition in Christian theology, as inaugurated over a century ago by Schleiermacher and continued in Ritschl and others, the author launches us into the main body of his work which is concerned with the empirical approaches to religion in the philosophies of W. E. Hocking, E. S. Brightman, J. E. Boodin, D. C. Macintosh, and H. N. Wieman.

Pointing out that there are three different meanings applied to the terms "empirical" and "empiricism," our author holds that the philosophy of each of these five thinkers is in some degree empirical in each of these senses. First of all, to be empirical is to be "realistic" or "tough-minded"; that is, to take account of all the relevant facts and not to shut one's eyes to any significant datum. Secondly, empiricism means just the "appeal to experience." In the case of these philosophers, it means looking into life and nature and religious experience to find what the significance is for religion of what is there experienced. Thirdly, empiricism may be conceived as primarily methodological in import, by which is meant a particular type of inquiry which specializes in a *posteriori* rather than a *priori* hypotheses and is inductive rather than rationalistic in character. These men, in other words, try to make their religious philosophy grow out of life rather than out of rationalistic *schema* and unsubstantiated claims having either supernatural or wishful rootage.

We have room for but a few comments upon the effects of this general empirical approach on the major religious views of these five men. One important fact to notice is that the empirical method not infrequently moves them from traditional theological conclusions, which they find to be unsupported by the "facts." In connection with their views of God they come to the conclusion that God is not a transcendent and timeless Absolute. Taking the reality of time seriously, they think of God as Creator, not in the sense that he is one who stands off from the universe and creates it once and for all; rather, he is one who functions continuously and creatively in the process of creativity. Since they must find God through experience, if at all, they hold that he cannot be held to be transcendent in the spatial sense of traditional theological thought, but rather as transcendent while immanent or as one in whom the world alone has any intelligible being.

The facts of experience also lead some of these five philosophers to deal with the problem of evil in much different ways than those which characterize traditional Christian thinking. Brightman, for instance, holds that evil is so tragic and irrational that we are driven to the conception of a "finite" or limited God who eternally struggles against the stubborn facts of the universe, or what he calls the "Given." Boodin finds a monistic view unacceptable in the light of the world's evil and lapses into a clear-cut cosmological and ethical dualism. Likewise, Wieman finds it necessary to adopt a dualism to meet the problem of evil, holding that God is the author only of the good. Our business, he contends, is not to worry about the general problem of evil, but to overcome specific evils through rational programs.

In all of this the attempt of our philosophers is to make religious beliefs experience-centred and pertinent for daily living. Despite considerable divergence in their conclusions, such is their single aim. But it is precisely in these divergent conclusions that our author finds the basic weakness of empirical religious philosophy to lie. He concludes: "Divergent theories interpreting a variety of experiences yield divergent conclusions. Thus, instead of discovering 'the meaning of God in human experience' we seem to discover the meanings of God in the personal experiences of five men of faith as interpreted in five suggestive and stimulating but conflicting philosophies" (p. 117). Martin is of the opinion that the appeal to religious experience as normative for religious belief creates as many problems as it solves. And, indeed, it is difficult to escape that conclusion after a perusal of these so-called empirical philosophies of religion.

What, then, should we do? Fall back upon supernaturalistic and rationalistic religious theories of reality? By no means. The solution lies, even though the present volume is none too clear on this point, in further and more adequate empirical approaches to religion. Theory must increasingly be checked against fact, supposition against experience, one datum against the whole. Slowly, painfully, but nonetheless surely man can come to increasing perceptions of the religiously incontrovertible facts of life. So instead of being a discouragement to those men of religion who feel that there are basic uniformities in the religious life, just as there are in the phases of scientific life, this volume should spur them on to the careful, minute, and repetitious experiments in religion. As comparable experiments have yielded such abundant fruitage in the sensory areas of life with which science deals, we must have faith that similar results can at last be won through a constant experimentalism in religion.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Gospel According to Gamaliel, by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. xii, 154, \$2.

This book is an imaginative story dealing with the reactions of Gamaliel to the historical Jesus and to the movement that grew up after his death. Gamaliel is introduced as a great rabbi who was peaceful, noble, and of universal outlook. When Jesus, called Joshua, appeared in Galilee, Gamaliel left Jerusalem to visit him; he witnessed his teaching and healing ministry; he discussed Jesus with those who knew him in Nazareth; he observed Jesus' gentleness with the ordinary people; but he saw him fail to understand the religious leaders. He felt that Jesus was doomed because of his inability to make sympathetic contact with the Pharisees. The death of Jesus is treated briefly, but is definitely the work of a selfish, narrow-minded priesthood. At this point, the turbulent Saul, a disciple of Gamaliel, takes the centre of the stage. His violent method is contrasted with the kindly Gamaliel. Eventually the catastrophic change in Saul turns him just as violently into a propagandist for the new cause. Other leaders of the early Christian movement are contrasted with Saul, and Jacob-James is presented as Paul's chief opponent. Peter clashes with Paul and declares he will go to take Rome as the first vicar of the city! As fiction this little book is interesting. As a challenge to modern theologies it is stimulating and inviting. However, it is far more Heard than history.

The author of a historical novel may or may not adhere to the facts of history. This author has chosen to depart from the conclusions of New Testament and historical scholarship at many points. He has given an interpretation of Jesus that seems more modern than the Synoptic account: the eschatological ideas of the gospels are weakened and made secondary, while Jesus becomes more of a modern social prophet than a prophet of Israel; he and Gamaliel share a universality that seems hardly consonant with the facts, either of Jewish or early Christian writings. He has assumed that James, the brother of Jesus, wrote the book of James and has used that material to depict him. He has not made use of the best Pauline letters in interpreting Paul, and, as a matter of fact, the real message of Paul nowhere enters the story. He has placed Peter in a position which only the fourth-century church would have understood, and would have been nonsense in the Jerusalem church. Such words as these sound strange for Simon: "I am his vicar. Thither I go to found the true priesthood of our Messiah. I am the first true Pontifex Maximus. I go to take Rome!"

So if this is a historical novel, it has made its history as it moves along. In general, it is not based on the best scholarly work in any area it touches, but is an adaptation designed to present the ideas of the author. Yet, no book by Heard can be read without feeling its power. Such is true of this one, and many will find it of great value in coming to grapple with the meaning of Jesus today.

JAMES RODNEY BRANTON

The Minister Teaches Religion, by Frank A. Lindhorst, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 125, \$1.

In this little book of 125 pages, Dr. Frank A. Lindhorst, head of the Christian Community Administration at the College of the Pacific, has made a refreshing contribution in the well-plowed field of Christian education. The last twenty-five years have yielded many books on the theory of Christian education for modern church schools, but here is one that provides guidance in the application of theory to all of the age groups represented in a church, with the minister as the central figure.

Many years ago, in 1908 to be exact, Dr. William H. P. Faunce, then president of Brown University, brought out a book entitled, *The Educational Ideal in the Ministry*. This book blazed a new trail for thoughtful ministers in their parish work, but it was not possible at that time to deal as practically with the problem as has now been done by Dr. Lindhorst. Here we find the accumulated theories of Christian education translated into methods that the minister himself can employ.

At the very outset, there is presented in parallel columns a statement of "The Old and the New in Christian Education." One can see at a glance the difference between the methods of a generation ago and those that obtain today in modern programs. It is an irenic chapter and will do much to clear away the prejudices that still linger in many minds as to the validity of the new procedures.

The author has sensed the fact that many ministers do not conceive of their task as comprehensively as they ought. They recognize their obligation to the adult portion of their constituency, but often fail to see that they have an urgent duty toward the younger groups, that is, from the kindergarten age up through all the grades of childhood to full maturity. Even when this obligation is felt, many ministers do not know how to go about the task, and this book charts the way, with many pertinent suggestions for dealing with each age group.

The pulpit is given a most significant place in the field of Christian education, and many a man's preaching would be given greater substance and pertinence to present-day problems if the author's suggestions were heeded. It would have been desirable, however, if, in his section "Using the Bible Effectively," he had given a more extended admonition in behalf of inductive expository preaching. This custom has gone out all too much in our American pulpit.

The administration of a church under the educational ideal is treated with considerable detail, and there are many suggestions given as to ways of securing commitments to ideals, enlistments for service, and simple self-expression.

Dr. Lindhorst's contribution to the educational aspect of the ministry deserves the most thoughtful consideration, and one can easily supplement the study of this book by making use of the excellent bibliographies appended to each chapter. Christian education is here placed at the heart of the minister's task in its whole range of obligation and is shown to be both an opportunity and a privilege.

CHARLES N. ARBUCKLE

Can These Bones Live? by Roger Babson and Dudley Zuver, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. x, 254, \$2.

This is the bitterest book I have read in a generation. The authors must be thoroughly unhappy about the church or they could find no satisfaction in releasing such a vitriolic volume. If they had told us in an introductory chapter what they had suffered at the hands of the church and its leaders, we might have been more sympathetic with their disillusionment, but lacking this knowledge, we can only react to their complaints from our own point of view.

The form of the book is peculiar in that it gives the impression of being formed out of a half-hundred brief editorials rather than being written according to a carefully thought-out plan. Even the paragraph development is jerky, being too replete with parenthetical phrases, and sacrificing smoothness for the sake of being epigrammatic. If one did not have frequent subtitles to mark the beginning of a new section, it would be almost impossible to note where the development of one thought terminates and another begins. Without being profound, the book still succeeds in being difficult to read.

From first to last this little book takes issue with religionists, and even declares itself as opposed to the use of the word "religion," despite the fact that it employs the word a dozen times in every paragraph. "Everyone admits that the Bible has something to do with religion. Astounding, therefore, is the fact that the words, religion and religious, scarcely occur in the Bible, never in the Old Testament or in the Gospels; only rarely and casually in the Epistles. The Jews, it is universally acknowledged, were the religious teachers of mankind. Yet they got along without the concept of religion. This well must give us pause" (p. 2). Such a naïve justification for the criticism of the use of the term "religion" does not stand on its own feet, and it is only when we come to such observations as we quote below that we detect the bias of the authors.

"When religion is transformed into a career or a vocation, that religion becomes, by virtue of that very act and process, a false and deceptive activity" (p. 2). "That professionalized religion is a highly flattering and lucrative profession cannot be disputed; but only for those who are employed therein" (p. 3). "Unfortunately for ecclesiastics, however, the Church retained the Bible, and its view of labor has persisted as a constantly dangerous and disruptive factor in Christendom. Religion is no pious effort of saving one's soul, especially if one be supported in idle comfort while he does it" (p. 101). Obviously the authors have some personal reasons for their reaction to "religionists" in positions of authority and have roundly condemned us all in the heat of their resentment.

That the authors are thoroughly embittered against organized religion in general and against ecclesiastical leaders in particular, may be glimpsed by reading the following quotations:

What can such organizations as the Boy Scouts, the Y.M.C.A., or the Sunday school do, save as the young know already the greatest thing in life before they present themselves for further instruction? Quite blindly, or more likely as a gesture of despair, the Church has blessed these institutions (p. 33).

The Church, in fact, seems eager to combat the falling attendance incurred by movie competition by going into the movie business itself, and shamelessly begs for funds to rent the films (p. 34).

Religion itself cannot be taught. Hence the antics, observable at every church headquarters known as religious education together with the empty and futile nature of ordinary Sunday school routine. It is the highly embarrassing business of dealing with a corpse (p. 39).

The children no longer look forward to the Sunday school picnic, for fear, one suspects, that the same art of deception will be practiced there (p. 40).

Seminary professors, for the most part, are men who have had no experience in the vital work of the Church, or have tried it for a brief period and have failed (p. 47).

It has been so long since the Church dealt with a matter of any importance, that it seems to lack all importance itself (p. 89).

That our churches are bound to experience in the future a considerable shrinkage of income, one may freely predict. To one of hard temperament this is a happy prospect (p. 90).

Bishops and secretaries know their constituencies are beyond reproach; do not laymen pay the bills? (p. 111).

We ridicule the Buddhist priests of Tibet for their prayer wheel contraptions. What we seem unable to imagine, however, is that when these distant monks find out about our missionary societies and social service outfits, they may have a laugh on us (p. 119).

This is not a great book. It will do no good, for bitterness never does.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

The Dynamics of Literature, by Nathan Comfort Starr, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 123, \$1.50.

Literature has always had its teachers. Meant to be enjoyed as an immediate experience, it has, nevertheless, had an inequality of distribution and receptivity. Some portions are enjoyed directly, other portions have an intellectual character or an emotional quality that is not within the experience of all readers. An "explana-

tion" becomes necessary. One who attempts this explanation treads upon dangerous ground. He may clarify and enhance; he may confuse and detract.

"... the reader who is alert and creative will eventually realize that the study of literature can prepare his mind as effectually for the confusing decisions of our turbulent times as any other kind of study" (p. 2). Thus the author offers a purposeful study on the ground that literature is dynamic, providing the powers of creation and re-creation within the reader. Its values are the values of life itself, translated into terms of imaginative persuasion. While this is true, it offers a temptation to reduce literature to the level of the practical and to judge its value in terms of the useful. This comes perilously close to seeing the beauty of poetry by means of the rigors of scansion.

The author does not stick too closely to his purpose, fortunately, but goes about the business of revealing the hidden techniques and procedures by which beauty and effectiveness are achieved. Thus students of literature may acquire a desirable synthesis of reason and emotion or, to phrase it more directly, learn that knowledge does not destroy love; it chastens it.

The chapter on "The Creative Reader" is very important, being the basic truth from which all else proceeds. Incidentally, it accomplishes in seventeen pages what Adler unnecessarily labored for in 371 pages of *How to Read a Book*. Then follow chapters on "The True and Lively Word," subsidiary and integral form, "Magnitude" and "Persuasion," wherein by careful explanation and concrete examples the author reveals many interesting and helpful facets of literature. "The Dynamics of Literature" is a good title for the book, although perhaps there is more of the dynamics that make good literature than of the dynamics for living provided for by these same writings.

Starr is, apparently, a traditionalist in literature. He has no time for anything but the best. He understands certain modern excursions, but is not convinced that they are necessarily in the direction indicated by the main trends of the past. Certainly not antagonistic to them, he is yet not an enthusiast for them. If one reads at all, one will read with greater understanding and wider appreciation after laying down *The Dynamics of Literature*.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Tutelo Spirit Adoption Ceremony, by Frank G. Speck, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942, pp. xix, 125, 75 cents.

So many Indian tribes of eastern North America became extinct or Europeanized before they were adequately studied that in some instances we know hardly more than their names and locations. For others our knowledge generally is confined to those cultural features readily detected, although often misinterpreted, by early casual and untrained observers, and seldom includes data on the more elusive aspects of their ways of life—social integration, philosophical attitudes, and religious concepts. In recent years it has been taken more or less for granted, and correctly so, that it now is too late to recover more than odd scraps of information such as may come to light occasionally in overlooked documentary sources.

The Tutelo and their immediate neighbors in aboriginal times, Siouan-speaking tribes of eastern Virginia, are among the most poorly known in the East. Very little about them is recorded in the colonial archives, and as the result of a number of misfortunes their disintegration was rapid in the historical period. Remnants of the tribe eventually moved northward to Iroquois country where among their Cayuga hosts the dwindling number of their descendants in the course of almost two centuries have gradually lost their language and cultural identity.

It thus comes very much as a surprise at this late date to find recorded in this volume entirely as the result of ethnographical inquiry the initial account, and with an abundance of detail, of a religious ceremony of this particular tribe. In certain respects more interesting still is the fact that this description is the first indication that the beliefs involved were ever present in the southeast, similar concepts heretofore being reported only from west of the Appalachians. It is even more amazing to note that the ceremonies have been recovered for the most part not from Tutelo descendants but from Cayuga converts to whose ancestors the rites were entirely unknown and who thus perpetuate today the traditions of a tribe virtually extinct in a cultural sense.

The Tutelo spirit adoption ceremony, whereby the soul of each Tutelo who has died during the year preceding the rites is recalled for one night to the circle of the living and permanently replaced in his family by a living person of the same sex and approximate age, adopted for the purpose, reveals one of the most interesting religious beliefs reported for our eastern Indians. The ceremony itself is characterized by a wealth of ritualistic detail painstakingly described by the author and illustrated by carefully prepared diagrams. Although the anthropologist will be most interested in the theoretical problems concerning historical relationship with other similar appearances, the general student will find much to contemplate in the inherent quality of the concepts themselves and in their profundity which have enabled them, almost exclusively of all Tutelo culture, not only to persist in the face of three centuries of European and Iroquoian onslaught but to spread to and be adopted by members of one of the conquering cultures.

Dr. Speck is to be congratulated for adding another chapter to his already extensive list of studies of survivals in eastern Indian cultures, and the Historical Commission is to be commended for making available studies of this type.

A valuable appendix contains a discussion and analysis of Tutelo music by Dr. George Herzog.

D. S. DAVIDSON

The International Law of the Future: Postulates, Principles and Proposals, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [distributed by Columbia University Press], 1944, pp. xxi, 196, \$2.

This little volume is important because of its relation to later specific advances toward world organization. It developed out of a series of discussions participated in by some two hundred authorities on international relations at centres throughout the United States and Canada in 1942 and 1943. Therein and through the ensuing preparation and criticism of reports these experts formulated a concise statement of their collective mind concerning standards which should help to end the war and establish and maintain a liberal and effective peace. Privately circulated long before its public appearance, the report had a profound effect upon public officials, teachers, and journalists during ensuing months. Informally it served as a scaffolding from which the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco drafts of the United Nations Organization were successively constructed. Between these original proposals and the United Nations Charter as it emerged in 1945 there are naturally certain significant differences, but the earlier principles are suggestive both for their own sake and for their apparent influence.

This preliminary plan contemplates the retention of independent sovereignties rather than the immediate creation of a single world government. It assumes "the establishment and maintenance of an effective legal order in a world of States."

This is to be applied through postulates, principles, and proposals, all of which are first stated; thereafter every one of these is briefly analyzed and explained, with considerable regard to theory, potential utility, and specific precedents drawn particularly from Pan-American or Western European relations of recent decades.

The six postulates may be summarized: the states of the world form a community, bound together by obligations, their sovereignty and international relations subject to international law, preferably through orderly procedures, on the assumption that threats of forces or failures to execute international responsibility on the part of one or more states are the concern of the entire community of states. The ten principles hold: each state has a legal duty to carry out its international obligations through constructive, positive conduct and through self-restraint against unwarranted and improper acts; it must furthermore coöperate fully, and when possible peacefully, with other states and international agencies for the implementation and advancement of international law and justice.

The twenty-three proposals advocate specific international machinery: the organization of the community of states upon a universal basis, with regional or other logical subgroups; the institution to include an Assembly, an Executive Council, a Secretariat, a Permanent Court of International Justice, and the perpetuation within its structure of the Hague Tribunal, the International Labor Organization, and the Postal and Telecommunication Unions. The responsibilities of the over-all organization and its submembers shall include the advancement of justice and the improvement of international conditions through the application of the principle of peaceful change and through control of such essential factors as armaments, international trade, finance, transport, public health, narcotics, population problems, cultural and scientific exchange, and welfare of dependent peoples. On this last vital point no new constructive suggestions are made, although precedents like the mandate system are briefly summarized.

An appendix presents the names and populations of seventy-three states existing in 1937, including all the minor ones, and indicates the exact degree to which each one participated in seven recent types of international agreement or organization.

The specific proposals of these experts provide a general framework similar to that later adopted at San Francisco with a few significant exceptions. The experts use the term Executive Council rather than Security Council and seem to expect it to be true to its name, concerned primarily with executive responsibilities rather than with specific security. While they do not provide for the veto power by any one of the great powers to the extent accepted by the U. N. O. under Soviet pressure, the experts do state that in the Executive Council as a general rule decisions shall be by unanimity except in regard to appointments and matters of procedure. Unanimity would have "the advantage of assuming the wider support of decisions and thus of increasing the efficacy of action taken by the Executive Council." To provide an effective voice for the great powers, those states with large populations might exercise a multiple or weighted vote in the Assembly, a point not included in the more equalitarian San Francisco draft. The experts added a further suggestion that there be no distinction between permanent and nonpermanent representation in the Executive Council, although they anticipated the presence there of certain powers most of the time. No express provision was made for an agency like San Francisco's ensuing Economic and Social Council, although such a body is entirely consistent with the spirit of the earlier document. Membership under the experts' draft is presumably open to all states, not merely the original United Nations and those other states which San Francisco termed "peace-loving." The

experts surpass San Francisco in flexibility and in provisions for the reduction of armaments and for the use of the techniques of peaceful change.

The book deserves the careful consideration of all intelligent citizens, including those with religious convictions. It stands as living testimony to the fact that even in the war's dark hours two neighboring democracies possessed capable jurists, scholars, and officials who cared and dared to set down for their own time and for posterity a prophetic pattern of international standards and potentialities. The invention of the atomic bomb does not outmode this thinking; it calls rather for the projection and adaptation of these ideals, or better ones, into the complex world of the future.

EARL CRANSTON

Radio in Health Education, prepared under the auspices of the New York Academy of Medicine, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. viii, 120, \$1.60.

Health talks and programs have been broadcast for over twenty years, from the early days of the radio. During this time the stations have provided sustaining time, and representative health organizations have prepared and presented the programs. The general dissatisfaction with results has led to the publication of this volume. The first part presents the conclusions of a three-year study and critical analysis of radiobroadcasting of health programs, made by Dr. Robert V. Schultz, under the auspices of the New York Academy of Medicine. The second portion consists of a dozen papers on the same subject presented at the December, 1943, meeting of the New York Academy of Medicine.

A number of weaknesses are found in present broadcasting practices. Various organizations provide the programs, generally the work of experts on subject matter but not on presentation. Confusion results from the variety of sponsors—voluntary organizations emphasizing certain diseases such as cancer, tuberculosis, etc.; governmental organizations and medical organizations presenting general topics. The cross-purposes of these organizations have led to confusion of methods and kinds of information. Objectives are not clear; programs are generally organized without consideration of the interests and needs of the listener groups. Programs are not planned or integrated. Those in charge of the programs have not drawn upon the radio industry for advice and assistance, nor has the radio industry insisted that health programs be conducted according to the best principles of broadcasting.

One especially valuable section of this book is the discussion on "address," in which is stressed the importance of address to the person in the spoken word—the address to the subject matter being characteristic of the written word. Unfortunately, medical men invariably speak to the subject rather than to the person. Radio programs must be addressed to the person. Another valuable section, in "The Listener Talks Back," is a detailed program analysis of a radio talk on X rays, which is most illuminating and reveals the new technique of the program analyzer.

The material is a basic and critical evaluation of objectives and techniques in radio health education. It is addressed to health educators, social workers, radio personnel, health organizations, and others professionally concerned with public health.

FRANK R. MOREY

Civilization and Group Relationships, edited by R. M. MacIver, New York, Institute for Religious Studies [distributed by Harper], ©1945, pp. xiii, 177, \$2.

This volume contains a series of twelve lectures by different authors delivered at the General Theological Seminary under the auspices of the Institute for Religious

Studies. All twelve deal with the challenge to unity and brotherhood raised by the prejudices and discriminations which divide group from group. The lectures, presented in their original form, have much of the directness and appeal of the spoken word.

To review this series of lectures as a single book is a difficult task, for each lecturer has developed his theme in his own way. There is, however, a certain unity in the volume derived primarily from the fact that each lecturer deals with his subject from the viewpoint of national welfare rather than from that of a specific minority. The first lecture, given by the editor, Mr. MacIver, emphasizes the importance of establishing good group relationships in the world and especially in the United States. His plea is for a change of attitude which should be accomplished through education.

Mr. Llewellyn explores the basis of social behavior as the "we group," of which each child becomes a member at birth, cultivates exclusiveness against the "they group." This exclusiveness makes it difficult for the individual to lose himself in the greater community which would liberate and enrich his life. He closes with practical suggestions as to ways by which the individual can overcome prejudice in his own life, and aid in overcoming it in the nation and in the world.

Mr. Lindeman discusses the many functional groups which exist. The fact that each of these tends to place its own interest above that of the common good creates tension between groups.

Mr. Ranck analyzes group discrimination and its eventuation in the clash of cultures. In his analysis he deals in a particularly helpful way with the difficulties faced by second-generation Americans.

Mr. Brunner points out the inequality in the educational opportunities open to the youth of America. This is due to the fact that each state has its own system of education. He sees it as a denial of the fundamental principle of democracy.

Mr. Kandel deals with the same general subject as Mr. Brunner. He brings evidence to show that educational opportunity is dependent upon location and economic ability.

Mr. Lynd discusses the lack of group status for those in the lowest economic class. Our culture is dominated by the economic motive. If we are to overcome discrimination and prejudice, we shall need social as well as economic planning.

Mr. Gifford discusses the social cost of our inequitable distribution of wealth. To approach our problems intelligently we must face realistically the fact that some of the factors are not unchangeable while others can be modified by education.

Mr. Starr gives an objective picture of prejudice and discrimination as they exist in labor unions, and the effort that is being made to overcome them. He emphasizes the necessity of buttressing ideals with economic facts if we hope to develop better relationships among groups.

Bishop Tucker points out the temptation confronting minority groups to promote their own interest to the exclusion of the common good. When they yield to this temptation, they make admission of their group to full participation in community life more difficult. He sees religion as possessing a principle of unity which should enable diverse groups to coöperate in promoting the welfare of society as a whole.

Father La Forge analyzes the rôle of myths in creating prejudice and discrimination against groups. To him religion has the power to dispel these myths.

Mr. Young urges the use of many methods to overcome the tensions which arise between groups. He points out the danger of confusing goals and programs.

All too often well-meaning reformers have enunciated high goals, but have failed to offer concrete programs by means of which these goals could be achieved.

In the final chapter the editor again emphasizes the importance of overcoming group tension if American democracy is to endure.

This reviewer was impressed by the differences of emphasis and of approach to the subject of group conflicts. Despite these differences, there is an agreement on the threat which group discrimination makes to our well-being as a nation. As one reads, one becomes increasingly aware of the fact that here is an area of our life as a people which demands attention.

This book should make a contribution to the reader's understanding of the basic causes underlying prejudice and discrimination. It should also provide a rich source of suggestions as to practical ways by which individuals and groups can aid in the solution of the problem created by discrimination. The value of the book is enhanced by the carefully reasoned, well-documented presentation of the contributors.

While it cannot be said that this volume is easy reading, it is an intelligent analysis of one of the major problems confronting us, and it does contain a carefully reasoned approach to the solution of that problem. It is the type of book that should prove enlightening and stimulating to the thoughtful Christian leader.

JOHN W. THOMAS

Pirkē Aboth, edited with introduction, translation, and commentary, by R. Travers Herford, 3rd rev. ed., New York, Jewish Institute of Religion, 1945, pp. vii, 176, no price.

The *Pirkē Aboth*, literally "chapters of the fathers," has long been one of the most cherished possessions of Judaism. It is the ninth tractate or treatise in the fourth order (division) of the Mishnah, and was, of course, included in the Talmuds, although, unlike most of the tractates, without the customary gemara, for its nature did not lend itself to such discussion and interpretation by the later scholars. It is also a part of the Jewish Prayer Book, and has exerted through the centuries an influence on Judaism and individual Jews far out of proportion to its modest size. In form it is a collection of maxims on conduct and sententious utterances on the profound value of a knowledge and study of Torah, from some sixty of the teachers of ancient Israel. It has been published many times, often with commentaries, and continues to speak to the heart of the Jew in a way that is definitely unique and unrivaled.

The present edition is a revision of the one which Dr. Herford, one of the comparatively few Christian scholars who really knows the rabbinical literature of which this is a lovely part, published several years ago. It consists of a new introduction, the Hebrew text, translation, and commentary. He prints the text and translation in convenient short sections, each followed by commentary and discussion. One of the admirable elements is the full identification of the several fathers, whose maxims are preserved. This is indispensable for the understanding of any rabbinic writing. While the Hebrew text and occasional critical notes (the latter conveniently set in smaller type) will prove of greater value to the professional student, they are rarely technical, and the volume is intended for general reading; thus the reader who knows no Hebrew and nothing about the rabbinical literature will find it entirely intelligible and an extraordinarily convenient introduction to the

larger field. In his new introduction Dr. Herford has urged that this collection of sayings was placed in its present position as a sort of epilogue to the whole Mishnah, which, he contends, originally ended with the order, *Nezikin*. Thus he believes that R. Judah, the editor of the larger work, by placing this compendium at this point, intended to illustrate the fact that the Mishnah was the outcome of the labors of many teachers, some learned, some obscure. Whether this explanation will commend itself to rabbinic scholars is perhaps uncertain. Dr. Herford's argument is of interest and shows distinct insight into the nature of what he aptly calls "a studied disorder." It is to be regretted that a more rigidly uniform method of dividing into verses cannot be adopted by editors. While Dr. Herford divides the little tractate into the traditional six chapters, he follows his own inclination in the division of the several chapters into verses. And this division and enumeration is at times quite different from that adopted by other editors, as Danby in the Oxford edition of the Mishnah, and Israelstam in the Soncino edition of the Talmud. This involves needless confusion in reference and citation. It may be freely conceded that here, as in the Bible, the earlier division into verses is often far from ideal; nothing save confusion is gained, however, by each individual editor changing the enumeration.

The present volume should prove very useful, not only to Jews for whom it is primarily produced, but for Christians. Actually, one of its principal values lies in the fact that it is written by a Christian scholar for Jews. It is alike free from the element of unfavorable comparison (*Judaism vs. Christianity*) and from almost inevitable, if unintended, apologetic. Dr. Herford knows Judaism and loves it; he is not intending to convert Jews to Christianity or Christians to Judaism. In the truest sense his interpretation is characterized by sympathetic appreciation for what is said; it is not a critical appraisal of what is, but should not be, nor of what is not, but should be.

One of the most profitable things a minister could do would be to purchase this little volume and study it; then he might well proceed to the altogether admirable translation of the whole Mishnah by Herbert Danby (Oxford, 1933). It would be surprising if he did not find in this excursion many fruitful ideas for sermons (thus even the most businesslike preacher would probably feel his time was not wasted); it would also be surprising if he did not find that he had come to have a fresh and deeper appreciation of the noble religion which has continued through the centuries, and which, despite its tough-bitted insistence on its own supremacy and its abiding confidence that God had revealed from the very beginning his complete and entire, if unfolding, will, has yet shown an amazing ability to adopt and adapt values wherever found, again and again turning what might easily have been a devastating flood into a bath of regeneration.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOK NOTICES

Event in Eternity, by Paul Scherer, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. x, 234, \$2.

This volume consists of six lectures, the themes for which were suggested by those sixteen chapters of Isaiah known as Second Isaiah. Dr. Scherer had the competent help of his colleague upon the faculty of Union Theological Seminary, Dr. Julius A. Bewer, in the editing and arranging of the biblical text. While these chapters from Isaiah are generously quoted in the text, this volume is not a commentary upon them. The author is more concerned with pointing to the values for our own times which lie in this material than he is with exegesis. Admittedly, he has relied heavily upon the commentaries of George Adam Smith and J. Skinner. The book has some sermonizing, some literary appreciation, and a touch of theology and of philosophy of religion. In Second Isaiah Dr. Scherer has found much to support his emphasis upon the glory and majesty of a God who lies beyond man, the theme of his first chapter. Another chapter deals with God in history. The servant songs are dealt with in a chapter entitled, "The God Who Would be Man." "The Eternal Purpose" and "The Divine Vocation" are the subjects of other sections. After reading this book, one is reassured of the value of an ancient book, such as the Second Isaiah, for the modern preacher. Dr. Scherer has found in this ancient material emphases which he has long cherished as strong convictions. These almost hidden insights he has picked out and applied with considerable effectiveness to modern situations. The result is a book, the reading of which has been a rewarding experience for one who is not in the parish ministry; perhaps, it would prove useful to the preacher. The author speaks of the value to himself of his study of the Second Isaiah and confesses: "It took me a quarter of a century to discover him. I knew he was there; but I had always looked on the place where he lay and passed by on the other side. Until the years were fulfilled, and I drew near, and saw that he was not as I thought—half dead." Other biblical material might well prove to be equally rewarding to one who has the patience to discover it and the imagination to preach it.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Old Testament: Its Form and Purpose, by Lindsay B. Longacre, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 264, \$2.

Within the compass of a small volume, Professor Longacre (recently retired from the chair of Old Testament at Iliff School of Theology, Denver) has given a popular synthesis of the results of modern criticism of the Old Testament. While the debates of critics are not intruded in the text nor quoted in the footnotes, one may detect from carefully chosen phrases an awareness of the problems of Old Testament scholarship. The critical position of the author is cautious and orthodox from the point of view of "higher criticism." A very real contribution is made by this volume in the method followed in approaching the study of the Old Testament. It begins with the emergence of "the Bible idea" with the writing and the general acceptance of the book of Deuteronomy. From this beginning the author proceeds to describe a "second Bible," that prepared by the priestly writers. Once the reader has a firm footing in the Priestly Document, he is led to go back to examine the early traditions preserved in both Bibles. Succeeding chapters deal with the prophets, the wise men, the temple hymnal, and the latest writings. Two concluding chapters are concerned with the problems of interpretation and of the

relevance of the Old Testament to modern life. This fresh approach to the highly technical analysis of the books of the Old Testament is a distinct contribution to methods of biblical instruction in schools and churches. The story of the formation of the Old Testament is told with simplicity and candor. The author deals kindly, but firmly, with readers who hold to the more traditional views with regard to the Bible. This book should find a place of wide usefulness as a popular and nontechnical introduction to the study of the meaning of the Old Testament.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Psychology of Religion, by Paul E. Johnson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 288, \$2.

During the first quarter of the present century many invaluable contributions to the psychological interpretation of religious experience were made, mostly in this country, by James, Hall, Starbuck, Leuba, Coe, Ames, Pratt, and others. While during the past twenty years no contributions of comparable importance have appeared, nevertheless much has been accomplished in the application of the already established principles of the psychology of religion to the practical problems of pastors and other religious workers. Moreover, the startling interpretations of Freud and his pupils have been carefully assessed, and it is beginning to be clear what in them is true and important, and what is either false or irrelevant from the standpoint of religious workers. This book should not be regarded as in any sense a substitute for the earlier and more profound authorities, but it will prove valuable as a supplement to them, and as a report upon the contributions of recent years. It will serve as a convenient and up-to-date manual of reference to the more important literature of the subject. The author is accurate, although occasionally superficial, in his accounts of the numerous investigations which he quotes and cites. His own comments are as a rule well balanced and judicious.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

Thy Health Shall Spring Forth, by Russell Dicks, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. vii, 61, \$1.25.

When Dr. Dicks advises and suggests, most earnest-minded pastors heed. He has long shown realistic and intelligent appreciation of religion's personal ministry. The approach to the sick, the sorrowing, and the disturbed in general, is one which few men of the cloth take lightly. All of us are forever eager to improve ourselves in the fine art of sincere and effective Christian graciousness. Hence many who have held themselves debtor to Dr. Dicks for direction and emphasis in this significant ever-recurring ministry in times of crisis, gladly thank him again for this helpful volume. It has two very definite values, to which a minister may well turn with appreciation again and again: first, an understanding interpretation of the mind of the distressed and troubled people we would serve, and second, a superb set of examples of meditations, prayers, and poems, the like of which may give sincerity a proper intimacy with intelligence in our ministry to those in special need. The book is, of course, doubly worthy in that it inspires and instructs without resort to argument or insistence upon superior wisdom.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

Three Plays: The Hostage, Crusts, The Humiliation of the Father, by Paul Claudel, translated by John Heard, Boston, Luce, ©1945, pp. 223, \$5.

By some competent critics Paul Claudel is judged to be the greatest living French poet. As a young man he read the poetry of Rimbaud, one result of which

was a compelling mystic experience. At the age of eighteen he was converted to Catholicism by hearing the *Magnificat* sung at a Christmas Mass. These are the two chief contributions to his writings and the two chief elements of his works. These three plays cover the period of France from the French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian War, and are the story of three generations of the same family. While this period in history provides the setting of the plays, it does not limit their meaning. Indeed, the same plays might have been set in almost any other time, providing it allowed naturally for the changes in family and individual outlook that grow out of the struggle to maintain inherited tradition while reaching out for a new spirit of development. The plots are somewhat conventional, at times even banal, but this is not the primary concern of Claudel. He is driven by a desire to make Catholicism the mother of man's richest life. Not that he argues this point; mysticism either assumes or ignores dogma. Rather he writes dramas of character and ideas, discussing at length the subtle shades of experience, and keeps always to the purpose of making real the strength that is in the gentle, but inexorable, power of spiritual truth. Thus, the apparent victory of the expedient and the temporal is seen to be a hollow conquest; God, the church, and truth are ultimately supreme and invincible. Each play promotes one great truth, a truth revealed not by the light of reason, but by the incomprehensible response of one's being. If this truth becomes identified with Catholicism, it is because Claudel both believes and feels it to be so.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Golden Words of Moses, by Maynard D. Follin, Boston, Bruce Humphries, ©1945, pp. 668, \$2.

The author begins this long commentary upon the book of Genesis by stating certain presuppositions: The usual approach of the commentators is fruitless; the book is verbally inspired by God; it contains hidden prophecies of the future course of events; and the key which will unlock these highly important secrets is a knowledge of symbolism. The claim is that, when the usual meaning of a word renders the passage confusing, the symbolic meaning will often make the passage quite clear. Despite the warning of the author in the first paragraph of the foreword, that "one who considers this too strong food would do well to stop right here," this reader went far enough to glean from the text the following symbolic meanings of words: "Heaven" is the spiritual man; "earth" is the natural man; "water" is human knowledge; "face" is intelligence; "grass," "herbs," and "trees" are terms for men in varying degrees of spiritual development; the "moon" is the Bible; "Babylon" rarely stands for the ancient geographic city, but for the confused teachings of the institutional churches; "bread" stands for doctrine; "wheat" for pure doctrine; "cattle" indicates a group of greater spiritual development than "beasts"; "fish" means men of knowledge; "garment" is a symbol of character ("hence the lack of raiment in the beginning for Adam and Eve"); "gold" is truth from God; "silver" is truth which man has evolved; "slay" may mean to convert or to teach thoroughly; "sun" is the figure of the Messianic Christ; "wine" is wisdom. When one has at his disposal this lexicographical information, he may find many hitherto unnoticed ideas in the book of Genesis—in fact, when words are given arbitrarily an entirely new set of meanings, one may find unnoticed ideas anywhere. The book abounds in absurd interpretations read into clear statements of the book of Genesis. Its sole claim to a place of value is that it is a compendium of curiosities.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Over the Sea, the Sky, by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. viii, 70, \$1.50.

This is a volume of forty-eight interesting poems, mostly religious. They are appealing because of their originality of content, imagery, and treatment, and because of their lack of the usual hackneyed expressions which characterize much religious verse. Many of them deal with current themes and reveal that the author is keenly aware of the religious implications of much in contemporary secularism. In fact, the range in theme is very wide, running from translations from the Chinese to a noon organ concert in the Wanamaker Store, Philadelphia, and the atomic bomb at Hiroshima. The poems reflect a broad social passion, a strong personal faith, and a deep insight into the ways of man and God.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

World Economic Survey, 1942-44, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 299, \$3.

This volume is an excellent study of the world economic situation as it appeared on the eve of victory for the United Nations. It covers the situation as it existed in particular countries in relation to production, consumption and rationing, finance and banking, price movements and control, international trade, and the transport situation. The study is made more useful by visual presentation of materials through graphs, tables, and diagrams. This is a book which should prove valuable to the student of economics. It will be of little interest to the parish minister.

JOHN W. THOMAS

BOOKS RECEIVED

**The Nature and Purpose of the Gospels*, by R. V. G. Tasker, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. x, 137, \$1.50.

Seed for Sermons, by Jerome O. Williams, Nashville, Broadman, ©1945, pp. ix, 135, \$1.25.

This volume contains fifty-two brief outlines for sermons. It is suggested that they are intended to indicate "the logical unfolding of the texts for presenting scriptural and spiritual messages."

**Justice and the Social Order*, by Emil Brunner, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. vii, 304, \$3.

**Guilt and Redemption*, by Lewis Joseph Sherrill, Richmond, John Knox, 1945, pp. 254, \$2.50.

**The Incarnation of the Word of God by St. Athanasius*, translated by A Religious of C.S.M.V. S.Th., New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 96, \$1.50.

**The New Modernism*, by Cornelius Van Til, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946, pp. xx, 384, \$3.75.

300 Favorite Poems, compiled by Thomas Curtis Clark, Willett Clark, 1945, pp. 124, \$1.

An interesting collection of readable poems. Some honest Philistines will probably find the concluding section, "Sense, Near-Sense and Nonsense," the most attractive part and worth the modest price of the whole volume.

**In Him Is Life*, by Robert H. Beaven, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 188, \$1.50.

**The Faith of a Protestant*, by W. Burnet Easton, Jr., New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xi, 76, \$1.50.

**The Way, the Truth and the Life*, by Glenn Clark, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. vi, 179, \$1.50.

**Light from the Ancient Past*, by Jack Finnegan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946, pp. xxxiv, 500, \$5.

* To be reviewed.